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This dissertation concerns the reception of the poet Kalidasa (c. 4th century), one of the 
central figures in the Sanskrit literary tradition. Since the time he lived and wrote, Kalidasa’s works 
have provoked many responses of different kinds. I shall examine how three writers contributed 
to this vast tradition of reception: Kuntaka, a tenth-century rhetorician from Kashmir; 
Vedantadesika, a South Indian theologian who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; and 
Sri Aurobindo, an Indian English writer of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who 
started out as an anticolonial activist and later devoted his life to spiritual exercises. While these 
readers lived well after Kalidasa, they were all deeply invested in his poetry. I wish to understand 
why Kalidasa’s poetry continued to provoke extended responses in writing long after its 
composition. It is true that readers often use past literary texts to various ends of their own devising, 
just as they often fall victim to reading texts anachronistically. In contradistinction to such cases, 
the examples of reading I examine highlight the role that texts themselves, not just their charisma 
or the mental habits of their readers, can have in constituting the reading process. They therefore 
urge us to formulate a more robust understanding of textual reception, and to reconsider the 




Table of Contents 
 
List of Transliterations         ii 
List of Abbreviations          iii 




Introduction           1 
1. Dramatis Personae          2 
2. Kalidasa’s Reception: An Overview       10 




Kuntaka’s Kalidasa: Poet of the Court       24 
1. The Pleasure of Kalidasa: Kuntaka’s Account of the Delicate Style   25 
2. Learning from Kalidasa: Kuntaka on the Educative Function of Poetry   43 
3. Kalidasa and the Pedagogy of Pleasure       65 




Vedantadesika’s Kalidasa: Poet of Daydreams      71 
1. The Presence of Kalidasa in Vedantadesika’s Writing     73 
2. On Devotional Meditation: Vivid Remembering in Ramanuja and Vedantadesika 87 
3. On Daydreaming: Vivid Remembering in Kalidasa     95 
4. Daydreaming as Meditation: Imaginative Exercises in the Messenger Poems  103 




Aurobindo’s Kalidasa: Poet of the Earth       121 
1. “The Seasons” and Kalidasa’s Poetry of the Senses     122 
2. Sensuousness and the History of Art       127 
3. Beyond Sensuousness: Two Ascetic Ideals      139 
4. The Poet-King: Aurobindo’s Character Sketch of Pururavas    144 




Conclusion: Sanskrit Literature and the Present      165 
1. The Trouble with Presentist Reading       166 
2. Poetry’s Afterthought: A Practice of Literary Criticism     172 
 
Bibliography           194	  
	 ii 
 
List of Transliterations 
 
I have used diacritical marks in the titles of all works composed in Indian languages. The names 
of authors and characters, as well as certain words, are not always given in diacritics: sometimes I 
have used diacritics only in a name’s first appearance, and sometimes not at all. Here is a list of 
some names and words that appear in the main text, together with their diacritical variants: 
 
Alvar   Āḻvār 
Andal   Āṇṭāḷ 
apsara   apsaras 
Anandavardhana Ānandavardhana 
Anasuya  Anasūyā 
Arunagirinatha Aruṇagirinātha 
Aushinari  Auśinarī 
Asvaghosha  Aśvaghoṣa 
Bana   Bāṇa 
Bhamaha  Bhāmaha 
Dandin  Daṇḍin 
Dasharatha  Daśaratha 
Dharini  Dhāriṇī 
Dilipa   Dilīpa 
Durvasa  Durvāsas 
Dushyanta  Duṣyanta 
Galava   Gālava 
Ganadasa  Gaṇadāsa 
Goda   Godā 
Godavari  Godāvarī 
Hamsapadika  Haṃsapadikā 
Hanuman  Hanumat 
Harsha   Harṣa 
Kaikeyi  Kaikeyī 
Kalidasa  Kālidāsa 
Kama   Kāma 
Kamandaki  Kāmandakī 
Kanva   Kaṇva 
Kartikeya  Kārttikeya 
Keshava  Ḱeśava 
Krishna  Kṛṣṇa 
Lakshmi  Lakṣṃī 
Lavangika  Lavaṅgikā 
Madhavya  Mādhavya 
Malati   Mālatī 
Mallinatha  Mallinātha 
Manavaka  Māṇavaka 
Mandanamishra Maṇḍanamiśra 
Manipravala  Maṇipravāḷa 
Maricha  Mārīca 
Mena   Menā 
Nanda   Nanda 
Nandi   Nandin 
Nandini  Nandinī 
Narayana  Nārāyaṇa 
Nipunika  Nipuṇikā 
Nishadha  Niṣādha 
Parvati   Pārvatī 
Pelava   Pelava 
Priyamvada  Priyaṃvadā 
Pururavas  Purūravas 
Purushottama  Puruṣottama 
Pushpaka  Puṣpaka 
Rama   Rāma 
Ramanuja  Rāmānuja 
Ravana  Rāvaṇa 
Samskara  Saṃskāra 
Sanumati  Sānumatī 
Shakuntala  Śakuntalā 
Shankara  Śaṅkara 
Shiva   Śiva 
Sita   Sītā 
Srivaishnava  Śrīvaiṣṇava 
Taraka   Tāraka 
Uma   Umā 
Urvashi  Ūrvaśī 
Valmiki  Vālmīki 
Vasishta  Vasiṣṭha 
Varuni   Vāruṇī 
Visvakarma  Viśvakarman 
Vedantadesika  Vedāntadeśika 
Vishnu   Viṣṇu 
Vyasa   Vyāsa 
yaksha   yakṣa 
yakshini  yakṣiṇī 
Yashoda  Yaśodā 
	 iii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
I have used abbreviations only when the section number and verse number are sufficient for 
locating the passage I am referencing. For example, the opening verse of Kalidasa’s Raghuvaṃśa 
would be given as R 1.1. In all other cases, I have provided in a footnote the full title of the work, 
the page number of the passage I am referencing, and (if applicable) the section and verse numbers 
for the text being commented on in the passage. For example, the citation for Kuntaka’s remarks 
on the educative function of poetry would be given as follows:  
 
1Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, ed. K. Krishnamoorthy (Dharwad: Karnatak University, 




A  Abhijñānaśākuntala 
H Haṃsasandeśa 
HC Harṣacarita 
K  Kumārasaṃbhava 
KĀ Kāvyādarśa 
MA Mālavikāgnimitra 






VJ  Vakroktijīvita 






I couldn’t have asked for a better guide over the past seven years than my adviser, Sheldon Pollock. 
He never discouraged me from pursuing an idea I came to him with, however premature it was, 
but showed me again and again how to take an idea and follow through on it with determination. 
More than this, he has modeled for me a commitment to thinking about what matters, and to doing 
so as part of a community. Jack Hawley has been a constant source of insights, encouragement, 
and genuine care. In so many conversations with him, his approachability led me to express 
thoughts which, had I remembered I was talking to a scholar of the highest caliber, I might have 
kept to myself; in this, perhaps unsurprisingly, he reminds me of Krishna. Meeting Branka Arsić 
was one of the great surprises of my graduate studies. She opened up to me whole new ways of 
thinking, and taught me that reading well has as much to do with rigor as with courage. Her 
generosity has meant so much to me. I am grateful to Rachel McDermott and Sudipta Kaviraj, who 
graciously agreed to join this committee in my project’s final stages. 
I have been privileged over the years to study works of Sanskrit rhetoric with Dr. K. 
Srinivasan, a scholar as brilliantly erudite as he is committed to teaching. Ever since I came to Erik 
Gray’s office several years ago with questions about British Romanticism, he has been supportive 
of my work and generous with his vast knowledge about poetry. Dr. S. Padmanabhan offered me 
invaluable guidance in thinking about the connections between Kalidasa and Vedantadesika, and 
Dr. S. S. Mukundan tirelessly helped me understand how Vedantadesika thinks about thinking. I 
have the deepest affection and admiration for the students in my section of Literature Humanities, 
who week after week bravely staked their perceptions, values, and judgments in countless close 
readings, and helped me more than they know as I tried to formulate my concluding arguments. 
	 v 
Judith Galas, Don Schawang, and Matt Patterson were the best English teachers anyone could ask 
for, and I continue to learn so much from them. 
My friendships sustained me during my time at Columbia, both the ones I made along the 
way and those that have deepened over the years. I would especially like to express my gratitude 
to Mark Balmforth, Justin Ben-Hain, Alex Elnabli, Yagna Nag Chowdhuri, Amanda Culp, Aditi 
Deshmukh, Meghan Hartman, Mridu Perima, Eric Gurevitch, Sarah Hawas, Nell Hawley, Zoë 
Woodbury High, Manpreet Kaur, Mininder Kaur, Shruti Krishnamoorthy, Aman Kumar, Guy 
Leavitt, Roopa Mahadevan, Padma Maitland, Nabanjan Maitra, Taarini Mookherjee, Andrew 
Ollett, Jay Ramesh, Anusha Rao, Sujata Rajpurohit, Kristina Rogahn, Guy St. Amant, Ramya 
Sampath, Aditi Sriram, Anusha Sriram, Aparaajit Sriram, Sruti Sarathy, Yogi Trivedi, Janet Um, 
Sheila Vatan, Anand Venkatkrishnan, Vidhya Chithi, Barbara Vinck, and Vivek Yadav.  
Hamsa and Arun, my sister and brother-in-law, were unstinting in their love and patience 
as I tried to finish writing. Their daughter Savitri Lalita recently came along; she seems to have a 
remarkable sense of humor, and I am excited to learn it. My parents, Aruna and Bala Subramaniam, 





















for appa and amma 
	 1 
Poetry’s Afterthought: Kalidasa and the Experience of Reading 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation concerns the reception of the poet Kālidāsa (c. 4th century), one of the 
central figures in the Sanskrit literary tradition. Since the time he lived and wrote, Kalidasa’s works 
have provoked a number of responses of many kinds, including commentaries, literary critical 
essays, poems, tributes, apocryphal verses, and biographical legends. I shall examine how three 
writers contributed to this vast tradition of reception: Kuntaka, a tenth-century rhetorician from 
Kashmir; Vedāntadeśika, a South Indian theologian who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries; and Sri Aurobindo, an Indian English writer of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries who started out as an anticolonial activist and later devoted his life to spiritual exercises. 
While these readers lived well after Kalidasa, they were all deeply invested in his poetry. I wish to 
understand why Kalidasa’s poetry continued to provoke extended responses in writing long after 
its composition. It is true that readers often use past literary texts to various ends of their own 
devising, just as they often fall victim to reading texts anachronistically. In contradistinction to 
such cases, the examples of reading I examine highlight the role that texts themselves, not just 
their charisma or the mental habits of their readers, can have in constituting the reading process. 
They therefore urge us to formulate a more robust understanding of textual reception. 
While the central chapters on Kuntaka, Vedantadesika, and Sri Aurobindo are all related 
by the general argument I will make about reading, the relationships among them will be made 
explicit only in the conclusion. In similar fashion, I will begin this chapter by introducing the four 
main figures of the dissertation individually, specifying for each reader the nature of his 
engagement with Kalidasa and the ways that my reconstruction of his reading builds on the work 
of previous scholars (section 1). In order to contextualize my case studies, I will then offer a broad 
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overview of Kalidasa’s reception (section 2).  I will conclude by considering the current state of 
Kalidasa studies, indicating the possibilities for literary scholarship that my dissertation tries to 
make possible in the study of premodern South Asia (section 3). 
 
 
1. Dramatis Personae 
Kalidasa. We know nothing about Kalidasa the man, other than that he likely lived under the 
Guptas between the fourth and fifth centuries. This biographical void, together with the popularity 
of Kalidasa’s poetry, has for centuries invited a great deal of speculation. For instance, in his 
sixteenth-century narrative poem Bhojaprabandha (“The Story of Bhoja”), Ballāla impossibly 
presents Kalidasa as a contemporary of the seventh-century poet Bāṇa and the eighth-century poet 
Bhavabhūti, and has all three writing in the court of the tenth-century king Bhoja.1 In the 
seventeenth century, a group of South Indian Sanskrit intellectuals whom Elaine Fisher has called 
Smārta-Śaivas, and who were concerned with consolidating a religious identity for themselves, 
imagined Kalidasa as a devotional figure who had composed hymns to the goddess.2 The Hindi 
playwright Mohan Rakesh (1925-1972) imagined yet another life for the poet in his play Aṣaṛha 
kā ek din (“A Day in the Month of Rain”), suggesting that if Kalidasa wrote so powerfully on the 
pain of abandonment, it is because he himself abandoned the woman he had loved before becoming 
famous.3 In addition to such written speculations, there is a vast oral tradition of apocryphal verses 
                                                
1 Ballāla, Bhojaprabandha, ed. Parasanatha Dvivedi (Agra: Vinod Pustak Mandir, 1972). 
 
2  Elaine M. Fisher, “‘Just Like Kālidāsa’: The Making of the Smārta-Śaiva Community of South 
India,” in Hindu Pluralism, Religion and the Public Sphere in Early Modern South India 
(University of California Press, 2017), 57–98. 
 
3 For a discussion of Rakesh's engagement with Kalidasa, see Simona Sawhney, “Who Is 
Kalidasa? Sanskrit Poetry in Modern India,” Postcolonial Studies 7, no. 3 (November 1, 2004): 
295–312. 
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attributed to Kalidasa, often accompanied by anecdotes recounting the situations in which he 
composed them. A comprehensive account of Kalidasa’s reception would consider the many 
legends about his life, as well as the works which have been spuriously attributed to him (not only 
solitary verses but also longer works such as Ghaṭakarpara and Nalodaya), as essential evidence 
for reconstructing Kalidasa’s place in the cultural history of South Asia. I do not attempt here to 
offer such an account, however, and will primarily be interested in the reception of a set of texts. 
In what follows, Kalidasa thus refers to the author of the following seven works: the dramas 
Abhijñānaśākuntala (“The Recognition of Śakuntalā”), Vikramorvaśīya (“Ūrvaśī Won by Valor”), 
and Mālavikāgnimitra (“Malavikā and Agnimitra”); the mahākāvyas or “court epics” 
Kumārasaṃbhava (“The Birth of the Prince”) and Raghuvaṃśa (“The Lineage of Raghu”); and 
the extended lyrics Meghadūta (“The Cloud-Messenger”) and Ṛtusaṃhāra (“The Round of 
Seasons”).  
Even specifying Kalidasa as the author of these works—that is, even identifying him by a 
set of texts he produced, not by the associations that have accumulated around his name—isn’t 
without its share of ambiguity. Text-critical studies have documented the several variations which 
abound in extant manuscripts of his poems, at levels ranging from the single syllable to entire 
cantos. For example, the first line of the Meghadūta ends in some versions with svādhikārāt 
pramattaḥ, in others with svādhikārapramattaḥ (both expressions might be translated as 
“negligent of his duty”); likewise, the number of cantos in Kumārasaṃbhava is in some 
manuscripts seven, in some eight, in some seventeen.4 Scholars have even doubted whether the 
                                                
 
4 For a discussion of the genuine extent of the Kumārasaṃbhava, see Gary Alan Tubb, “The 
Kumārasaṃbhava in the Light of Indian Theories of the Mahākāvya” (Harvard University, 
1979), 22–23; for text-critical discussions of Raghuvaṃśa and Abhijñānaśākuntala, see Dominic 
Goodall and Harunaga Isaacson, The Raghupañcikā of Vallabhadeva: Being the Earliest 
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Ṛtusaṃhāra is the genuine work of Kalidasa, a question to which I shall return in chapter 4. The 
readers of Kalidasa studied in this dissertation certainly would not have used the exact same 
versions of his poems. Notwithstanding this variability, Kalidasa’s canonical oeuvre has retained 
enough stability that, as the following chapters make clear, Kuntaka, Vedantadesika, and 
Aurobindo can reasonably be said to have responded in writing to the same Kalidasa. In other 
words, if it were somehow possible to sit them down for a conversation about Kalidasa over coffee, 
each would leave convinced they had all been talking about the same poet. 
 
Reader 1: Kuntaka. As with Kalidasa, we know nothing about Kuntaka’s life, other than that he 
likely lived in Kashmir around the middle of the tenth century.5 The only work of Kuntaka we 
have is the Vakroktijīvita (“The Life of Indirect Expression”), a treatise which belongs to a tradition 
of Sanskrit rhetoric called alaṅkāraśāstra (“the science of rhetorical figures”). Sanskrit 
rhetoricians were concerned with a range of intellectual projects, including enumerating figures of 
speech, formulating guidelines for the proper construction of good poetry, and describing the 
special ways that language and consciousness work in literary experience. While Kuntaka certainly 
belongs to this tradition, quoting from its previous authors and responding to their arguments, 
scholars have nonetheless considered him an outlier, finding it difficult to characterize Kuntaka’s 
thinking in terms of the questions that interested his forebears and even his successors. Lawrence 
McCrea, for instance, has noted that while most rhetoricians writing after Ānandavardhana (9th 
                                                
Commentary on the Raghuvaṃśa of Kālidāsa: Critical Edition with Intrduction and Notes (E. 
Forsten, 2003), xiii-lxiii and Lyne Bansat-Boudon, “Le Texte Accompli Par La Scene: 
Observations Sur Les Versions de Sakuntala,” Journal Asiatique 282 (1994): 280–333. 
 
5 On the date and provenance of Kuntaka, see Krishnamoorthy’s introduction to Kuntaka, 
Vakroktijīvita, ed. K. Krishnamoorthy (Dharwad: Karnatak University, 1977), xiv. 
	 5 
century) in one way or another absorbed his influential idea that rasa, or the kind of emotion 
generated by poetry in an ideal reader, should serve as the primary criterion for judging literary 
works, Kuntaka’s interests seem to lie elsewhere (where exactly is a question open to debate). 
However we understand Kuntaka’s theory of poetry, it is at least clear that his approach to writing 
on literature is unique. Early rhetoricians rarely ever cited examples from actual literary works, 
most often composing their own verses to illustrate the principles and definitions of rhetorical 
figures they proposed. And while later rhetoricians started to engage more directly with the 
Sanskrit literary canon (mainly by the influence of Anandavardhana), Kuntaka’s comments on 
literary works are uniquely characterized by a density of observation and style of attention that 
make him seem more of a “practical literary critic,” as K. Krishnamoorthy puts it, than a literary 
theorist.6 Since Kalidasa is among the poets he most often discusses, the Vakroktijīvita provides 
ample material for studying Kuntaka’s engagement with him. 
While scholarly interest in Kuntaka has grown in the past decade or so, Krishnamoorthy 
remains the only scholar who has specifically focused on Kuntaka’s reading of Kalidasa. In an 
appendix to his book on Kalidasa, he indicates many of the crucial features of that reading, such 
as Kuntaka’s characterization of Kalidasa’s style as “delicate” (sukumāra), his interest in analyzing 
some of his works in their entirety (as opposed to examining only solitary verses), and his attention 
to the ethical content of his poems.7 I shall build on Krishnamoorthy’s analysis in chapter 2, 
developing these points in greater detail while also relating Kuntaka’s comments on Kalidasa to 
his theory of poetry more explicitly. My chapter also contributes to the larger body of scholarship 
                                                
6 Kuntaka, xxxv. 
 




on Kuntaka, primarily in two ways. The first concerns his concepts of svabhāvokti (“naturalistic 
description”) and pratibhā (“poetic power” or “imagination”), which David Shulman has 
suggested are central to Kuntaka’s thought.8 I will develop that suggestion in my explanation of 
what Kuntaka means when he asserts that Kalidasa’s poetry puts “emphasis on the nature of 
things” (bhāvasvabhāvaprādhānya), while slightly differing from Shulman in my interpretation of 
these concepts. The second concerns Kuntaka’s broader theory of poetry, in which McCrea claims 
to find no coherent system: “If Kuntaka’s analysis of vakrokti [‘indirect expression’] can be 
described as a ‘theory’ of poetics at all, it is one so flexible and so open ended as to be virtually 
devoid of substantive content.”9 Yet, in the course of studying his reading of Kalidasa, I have 
found that Kuntaka’s theory of poetry is not only systematic but also compelling. The difficulties 
in grasping that system appear to lie in the fact that, whereas the approach to poetry inaugurated 
by Anandavardhana focuses on the reader’s experience, the questions that motivate Kuntaka’s 
theory most often concern the psychology of the poet. To elaborate this shift in theoretical 
emphasis is beyond the scope of my dissertation, which does not primarily focus on Kuntaka; 
nonetheless, something of that reorientation comes through in Kuntaka’s discussion of Kalidasa. 
 
Reader 2: Vedantadesika. Veṅkaṭanātha (traditional dates 1268-1369), or Vedantadesika 
(“Teacher of Vedanta”) as he is most commonly known, was a major theologian of 
Srivaishnavism, a South Indian religious tradition whose central deity is Vishnu and whose 
                                                
8 David Shulman, More Than Real: A History of the Imagination in South India (Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 89-98. 
 
9 Lawrence J. McCrea, The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir (Department of Sanskrit 
and Indian Studies, Harvard University, 2008), 360. 
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theology is inspired both by the Sanskrit Vedantic corpus and by the Tamil devotional poetry of 
twelve saints known as the Alvars.10 Vedantadesika produced a vast body of writing in Sanskrit, 
Tamil, Prakrit, and Manipravala (a hybrid of Sanskrit and Tamil), which includes works of 
theology, poetry, and commentary on Srivaishnava scriptures and previous theological writings. 
We can tell that Vedantadesika was an enthusiastic reader of Kalidasa mainly from his poetry: his 
Haṃsasandeśa (“Message of the Goose”) is modeled closely on Kalidasa’s Meghadūta, his 
Yādavābhyudaya (“The Rise of the Yadus”) is modeled loosely on Kalidasa’s Raghuvaṃśa, and 
his poetry is filled throughout with allusions to Kalidasa. While Kalidasa’s poetry features many 
divine characters, his poetry is by no means religious, concerning itself more with the emotions of 
ordinary (laukika) life, such as human love and homesickness, than with religious emotions such 
as self-surrender and cosmic gratitude. By contrast, everything Vedantadesika ever wrote, 
including his poetry inspired by Kalidasa, is religious. This difference raises the question of how 
exactly to understand Vedantadesika’s investment in Kalidasa, which I shall try to answer in 
chapter 3 by reading his poetry alongside Kalidasa’s work, as well as consulting relevant texts 
from his theological writings. 
Most of the scholarship on Vedantadesika’s relation to Kalidasa has focused on the 
Haṃsasandeśa’s relation to the Meghadūta, which is indeed the most significant link between the 
two poets. Yigal Bronner and David Shulman have read the poem as indexical for the vitality and 
new local emphasis of Sanskrit poetry in the second millennium;11 Steven Hopkins has situated 
                                                
10 For a discussion of the biography and hagiographical traditions around Vedantadesika, as well 
as a study of his devotional poetry, see Steven Paul Hopkins, Singing the Body of God: The 
Hymns of Vedantadesika in Their South Indian Tradition (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
11 Yigal Bronner and David Shulman, “‘A Cloud Turned Goose’: Sanskrit in the Vernacular 
Millennium,” The Indian Economic & Social History Review 43, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 1–30. 
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the poem within the major genre of messenger poetry;12 and Ajay Rao has argued that the poem 
should be seen as part of a larger hermeneutic enterprise wherein Srivaishnava theologians read 
religious meanings into the Rāmāyaṇa.13 That Vedantadesika’s poem can be examined from so 
many perspectives speaks to what Shulman and Bronner have called its “depth,” or its 
simultaneous participation in multiple traditions and literary canons.14 In understanding 
specifically why Vedantadesika turns to Kalidasa’s poem for his model, I have found that the most 
illuminating context in which to situate Haṃsasandeśa is his own oeuvre as well as that of 
Kalidasa. In addition to exploring connections between the two writers which have not yet been 
discussed in detail, then, I will propose another comparative reading of Haṃsasandeśa and 
Meghadūta, which highlights the connection between Kalidasa’s obsession with daydreaming and 
Vedantadesika’s understanding of devotional meditation. 
 
Reader 3: Sri Aurobindo. Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), or Sri Aurobindo as he would come to 
fashion himself later in his life, is the author of a vast body of writing that includes poetry, 
philosophy, literary criticism, translations, and essays on culture and politics.15 While he is most 
commonly known today as the guru who founded the Sri Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry 
partway through his life, I wish to pull aside the aura surrounding his name, which has inspired 
                                                
12 Steven Hopkins, The Flight of Love: A Messenger Poem of Medieval South India by 
Venkatanatha (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
 
13 Ajay K. Rao, Re-Figuring the Ramayana as Theology: A History of Reception in Premodern 
India (Routledge, 2014), 19–43. 
 
14 Bronner and Shulman, “‘A Cloud Turned Goose,’” 28. 
 
15 For an account of Sri Aurobindo’s life and work, see Peter Heehs, The Lives of Sri Aurobindo 
(Columbia University Press, 2008). 
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devotion in some and revulsion in others, and regard him primarily as a writer of English, and of 
course as a reader of Kalidasa. Aurobindo spent most of his formative years in England, where he 
studied Latin and Greek at Cambridge, read widely in the literary traditions of Europe, and started 
learning Sanskrit. When he returned to British India in 1893 never to leave again, he deepened his 
knowledge of Sanskrit and its literature and philosophy. It is within a decade of his return that 
most of Aurobindo’s texts on Kalidasa were written, on the eve of his immersion in anticolonial 
politics. Around the time he first took an interest in Kalidasa, then, Aurobindo was rediscovering 
his cultural roots and contemplating what his involvement in Indian politics would look like.  
Passing references to Aurobindo frequently appear in Indian scholarship on Kalidasa from 
the mid to late twentieth century, indicating that at least among Sanskritists in India, he has long 
been regarded as a major interpreter of Kalidasa.16 This is largely thanks to the Ashram’s 
publication department, which in 1954 brought out much of Aurobindo’s unpublished writing on 
Kalidasa in a single volume.17 Despite the availability of this material, scholarship on Aurobindo 
has not yet looked in detail at the precise nature of his engagement with Kalidasa, which I will 
attempt to reconstruct in chapter 4.18 Unlike many other nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
readers, whose investment in Kalidasa focused mainly on Abhijñānaśākuntala and Meghadūta, 
                                                
16 See, for instance, Shrikrishna Sakharam Bhawe, Kalidasa: The National Poet of India (Good 
Companions, 1964), 25–26; Dimbeswar Sarma, An Interpretative Study of Kālidāsa (Sarma, 
1968), 82; Samudrala Nagaiah, Kalidasa (Super Power Press, 1978), 197; K. Krishnamoorthy, 
Kālidāsa (Sahitya Akademi, 1994), 64. 
 
17 For a full publication history of Aurobindo’s writings on Kalidasa, see Sri Aurobindo, 
Kalidasa: Essays and Translations (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Publication 
Department, 2004), 329.  
 
18 The only other attempt I have encountered is Prafulla K. Mishra, “Shri Aurobindo’s Vision on 
Kalidasa,” Journal of the Oriental Institute University of Baroda 43 (1994): 219–24. 
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Aurobindo seems to have been especially fascinated by the play Vikramorvaśīya, writing 
extensively on its themes and characters, translating it into English, and composing a blank-verse 
poem in four cantos inspired by it called Urvasie. Analyzing these materials, I will show how 
Kalidasa’s poetry prompted Aurobindo to explore the nature of, and relationship between, ascetic 
life and revolutionary politics. My chapter on Aurobindo’s reading of Kalidasa adds to a number 
of recent studies which suggest that Aurobindo’s investment in ancient materials is too complex 
to be characterized as merely reactionary or derivative, and which try to deal with that complexity 
by furnishing less obvious but more illuminating intellectual contexts for his writing.19 
 
 
2. Kalidasa’s Reception: An Overview 
Although my dissertation does not offer a comprehensive history of Kalidasa’s reception, 
a brief overview of it will help contextualize my case studies. Kalidasa has been known as the 
master-poet of Sanskrit literature since at least (and likely before) 634 C.E., when his poetic skill 
was acknowledged in an inscription issued by Pulakeśin II at Aihole. While his fame has remained 
essentially undiminished till today, the reasons that people have been drawn to Kalidasa’s poetry 
have fluctuated over time, and might be understood as falling into three historical phases. The first 
corresponds to what Sheldon Pollock has called the cosmopolitan era (around the first millennium 
C.E.), when Sanskrit served as the primary language of literature and power in courts across South 
                                                
19 See for example Andrew Sartori, “The Transfiguration of Duty in Aurobindo’s Essays on the 
Gita,” Modern Intellectual History; Cambridge 7, no. 2 (August 2010): 319–34; Leela Gandhi, 
The Common Cause: Postcolonial Ethics and the Practice of Democracy, 1900-1955 (University 
of Chicago Press, 2014); Tamara Chin, “Anti-Colonial Metrics: Homeric Time in an Indian 
Prison, Ca. 1909,” ELH 81, no. 3 (2014): 1029–53. 
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Asia.20 One major source for understanding Kalidasa’s reception in this period is the Sanskrit 
poetic corpus. Around the time of the seventh-century Aihole inscription but at the court of a rival 
king, the poet Bāṇa praises Kalidasa in the prologue of his Harṣacarita (“The Life of King 
Harsha”): “Who has not delighted in the blossoming utterances of Kalidasa, as in full and honey-
sweet bouquets?”21 This verse, the first of many references to Kalidasa we find in poetry, indicates 
how widely revered he was among poets, at the same time as it anticipates the great influence he 
would never cease to have in the Sanskrit literary tradition. Kalidasa’s canonical status is also 
attested in the work of Sanskrit rhetoricians, many of whom (especially from the ninth century 
onward) considered his work to exemplify the qualities of poetry most worthy of emulation. For 
example, in his ninth-century book Dhvanyāloka (“Light on Suggestion”), Anandavardhana 
writes, “In this world, which has seen a long tradition of all kinds of poets, only two or three like 
Kalidasa, or maybe five or six, can be counted as great.”22 The late tenth-century rhetorician 
Abhinavagupta doesn’t just admire Kalidasa but uses his intuitions about literature to develop his 
own theory of aesthetic experience.23 Yet another source for Kalidasa’s reception, in addition to 
epigraphy, poetry, and rhetoric, is a tradition of direct commentaries on his poems (soon to be 
                                                
20  The logic of this periodization is most extensively laid out in Sheldon Pollock, The Language 
of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006). 
 
21 nirgatāsu na vā kasya kālidāsasya sūktiṣu | 
prītir madhurasāndrāsu mañjarīṣviva jāyate || HC 1.16 ||  
 
22 asminn ativicitrakaviparamparāvāhini saṃsāre kālidāsaprabhṛtayo dvitrāḥ pañcaṣā vā 
mahākavayaḥ iti gaṇyante | (Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, Dhvanyālokalocana: Kerala 
Commentaries, vol. 1 (Kochi, Kerala: Centre for Heritage Studies, 2011), 300, commentary on 
1.6.) 
 
23  See Sheldon Pollock, A Rasa Reader: Classical Indian Aesthetics (Columbia University 
Press, 2016), 195.  
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described in some detail) which indicate that for many of Kalidasa’s earlier readers, his poems 
served a range of pedagogical functions as well. 
Kalidasa continued to be a major influence in poetry of the vernacular era, when Sanskrit 
and the cosmopolitan order for which it served as lingua franca started ceding ground to local 
languages and forms of governance. This era appears to mark a second phase in Kalidasa’s 
reception, the crucial features of which Yigal Bronner has usefully summed up in the following 
comment on Meghadūta (“The Cloud-Messenger”):  
Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries there seems to have been a sudden 
surge of engagement with Kālidāsa’s [Meghadūta] throughout South Asia in a 
variety of languages and in regions as remote from one another as Gujarat in the 
northeast and Sri Lanka in the far south. This textual engagement, although by no 
means uniform, seems to be part of regional efforts to envision and create local 
maps—political, cultural, linguistic, religious, and sectarian—and thus is often 
done in conversation not just with the classical Kālidāsan template but also with 
local traditions and texts.24 
 
The Meghadūta certainly wasn’t unpopular before; however, the enthusiasm it generated in the 
vernacular millennium was so remarkable as to inspire an entire genre of poetry, which for Bronner 
is “perhaps the richest and most vital of South Asia’s premodern literary genres.”25 While the 
messenger poems mentioned by Bronner retain the form of Kalidasa’s poem, their concerns are 
markedly different: not only are many of them written in languages other than Sanskrit, but they 
also record new local geographies, landscapes, and styles of thinking.26 This trend of localization 
                                                
24Yigal Bronner, “Birds of a Feather: Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa’s Haṃsasandeśa and Its Intertexts,” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 133, no. 3 (2013): 522. 
 
25 Ibid., 496.  
 
26 See also Steven Paul Hopkins, “Lovers, Messengers, and Beloved Landscapes: 
‘Sandeśakāvya’ in Comparative Perspective,” International Journal of Hindu Studies 8, no. 1/3 
(2004): 29–55 and Erin Epperson, “Kālidāsa in Tibet: Messenger Poetry in Translation” (The 
University of Chicago, 2017). 
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suggests that in the vernacular era, Kalidasa’s poetry was activated by (that is, read as pertaining 
to) a wider range of contexts than before, not just Sanskrit cosmopolitan courts but regional 
cultures, vernacular literatures, and religious traditions. 
The commentaries I just mentioned, the earliest of which were written by Vallabhadeva in 
the tenth-century, document another significant strain in the reception of Kalidasa, both in the 
cosmopolitan and vernacular eras.27 While varying widely in aim and level of detail, these 
commentaries typically offer helpful clarifications for each individual verse of the poem, 
somewhat resembling lecture notes for a close and continuous reading of Kalidasa’s poems. To 
Ingalls, the format of the commentaries suggests that “these poems were taught by school teachers 
verse by verse, explaining the formation of each word, furnishing the appropriate rule for each 
construction, and defining each figure of speech.”28 In his discussion of Prakāśikā (“Lamp”), 
Aruṇagirinātha’s fourteenth-century commentary on the Kumārasaṃbhava, Pollock has argued 
that Kalidasa’s poem would not only have offered instruction in the finer points of Sanskrit (the 
relative ease of Kalidasa’s language making it an ideal entry-point for such instruction) but would 
have served other needs as well. Arunagirinatha ends his work by specifying three kinds of readers 
for whom it is intended: “those who have pedagogical needs (who ‘have difficulty understanding 
the meaning of the sentences’); those who have aesthetic needs (who ‘are addicted to bathing in 
the deep water of aesthetic emotion [rasa]’); and those who have religious needs (who are 
                                                
27 For a discussion of Vallabhadeva and his commentaries, see Goodall and Isaacson, The 
Raghupañcikā of Vallabhadeva, xv-xxi. 
 
28Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “Kalidasa and the Attitudes of the Golden Age,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society; New Haven, Etc. 96, no. 1 (January 1, 1976): 19. 
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‘devotees of Śiva and the goddess’).”29 And in his analysis of Arunagirinatha’s comments on the 
first canto, Pollock makes the following inference: 
The traditional reader could…be said to have made sense of the first chapter of 
Kumārasaṃbhava when he understood the paradigms—in grammar, rhetoric, the 
moral sciences, logic, erotics, law, and the like—the poet was striving at once to 
suggest and thereby to reaffirm, all in service of the reader’s Bildung.30  
 
Pollock’s study suggests that for many readers of Kalidasa who lived in the millennium after he 
wrote, his poems weren’t consumed for enjoyment alone but also for the social and even religious 
values they were seen as reflecting and reinforcing. As of now, however, this suggestion is just a 
promising starting-point for understanding a vast archive that awaits systematic analysis. 
In 1789, William Jones translated Abhijñānaśākuntala into English for the first time under 
the title Sacontalà; or, The Fatal Ring, and two years later, Georg Forster translated Jones’ version 
into German. These translations inaugurated a third phase in Kalidasa’s reception, an era when his 
poetry came to be almost indissociable from the question of India and indeed was often understood 
as the expression of India’s essence. For German readers including Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-
1803) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), Abhijñānaśākuntala expressed an earlier, primitive 
world where Europe’s civilizational childhood was imagined to have transpired.31 The famous 
British Indologist Sir Monier-Williams (1819-1899) seems to have believed that 
Abhijñānaśākuntala still captured the essential culture of India in the mid-nineteenth century, 
                                                
29 Sheldon Pollock, “What Was Philology in Sanskrit?,” in World Philology, ed. Benjamin A. 
Elman, Ku-ming Kevin Chang, and Sheldon Pollock (Harvard University Press, 2015), 125. 
 
30 Ibid., 127. 
 
31 In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I will discuss the German reception of Kalidasa in some detail. 
See also Chapter 2 of Amanda Culp, “Searching for Shakuntala: Sanskrit Drama and Theatrical 
Modernity in Europe and India, 1789-Present” (Columbia University, 2018). 
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describing it in the preface to his own translation of the play as “the most popular of Indian dramas, 
in which the customs of the Hindus, their opinions, prejudices and fables; their religious rites, daily 
occupations and amusements, are reflected as in a mirror.”32 Such a cultural-essentialist approach 
to Kalidasa, and to Sanskrit literature more generally, was widespread in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, not only among European Indologists but also Indian intellectuals; as Simona 
Sawhney notes, “the very question of what India is…is deeply connected to the status and place 
of Sanskrit texts in the life of the modern nation.”33 In India, this approach thus led to the common 
understanding of Kalidasa as the national poet, a view which at a basic level amounts to seeing his 
poetry as a repository for what is distinctive about India and associating it, as nationalist 
historiographers did, with the idea of an Indian Golden Age under the Guptas.34 Even for Indian 
writers who didn’t see Kalidasa in such unambiguous terms, his poetry was nonetheless tied to the 
question of India, specifically of modern India’s relationship to its own antiquity. Ananya Vajpeyi 
has shown how, while Rabindranath Tagore differed from his nationalist contemporaries in the 
way he related to India and its history, he still turned to Kalidasa to explore that relationship, 
finding in the Meghadūta “an allegory of the modern self’s encounter with the past.”35 Likewise, 
                                                
32 Quoted in Romila Thapar, “Kalidasa in the Ninteenth Century in Europe and in India,” in 
Mapping Histories: Essays Presented to Ravinder Kumar, ed. Neera Chandhoke (Anthem Press, 
2002), 17. Thapar’s essay provides a quick survey of the reception of Abhijñānaśākuntala in this 
period. 
 
33  Simona Sawhney, The Modernity of Sanskrit (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2009), 5. 
 
34 On the concept of the Golden Age in Indian historiography, see Romila Thapar, The Penguin 
History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 (Penguin Books India, 2003), 16–17; 280–
281. 
 
35 Ananya Vajpeyi, Righteous Republic (Harvard University Press, 2012), 112. 
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in her analysis of the aforementioned play Aṣārḥa kā ek din, Sawhney argues that Mohan Rakesh’s 
unflattering and controversial characterization of Kalidasa as somewhat egotistical—for instance, 
when he distorts the nature of his lover Mallika’s suffering by aestheticizing it again and again in 
his poetry (as the suffering of Shakuntala, of the yakshini, of Uma, of Rati)—casts suspicion on 
the reality of the India evoked in Kalidasa’s poetry, as well as the impulse to idealize that India.36 
In focusing on how three figures read Kalidasa, my dissertation contributes to the body of 
scholarship which has allowed me to reconstruct this picture of Kalidasa’s reception. In certain 
ways, Kuntaka, Vedantadesika, and Sri Aurobindo confirm the trends outlined above: in 
Vakroktijīvita, Kuntaka values Kalidasa’s poetry both for the great pleasure it yields and for the 
instruction it offers princes and courtiers; Vedantadesika’s messenger-poem Haṃsasandeśa 
(“Message of the Goose”) typifies the regionalization of Kalidasa in the vernacular millennium, as 
David Shulman and Yigal Bronner have demonstrated;37 and in passages such as the following, 
Aurobindo joins the many readers who regarded Kalidasa as India’s preeminent national poet: 
India, her great mountains and forests and plains and their peoples, her men and 
women and the circumstances of their life, her animals, her cities and villages, her 
hermitages, rivers, gardens and tilled lands are the background of narrative and 
drama and love poem. [Kalidasa] has seen it all and filled his mind with it and never 
fails to bring it before us vivid with all the wealth of description of which he is 
capable.38 
 
But the ways these readers instantiate general tendencies shouldn’t distract us from what is distinct 
about each of them. While Kuntaka is not alone in admiring Kalidasa, the questions and criteria 
that guide his thinking about poetry (and therefore about Kalidasa) distinguish him from nearly all 
                                                
36  Simona Sawhney, “Who Is Kalidasa? Sanskrit Poetry in Modern India,” Postcolonial Studies 
7, no. 3 (November 1, 2004): 295-311. 
 
37 See Bronner and Shulman, “‘A Cloud Turned Goose.’” 
 
38 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 131. 
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other Sanskrit rhetoricians; as much as the Haṃsasandeśa resembles messenger poems of the same 
period that record local geographies, it also connects Kalidasan themes to theological ideas which 
are specific to the Srivaishnava religious tradition; and while in some passages Aurobindo is 
interested in explaining how Kalidasa’s poetry is characteristically Indian, in others he emphasizes 
themes in Kalidasa’s poetry that have much broader implications—for example, the idea of the 
poet-leader. I will be interested, then, not only in how these readers confirm the understanding of 
Kalidasa’s reception afforded by existing scholarship but also in how they add to that 
understanding. 
 
3. Reading Kalidasa in the Present 
Kalidasa is still widely acknowledged as one of the most influential figures in India’s 
literary traditions. Despite that reputation, however, his work draws little critical attention. Here is 
how the state of Kalidasa studies seemed to Sawhney in 2004: 
We have come to a peculiar kind of juncture when Kalidasa’s poetry is fast 
vanishing from our horizon. …While the work of the early Greek dramatists, for 
instance, continues to be widely read in the Humanities, and moreover to inspire 
significant new readings, not only by literary critics but also by philosophers, 
political theorists, psychoanalysts, and anthropologists, Kalidasa’s work seems to 
be virtually unread today outside of a small circle of Sanskritists and dramatists, 
even in India.39 
 
Sawhney’s observations still hold true today. Kalidasa’s poetry is of course still read by students 
of Sanskrit, often taught to them as their first example of kāvya (belletristic poetry), and is regularly 
translated by Sanskritists and poets. However, scholarship on Kalidasa tends to focus more on 
moments in his reception than on how we might ourselves read his poetry. When questions about 
                                                
39 Sawhney, “Who Is Kalidasa?,” 296. 
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his present-day relevance are raised—as they were, for example, in a panel titled “Kalidasa: The 
Eternal Poet” at the 2017 Jaipur Literary Festival—he is typically regarded either as a cultural 
treasure of India or as the composer of eminently graceful or beautiful verses, as “an indulgent 
aesthete, culling blossoms of poetry for his own pleasure.”40 It is certainly true that Kalidasa is an 
important figure in India’s cultural history, and that many have derived immense pleasure from 
reading him. However, the idea that Kalidasa’s poetry could feed thought, not just an appetite for 
beauty or patriotic sentiment, is strangely uncommon, and in the last four decades has been taken 
seriously only in a handful of articles. Some of these have anticipated or echoed Sawhney’s call 
for new approaches to the study of Kalidasa. In an essay written in 1976, for example, Sudipta 
Kaviraj observes that “The Meghadoota…is a richer and more complex art object than is 
commonly supposed.… Critics have usually been rather unimaginative about the Meghadoota.”41 
Kaviraj’s essay is as much about Kalidasa’s poem as it is about the idea of poetry as a form of 
thinking, and thus implicitly of a certain mode of literary criticism (hence its title, “The Theory in 
the Poem: Alienation Themes in Meghadūta”). To his 1988 essay “Kalidasa’s Metadrama: 
Mālavikāgnimitra,” Robert Goodwin adds the subtitle “Redressing critical neglect,” and notes of 
the play that “the numerous monographs on Kalidasa and the histories of Sanskrit literature and 
drama deal with it, of course, but usually on the level of plot description.”42 In 2014, David 
Shulman made a similar diagnosis of Kalidasa criticism in his essay on the Raghuvaṃśa: 
                                                
40 Sawhney, "Who Is Kalidasa?," 296. 
 
41 Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Theory in the Poem: Alienation Themes in Meghadūta",” Journal of the 
School of Languages 4.1 (1976): 29; ibid., 32. 
 
42 Robert E. Goodwin, “Kalidasa’s Metadrama: Mālavikāgnimitra,” Journal of South Asian 
Literature 23, no. 1 (1988): 119. 
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“Simplicity, clarity, a certain sustained ‘sweetness’ or elegance (lalitodgāra) of style and diction—
we are used to characterizing Kālidāsa in such terms, at once undeniable and largely 
meaningless.”43 Part of what I want to do in the following pages is foreground this persisting sense 
that something is lacking in how we write on Kalidasa, and to interrogate that sense: why haven’t 
more “significant,” “imaginative,” or “meaningful” approaches to Kalidasa gained traction?  
The version of the question that animates this dissertation runs as follows: what exactly 
prevents or disinclines us from reading Kalidasa’s poetry how Kuntaka, Vedantadesika, and Sri 
Aurobindo read it—that is, as though we ourselves could still be addressed by it? The bias against 
such reading in South Asian literary studies, which I will examine closely in the concluding 
chapter, seems to involve a suspicion of the idea that a work could mean something beyond its 
context of production without its readers being either naïve or strategic. It is to challenge this 
suspicion—to question whether naïveté is really a necessary precondition for reading a past text 
as though it had implications for one’s current circumstances—that I have chosen to examine very 
closely three particular instances of reading Kalidasa, rather than come up with a more 
comprehensive but general account of his reception. In addition to contributing to the scholarship 
on Kalidasa’s reception, then, each chapter is also a case study in what it is to read.  
Forming a clear picture of reading seems to be a priority in premodern South Asian literary 
studies today, not just for the general reason that reading happens to be the vocation of textualists 
but because of a recent sense in the field that the practice of reading should be made the object of 
explicit reflection. This sense appears, for example, in the idea of “sensitive reading,” a phrase 
which has come to be associated with Shulman’s scholarship and is in fact the title of a forthcoming 
                                                
43 Yigal Bronner, David Dean Shulman, and Gary Alan Tubb, Innovations and Turning Points: 
Toward a History of Kāvya Literature (Oxford University Press, 2014), 35. 
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edited volume in his honor.44 Shulman has characterized his own approach as a practice of 
“listening hard or well” to texts, as opposed to “disemboweling” or “displacing” them.45 It also 
shows itself in Pollock’s recent work outlining a new philology—for instance, in his idea of 
“learning to read in three dimensions,” which he glosses as a “philological practice that orients 
itself simultaneously along three planes of a text’s existence: its moment of genesis; its reception 
over time; and its presence to my own subjectivity.”46 Since the word reading is taken to mean 
many things in these discussions, among them the variety of ways that scholars make arguments 
with and about texts, it would be helpful to disambiguate the senses in which it is used. As an 
ensemble, the thinkers discussed in this dissertation invite us to confront the ambiguities around 
reading, because it isn’t at first clear how each one’s writings constitute a reading of Kalidasa in 
the same sense of the word. However much Kuntaka references Kalidasa in Vakroktijīvita, his 
treatise isn’t about Kalidasa but about poetry; Vedantadesika writes a lot of poetry inspired by 
Kalidasa but says close to nothing about him explicitly; and Aurobindo’s engagement with 
Kalidasa is documented not only in critical essays but also in translations and original poetry. What 
could it mean to characterize these diverse written engagements as readings of Kalidasa? 
Despite their differences, the three readers have one thing in common, which will serve as 
my starting-point: all of them read Kalidasa. In beginning with this simple and obvious fact, I am 
guided by Marielle Macé’s suggestion that we “consider reading as a conduct, a behavior rather 
                                                
44 Yigal Bronner and Charles Hallisey, eds., Sensitive Readings: Essays in Honor of David 
Shulman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Forthcoming). 
 
45 David Dean Shulman, The Wisdom of Poets: Studies in Tamil, Telugu, and Sanskrit (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2; ibid., 137. 
 
46 Sheldon Pollock, “Philology in Three Dimensions,” Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval 
Cultural Studies 5, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 409; 399. 
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than a decoding.”47 Macé helps me distinguish between two senses of the word: (1) reading as an 
interpretation of a text and therefore, in an extended sense, as a genre of writing (for instance, 
when we refer to Tagore’s essay on Abhijñānaśākuntala as his reading of that play), and (2) 
reading as an act (for instance, when we speak of Pururavas’ reading of Urvashi’s love letter, or a 
parent’s reading of a bedtime story to a child). By drawing attention to the more ordinary sense of 
reading, I do not mean to favor one definition of the word over others arbitrarily, or pick the one 
that suits me best; rather, I wish to momentarily loosen the tight grip that its more specialized 
senses have on us, so that we may understand those senses a little more clearly and thus come to 
use the word with greater precision. As an illustration of what I mean, consider two texts that I 
examine in this dissertation: Aurobindo’s character sketch of Pururavas, the king in Kalidasa’s 
Vikramorvaśīya; and Vedantadesika’s poem Haṃsasandeśa, whose structure and content are 
inspired by Kalidasa’s Meghadūta. If the first text more obviously counts as what we would call a 
reading of Kalidasa than the second—that is, if the use of Vedantadesika’s poem in reconstructing 
his reading of Kalidasa seems to demand a special explanation, but the use of Aurobindo’s 
character sketch doesn’t—this is likely because reading has come to be synonymous with the 
modern genre of the critical essay. However, it in fact bears asking of Aurobindo’s essay too how 
it constitutes a reading of Kalidasa; or to put it more concretely, we should ask of both 
Vedantadesika’s poem and Aurobindo’s essay what experience of reading Kalidasa each one 
presupposes, and why each reader was moved to record that experience in the specific written form 
he did. For the form in which an experience of reading is reflected is significant: not all reading 
culminates in explicitly worded commentaries or interpretations—indeed, most instances of 
                                                
47 Marielle Macé, “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being,” trans. Marlon Jones, New Literary 
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reading do not, such as reading a life-changing book, or Vedantadesika’s reading of Kalidasa—
and it strikes me as arbitrary to privilege the ones that do. Accordingly, in the following chapters, 
the various texts I use (essays, poems, treatises, commentaries) are treated not as documents from 
which I could more or less directly read off interpretations of Kalidasa’s poems that are 
paraphrasable as propositions, but as records testifying to different experiences of reading 
Kalidasa, which I shall attempt to describe in detail. 
My interest in the variety of ways that reading provokes extended responses in writing 
ultimately stems from the question that motivates this dissertation: how might we write on 
Kalidasa’s poetry today? It is in fact a relatively small group of people who read texts with the 
intention of writing about them, including religious exegetes, literary reviewers, literary critics, 
philosophers, and academics. What moves certain readers of literature to write about it, or to write 
inspired by it, if not just a cultural or institutional habit? What exactly is the contemporary practice 
of writing on literature known as literary criticism, and what kind of knowledge does it yield? 
These questions, to which I return in the conclusion, are worth asking because there isn’t a 
consensus on how literary criticism should be practiced today. In his introduction to 
Kuntaka’s Vakroktijīvita, Krishnamoorthy characterizes criticism as the “appreciation and 
appraisal” of a work, observing that “Kuntaka always is concerned with the oft-repeated 
question—‘what has the poet tried to express and how [has he] expressed it?’ It is the only possible 
method open for practical criticism.”48 Walter Benjamin, who found inspiration for his approach 
to writing on literature in the concept of criticism developed by the German Romantics, explains 
that concept as follows: “the critique is not meant to do anything other than discover the secret 
                                                
48 Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, xxxvi; ibid., xxxviii. 
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tendencies of the work itself, fulfill its hidden intentions.…For the Romantics, criticism is far less 
the judgment of a work than the method of its consummation.”49 And in the middle of one of his 
critical essays, Stanley Cavell explains his own method by analogizing it to the way he practices 
philosophy: “If philosophy can be thought of as the world of a particular culture brought to 
consciousness of itself, then one mode of criticism (call it philosophical criticism) can be thought 
of as the world of a particular work brought to consciousness of itself.”50 Different as these 
characterizations are, the lack of consensus in how literary criticism should be written isn’t a 
problem to be solved, since as Cavell’s generous phrasing suggests, there are many ways of 
responding to literature in writing. Nonetheless, in forming one’s own way of responding to 
Kalidasa, it is helpful to study what some of these have been; that is what I shall attempt to do in 
the following chapters. 
  
                                                
49 Walter W Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings. Vol. 1 Vol. 1, ed. Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), 153. 
 
50 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 288. 
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Chapter 2: Kuntaka’s Kalidasa 
Poet of the Court 
 
All of Kuntaka’s writing on Kalidasa is contained in his one surviving work titled Vakroktijīvita, 
or “The Essence of Indirect Expression.” Since the aim of this book is not to offer interpretations 
of particular poems but to propose a general theory of poetry, Kuntaka’s comments on Kalidasa 
are intended less to offer interpretations of his poetry than to clarify the various theoretical points 
he is making. Nonetheless, his analyses of literary works are often so detailed that they reveal 
much about how he read them; as Krishnamoorthy observes, “in the whole range of Sanskrit 
poetical theory, we do not have anyone who can be termed a practical literary critic in the modern 
sense of the term except Kuntaka.”51 Moreover, Kuntaka clearly has a special investment in 
Kalidasa, devoting a large passage in the first chapter to characterizing his poetic style and 
commenting throughout the book on many individual moments in Kalidasa’s poetry. It is on the 
basis of such passages that I will reconstruct his reading of Kalidasa. Following the logic of an 
early section of Vakroktijīvita, where pleasure and instruction (camatkāra and upadeśa) are 
specified as the two main purposes of poetry, Kuntaka’s comments on Kalidasa tend to emphasize 
one or the other of these.52 Accordingly, I shall begin the chapter by explaining what exactly 
Kuntaka finds pleasurable about Kalidasa’s poetry (section 1). I will then shift attention to those 
passages where Kuntaka is concerned with the capacity of Kalidasa’s works to instruct members 
                                                
51 Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, xxxv. 
 
52 In VJ 1.5, Kuntaka writes, “A taste of the nectar that is poetry creates pleasure in the mind” 
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lesson in attaining the four-fold benefit <[dharmāder upeyasya] caturvargasya [sādhane] 
saṃpādane tadupadeśarūpatvād upāyas> (Ibid., 3.) 
	 25 
of royal courts how best to conduct themselves (section 2). I will conclude by suggesting how 
these two sets of remarks might be related to each other (section 3).   
Kuntaka develops a rich set of concepts in the Vakroktijīvita, and I would like to comment 
briefly on some of the choices I have made in writing on these. One common approach to 
translating concepts is grounded in a principle of consistency (for example, translating vakratā in 
every instance as “obliquity,” or rasa as “aestheticized emotion”). I have opted against such an 
approach here, mainly because each of Kuntaka’s concepts brings together a range of senses that 
no English word encompasses by itself. A word appearing in its conventional sense in one passage 
of the Vakroktijīvita will appear elsewhere in its etymological sense, and still elsewhere in a sense 
that Kuntaka wishes to confer on it. I have therefore chosen to translate vakratā on different 
occasions as “deviation,” “modification,” “technique,” and “artistry”; pratibhā as “inspiration,” 
“poetic power” and “the poetic faculty”; parispanda as “throbbing out,” “nature,” “essential 
aspect,” and “vibrancy”; alaṃkāra as “figure of speech” and “that which renders sufficient”; 
svabhāvokti as “natural description” and “the telling of a thing’s nature”; rasa as “depicted 
emotion,” “emotion in literature,” “literary emotion,” and “state of mind”; and so on. Such 
fluctuations aren’t symptoms of a lack of rigor but respond to the fluctuations inherent in 
Kuntaka’s use of concepts. More generally, my approach rests on the presumption that we don’t 
really know a concept by defining it—by pinning it down to a single analogue or synonym in 
English—but by observing how it behaves in a range of different environments. 
 
1. The Pleasure of Kalidasa: Kuntaka’s Account of the Delicate Style 
 
An important passage in Kuntaka’s first chapter gives us the closest thing we find in his 
writing to an explicit characterization of Kalidasa’s oeuvre in its entirety. In a series of brief 
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statements (kārikās), Kuntaka offers a description of what he calls sukumāra-mārga—the “delicate 
path” or “delicate style.” The description is meant to apply to the work of any poet composing in 
this style, but Kuntaka clearly has Kalidasa in mind while writing it: not only does he name 
Kalidasa as the style’s foremost exponent, but every example he provides in his subsequent 
commentary on these statements is drawn from Kalidasa’s poetry.53 It is thus possible to read the 
passage as a comment on Kalidasa: 
25  The style which is beautiful due to novel phrases and ideas arising from an unfailing 
inspiration (pratibhā); which includes a few attractive figures of speech, added 
effortlessly; 
 
26 whose emphasis on the nature of things (bhāva-svabhāva) outdoes acquired skill; 
which is beautiful for resonating with the minds of sensitive readers who 
understand the true meaning of depicted emotions (rasa) and their assisting factors; 
 
27 which is delightful, thanks to a beauty whose precise locus is indiscernible; which 
resembles the remarkable handiwork resulting from the skill of Brahma; 
 
28  in which all the brilliance (vaicitrya) we find has arisen from inspiration, and 
appears dripping with the nature of delicateness (saukumārya)— 
 
29 this style is called the delicate style. Great poets travel along it, like bees along 
groves of blooming flowers.54 
 
The difficulties in grasping the precise sense of this passage involve Kuntaka’s use of complex 
concepts which are central to his theory of poetry, including pratibhā, svabhāva, vaicitrya, and 
saukumārya. In the interpretation that follows, I will therefore be consulting the sections of his 
                                                
53 “It is the path by which true poets travel, starting with Kalidasa.”  <yena mārgeṇa satkavayaḥ 
kālidāsaprabhṛtayo gatāḥ|> (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 43, commentary on 1.29.) 
 
54 amlānapratibhodbhinnanavaśabdārthasundaraḥ | ayatnavihitasvalpamanohārivibhūṣaṇaḥ ||  
bhāvasvabhāvaprādhānyanyakkṛtāhāryakauśalaḥ | rasādiparamārthajñamanaḥsaṃvādasundaraḥ ||  
avibhāvitasaṃsthānarāmaṇīyakarañjakaḥ | vidhivaidagdhyaniṣpannanirmāṇātiśayopamaḥ ||  
yat kiṃcanāpi vaicitryaṃ tatsarvaṃ pratibhodbhavam | saukumāryaparispandasyandi yatra 
virājate || 
sukumārābhidhaḥ so’yaṃ yena satkavayo gatāḥ | mārgeṇotphullakusumakānaneneva ṣaṭpadāḥ || 
VJ 1.25-29 || 
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book which discuss these concepts in detail in addition to Kuntaka’s own commentary on these 
statements.55 By examining this passage, then, we will simultaneously come to understand both 
Kuntaka’s theory of poetry and his account of the specific pleasure of reading Kalidasa.  
 
It is significant that Kuntaka begins his own explanation of the features listed in the passage not at 
the beginning, but with statement 1.28: “in [the delicate style], all the brilliance (vaicitrya) we find 
has arisen from inspiration, and shines out dripping with the nature of delicateness (saukumārya).” 
Kuntaka here relates the concepts of brilliance and delicateness, two terms of a polarity that 
structures many of his thoughts.56 It is the same polarity explicitly invoked here which in fact 
informs the other features listed in the passage. Thus, for example, whereas poetry in the delicate 
style (sukumāra-mārga) generally has only a “few captivating figures of speech,” poets writing in 
the brilliant style (vicitra-mārga) “heap figure upon figure”; if the source of beauty in Kalidasa’s 
poetry is “indiscernible,” brilliant poetry sources its appeal in the sheer skill of the poet; and if 
Kalidasa’s figures of speech have been added “effortlessly,” figuration in brilliant poetry is the 
result of intensive training.57 A list of examples for each style, selected by Kuntaka himself, may 
serve as a helpful point of reference: 
  
                                                
55 The format of Vakroktijīvita—a number of brief statements (kārikās) accompanied throughout 
by an expansive prose commentary—is common in Sanskrit scientific writing (i.e., śāstra). 
 
56 Kuntaka also describes a third style, madhyama or “middle,” but since this style is defined in 
terms of sukumāra and vicitra, it suffices here to focus on just these two. 
 
57 The references here are, in order, to VJ 1.25 (-svalpamanohārivibhūṣaṇaḥ); 1.35 (alaṃkārasya 
kavayo yatrālaṃkaraṇāntaram…nibadhnanti);  1.27 (avibhāvitasaṃsthānarāmaṇīyakarañjakaḥ); 
1.39 (…pratibhollekhamahattvena mahākaveḥ); 1.24 (ayatnavihita-); and 1.43 and commentary 
(vidagdhakavayo kecid eva vyutpannāḥ). 
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Delicate poetry  
 
(All of these examples are from Kalidasa.) 
 
The day’s heat had grown too intense  
and the night too thin; at odds  
in their opposed deeds, the two were like  
a quarreling wife and husband.58 
 
The too red flames-of-the-forest,  
curved like crescent moons— 
for they hadn’t yet bloomed— 
appeared like nail-marks on  
the body of the forest-groves,  
who had recently made love with Spring.59 
 
Before him appeared a pack of antelope:  
the does’ mouths filled with grass, 
their movement stalled by their young  
drinking again and again at their udders,  
the proud bucks advancing ahead.60 
 
The couples revealed their love with deeds…61 
 
When the antelope scratched his lover with an antler,  
her eyes squinted at the touch.62 
 
Remembering your trembling embrace at night  
that I’d felt once, fearful Sita, 
I somehow endured the cloud’s thundering  




                                                
58 pravṛḍdhatāpo divaso’timātram atyarthameva 
kṣaṇadā ca tanvī | 
ubhau virodhakriyayā vibhinnau jāyāpatī 
sānuśayāvivāstām || VJ 1.ś74; R 16.45 || 
59 bālenduvakrāṇyavikāsabhāvād babhuḥ 
palāśānyatilohitāni | 
sadyo vasantena samāgatānāṃ nakhakṣatānīva 
vanasthalīnām || VJ 1.ś75; K 3.19 || 
60 tasya stanapraṇayibhir muhur eṇaśāvair 
vyāhanyamānahariṇīgamanaṃ purastāt | 
āvirbabhūva kuśagarbhamukhaṃ mṛgāṇāṃ yuthaṃ 
tadagrasaragarvitakṛṣṇasaram || VJ 1.ś76; R 9.55 || 
61 dvandvāni bhāvaṃ kriyayā vivavruḥ || VJ 1.ś77; K 
3.35 || 
62 śṛṅgeṇa ca sparśanimīlitākṣīṃ mṛgīm akaṇḍūyata 
kṛṣṇasāraḥ || VJ 1.ś78; K 3.36 || 
63 pūrvānubhūtaṃ smaratā ca rātrau kampottaraṃ 
bhīru tavopagūḍham | 
guhāvisārīṇyativāhitāni mayā kathaṃcid 
ghanagarjitāni || VJ 1.ś79; R 13.28 || 
Brilliant poetry 
 
O ocean, who easily surpasses the Buddha!  
What’s the use of many words?  
There is no one who, like you,  
has vowed to ensure others’ welfare.  
For in famously refusing 
to comfort thirsty journey-goers,  
you show compassion for the desert,  
upbearing his burden of selfishness.64 
 
Is this a fresh vine upon the tree of youth,  
budding forth by the burden of its juice?  
Is it a wave on the ocean of beauty,  
tossed with playful grace? 
Or, is what I see before my eyes  
the instructor’s rod of the Love God, 
confident in explaining his philosophy of love,  
teaching them whose longing is intense?65 
 
Which land suffers love-sickness by your absence and thus 
goes to waste? (i.e., “Where are you from?”)66 
 
And what are the pure indestructible syllables that partake 
of fame?67 (i.e., “What is your name?”) 
 
If the sun, sole illuminator  
of all of Brahma’s creations,  
didn’t enter the ocean for a little while,  
how else would that creator of rays  
reveal with any clarity the darkness,  
or the moon, or this flickering cluster of stars?68
64 he helājitabodhisattva vacasāṃ kiṃ vistarais 
toyadhe nāsti tvatsaḍrśaḥ paraḥ parahitādhāne 
gṛhītavrataḥ | 
tṛṣyatpānthajanopakāraghaṭanāvaimukhyalabdhāyaśo 
bhāraprodvahane karoṣi kṛpayā sāhāyyakaṃ yan 
maroḥ || VJ 1.ś90 || 
65 kiṃ tāruṇyataror iyaṃ rasabharodbhinnā navā 
mañjarī līlāprocchalitasya kiṃ laharikā 
lāvaṇyavārāṃnidheḥ | 
udgāḍhotkalikāvatāṃ 
svasamayopanyāsaviśrambhiṇaḥ kiṃ sākṣād 
upadeśayaṣṭir athavā devasya śṛṅgāriṇaḥ || VJ 1.ś92 || 
66  katamaḥ pravijṛmbhitavirahavyathaḥ śūnyatāṃ 
nīto deśaḥ || VJ 11.ś94 || 
67 kāni ca puṇyabhāñji bhajantyabhikhyām akṣarāṇi || 
VJ 1.ś95 || 
68 viśati yadi no kaṃcit kālaṃ kilāmbunidhiṃ vidheḥ 
kṛtiṣu sakalāsveko loke prakāśatāṃ gataḥ | 
katham itarathā dhāmnāṃ dhātā tamāṃsi niśākaraṃ 
sphurad idam iyattārācakraṃ prakāśayati sphuṭam || 
VJ 1.ś99 || 
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At first glance, Kuntaka’s distinction between delicate and brilliant poetry may strike us as 
familiar. Within the Sanskrit tradition, it seems to resemble to the distinction Daṇḍin made 
between the poetic styles vaidarbhī and gauḍī, which he defined on the basis of formal 
characteristics of language such as the degree of figuration, selection of consonants, and length of 
compounds.69 It may also remind us of distinctions made by writers in other critical traditions. For 
instance, in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, William Wordsworth famously opposes the “deluges 
of idle and extravagant stories in verse” to his own simpler “language near to the real language of 
men”; and when Kuntaka writes of delicate poetry that “all the figurative elements we find in it 
have arisen from inspiration,” he seems to anticipate Wordsworth’s much later remarks on the role 
of personifications in his poems: “they are a figure of speech occasionally prompted by passion, 
and I have made use of them as such; but have endeavoured utterly to reject them as a mechanical 
device of style.”70 Such parallels are no doubt helpful in identifying a range of contexts to which 
Kuntaka’s distinction between brilliance and delicateness might pertain. Yet my main reason for 
introducing them here is to grasp the specificity of Kuntaka’s concepts, by showing where they 
diverge from apparent analogies. For while it is true that Kuntaka’s descriptions of style do touch 
on formal characteristics of poetic language (as in statements 1.25 and 1.27), we will see that their 
                                                
69 KĀ 1.40: “There are many poetic styles, each distinguishable from the other by minute 
differences. Among them, I shall describe the two styles called vaidarbhī and gauḍī, since the 
difference between them is quite clear.…” <asty aneko girāṃ mārgaḥ sūkṣmabhedaḥ parasparam 
| tatra vaidarbhagauḍīyau varṇyete prasphuṭāntarau ||> 
 
70 William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads: 1798 and 1802, ed. Fiona 
Stafford (OUP Oxford, 2013), 100; ibid., 112. 
I have chosen here to translate vaicitryam…sarvam as “all the figurative elements” primarily to 
emphasize its similarity to Wordsworth’s comment. Yet the choice is also supported by 
Kuntaka’s own commentary on this statement: “vaicitrya means ‘the state of being captivating,’ 
or again, ‘being possessed of indirect speech [vakrokti]’;  sarva or ‘all [that is captivating]’ refers 
to the lot of poetic factors, such as figures of speech.” <vaicitryaṃ vicitrabhāvo 
vakroktiyuktatvam | tatsarvam alaṃkārādi> 
	 30 
primary concern lies elsewhere. Nor are brilliance and delicateness evaluative concepts, since 
unlike theorists who would assert the superiority of one style to another, Kuntaka strictly excludes 
any hierarchy from his own typology of styles: “it makes no sense to say that there are three styles 
ranked best, average, and lowest.”71 If his concepts are neither merely rhetorical nor evaluative, 
then how are we to understand them? 
We find a clue in statement 26 of the passage: “[in the delicate style], an emphasis on the 
nature of things outrivals acquired skill….” This remark might be coupled with statements 
Kuntaka will later make in his description of the brilliant style: 
36 Just as pieces of jewelry covering a woman’s body generate beauty, radiating 
cascading streams of light with their precious stones,  
 
37 so [in the brilliant style] intrinsically radiant figures of speech illuminate the content 
(alaṅkārya), which lies within their beauty.  
 
38 In [this style], even an object whose treatment in poetry isn’t new is sufficient, since 
it is brought to a remarkable height just by brilliance in the expression; 
 
39 In [this style], all that appears one way seems another just as a great poet pleases, 
simply by the greatness of his imaginative presentation.72 
 
The aim of delicate poetry is to remain faithful to some aspect of the object being described. By 
contrast, what matters in brilliant poetry is not the actual nature of the described object, but the 
way that object is made to seem; hence, even a hackneyed idea is suitable for poetic treatment, 
                                                
71 na ca rītīnām uttamamadhyamādhamatvabhedena traividhyaṃ vyavasthāpayituṃ nyāyyam | 
(Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 41, commentary on 1.24.) 
 
72 ratnaraśmicchaṭotsekabhāsurair bhūṣaṇair yathā | kāntāśarīram ācchādya bhūṣāyai parikalpyate 
|| 
yatra tadvad alaṃkārair bhrājamānair nijātmanā | svaśobhātiśayāntaḥstham alaṃkāryaṃ 
prakāśate [alt: prakāśyate] || 
yadapyanūtanollekhaṃ vastu yatra tadapyalam | uktivaicitryamātreṇa kāṣṭhāṃ kāmapi nīyate ||  
yatrānyathābhavat sarvam anyathaiva yathāruci | bhāvyate pratibhollekhamahattvena mahākaveḥ 
|| VJ 1.36-39 || 
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reinvigorated “just by brilliance in the expression.” Both of these descriptions (the first of delicate 
poetry, the second of brilliant poetry) share a concern with the relationship that language has with 
the things it describes. More precisely, they rest on an assumption which may at first seem too 
obvious to state explicitly: that all language presents the nature of something or another, whether 
this presentation is true to life or fanciful; as Kuntaka elsewhere puts it, “only something connected 
with its nature ever enters the path to expression.”73 However obvious this idea may initially 
appear, it is in fact the central thesis of Kuntaka’s theory of poetry, as we can infer from the 
attention he devotes to a figure of speech called svabhāvokti, sometimes translated as “natural” or 
“naturalistic description.” Indeed, as I will try to show in what follows, it is no exaggeration to say 
that svabhāvokti is the most important concept developed in the Vakroktijīvita, for while the title 
of the book seems to grant this status to vakrokti (“crooked” or “indirect expression”), the full 
significance of that word can be properly understood only in terms of Kuntaka’s interpretation of 
svabhāvokti. 
Well before Kuntaka uses it, the word svabhāvokti already appears in the pages of earlier 
Sanskrit rhetoricians, to whom we must now briefly turn. These writers (including the earliest 
rhetoricians Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin) are more interested in proposing guidelines for writing poetry 
than in explicitly raising theoretical issues, and in that regard their statements more closely 
resemble the stylistic prescriptions we might find in a writing manual than a philosopher’s 
reflections on poetic language. Nonetheless, in positioning his own theoretical claims in relation 
to the writers who precede him, Kuntaka in effect draws out some of their implicit assumptions 
about the nature of poetry. Most crucially for Kuntaka, insofar as these writers are preoccupied 
                                                
73 svabhāvayuktam eva sarvathābhidheyapadavīm avatarati | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 21, 
commentary on 1.12.) 
	 32 
with cataloguing figures of speech, they seem to adopt a view of poetry that sees figuration as its 
defining feature.74  
One of the challenges such a view might face concerns how it would account for poetry 
devoid of figurative language. Consider a line taken from the Kumārasambhava, one of numerous 
instances of non-figurative poetry to be found in Kalidasa’s oeuvre: 
When the antelope scratched his lover with an antler,  
her eyes squinted at the touch.75 
 
While impressionistically it might be easy to recognize such a sentence as poetic, what makes it 
so? More generally, in the absence of an easily discernible figure of speech, what distinguishes a 
poetic utterance from the speech we encounter in everyday life? The early rhetoricians seem to 
have bypassed the question by granting such examples their own figure of speech, which came to 
be called svabhāvokti.76 However, Kuntaka finds this solution inadequate; for if svabhāvokti were 
considered a figure of speech, then “even a cart-driver’s sentences, being possessed of svabhāvokti, 
would be figurative….”77 Neither scholastic pedantry nor an elitist disdain for the way laborers 
speak motivates Kuntaka’s objection. Rather, if Kuntaka takes issue with positing svabhāvokti as 
a figure of speech, it is because doing so covers up rather than confronts the provocation that non-
figurative verse poses to the theory of poetry. Or to put the same argument in less polemical terms: 
if Kuntaka does not consider svabhāvokti a figure of speech, it is because in a certain sense all 
                                                
74 For a detailed discussion of the theory implicit in the works of early rhetoricians, see McCrea, 
The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir, 34–39. 
 
75 śṛṅgeṇa ca sparśanimīlitākṣīṃ mṛgīm akaṇḍūyata kṛṣṇasāraḥ || VJ 1.ś78; K 3.36 || 
 
76 On the history of the concept of svabhāvokti, see V. Raghavan, Studies on Some Concepts of 
the Alaṃkāra Śāstra (Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1973), 92–116. 
 
77 śākaṭikavākyānām api sālaṃkāratā prāpnoti svabhāvoktiyuktatvena | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 
21, commentary on 1.12.) 
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language (“even a cart-driver’s sentences”) is svabhāvokti. We might better appreciate Kuntaka’s 
point if we translated svabhāvokti not as “natural description” but, more literally and as Kuntaka 
himself recommends, as “the telling of [a thing’s] nature” (svabhāvasya uktiḥ).78 Taken in this 
more fundamental sense, the word svabhāvokti no longer designates a distinct figure of speech but 
offers a description of language as such.  
Such a description evidently holds true in a trivial sense for statements like “The sky is 
blue,” which predicates blueness of the sky. But in Kuntaka’s readings of individual poems, we 
find a more nuanced understanding of his claim that all language tells the nature of things. His 
reading of Raghuvaṃśa 5.15 is particularly instructive here, since it very clearly differentiates 
between a purely formal predication, which exists only as a grammatical structure, and a more 
fundamental predication, which for Kuntaka is the kind of predication that occurs as language 
itself. Canto 5 of Kalidasa’s Raghuvaṃśa opens with the arrival of the sage Kautsa at the court of 
Raghu. The sage has come to request money from the generous king, but he quickly learns that the 
king has nothing left to give: 
Lord of men! Standing there with your body only, 
having gifted away your wealth to blessed suppliants,  
you appear like a rice plant standing with its stalk only, 
after foresters have plucked all the grain.79 
 
While the apparent subject here (what Kuntaka calls the vācya or abhidheya) is the king, Kuntaka 
is primarily interested in what the utterance reveals about the speaker: “While describing the nature 
of such a great king as praiseworthy, the sage [has used] a figure of speech that refers back to an 
                                                
78 svabhāvoktir…yā svabhāvasya padārthadharmalakṣaṇasya parispandasya uktir abhidhā | 
(Ibid., 20, commentary on 1.11.) 
 
79 śarīramātreṇa narendra tiṣṭhann ābhāsi tīrthapratipāditarddhiḥ | 
āraṇyakopāttaphalaprasūtiḥ stambena nīvāra ivāvaśiṣtaḥ || VJ 118; R 5.15 || 
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activity rooted in his own experience….”80 Rather than understand Kalidasa’s image as merely 
decorative, or as a free-floating description unconditioned by the one who speaks it, Kuntaka’s 
instinct is to place it within the context of the sage’s “own experience” of living in an ashram. 
Another character would have spoken differently in Kautsa’s situation; the god Indra, for example, 
might have constructed the impossible image of a tree in heaven bereft of all its gifts. Kalidasa’s 
verse thus adds less to our understanding of the king than to our understanding of Kautsa: “the 
nature of the subject appears almost entirely covered up by the nature of the speaker.”81 Therefore, 
in Kuntaka’s claim that “only an entity connected with its nature can ever enter the path to 
expression,”82 the entity whose nature is revealed in language need not coincide with what is 
grammatically predicated. Even the monosyllable “Help!” might be understood to predicate fear 
on the part of the one who has cried out. 
All language thus tells the nature of things; what distinguishes poetic language is the way 
it tells this nature. To see what changes for Kuntaka in this shift from “all language” to “poetic 
language”—from svabhāvokti to vakrokti, we might say—let us consider the objection of a 
hypothetical interlocutor with which Kuntaka opens his book: 
If the things in the universe were shown just as they are, then there would be no 
wonder at all; for it is by universal law that the kimśuka tree is red.83 
 
                                                
80 atra ślāghyatayā tathāvidhamahārājaparispande varṇyamāne 
munināsvānubhavasiddhavyavahārānusāreṇālaṃkaraṇayojanam [aucityaparipoṣam āvahati] | 
(Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 68, commentary on 1.54.) 
 
81 atra vaktuḥ svabhāvena ca vācyaparispandaḥ saṃvṛtaprāyaḥ lakṣyate | (Ibid., commentary on 
1.54.) 
 
82 svabhāvayuktam eva sarvathābhidheyapadavīm avatarati | (Ibid., 21, commentary on 1.12.) 
 
83 yathātattvaṃ vivecyante bhāvās trailokyavartinaḥ | yadi tan nādbhutaṃ nāma daivaraktā hi 
kiṃśukāḥ || VJ 1.ś2|| 
	 35 
The objection rests on a static interpretation of a thing’s nature; that is, it assumes that the nature 
of a thing is plain for all to see in the same way. Since language that adheres to a thing’s actual 
nature amounts to stating the obvious, writing devoid of figures of speech would simply be 
redundant, adding nothing new to our knowledge or experience of the world. 
It is in order to distance himself from this view, I take it, that in referring to an entity’s 
nature Kuntaka generally prefers the word parispanda—literally a “throbbing out”—repeating it 
with an almost obsessive frequency in his main text while using the more common svabhāva to 
gloss it in his commentary. The concept of parispanda has a rich history in the theological tradition 
commonly known as Kashmiri Shaivism. Here I would simply like to note that in preferring this 
word, Kuntaka draws our attention to what we might call the partial or aspectual nature of 
perception—the fact that, in any perception, certain aspects of the perceived object throb out while 
others recede into the background. A well-known philosophical example serves as a useful 
illustration of this point: since in any perception of a cube at most three faces are visible while the 
rest remain concealed, no single perception of it could possibly include all the faces at once. The 
same is true of non-geometric facets of a cube, including color, texture, its use as a die, the dots 
on its faces, and its temperature while pressed against our palm: in a given moment, some of these 
aspects will attract our attention while others elude it.  
For Kuntaka too all perception is necessarily aspectual. What distinguishes poetic 
perception lies in the kinds of aspects it registers:  
Even if it is possible for an object to be inlaid with all sorts of qualities, what is 
expressed [in poetry] is an object’s connection with just the kind of quality capable 
of giving pleasure to sensitive readers. And a quality is deemed capable of giving 
such pleasure if, because of it, the grandeur of the thing’s nature is brought to light, 
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or alternatively, if what is brought to light is the thing’s capacity to develop an 
emotion in literature (rasa).84 
 
While all utterances present an object under some aspect or another, poetic utterances record 
specifically those aspects that “give pleasure.” As the second sentence specifies, the pleasure that 
Kuntaka means here is not a vaguely defined sense of aesthetic enjoyment but derives quite 
precisely from the intensity of the sensations which poets create in their work. Since poets writing 
in the brilliant style (where “all that is one way seems another”) project onto entities aspects of 
their own contrivance, poetic power (pratibhā) for them amounts to something like a superior 
imaginative faculty. By contrast—and more relevant in the present context—since poets writing 
in the delicate style place “emphasis on the nature of things,” poetic power in their case amounts 
to something like a heightened attentiveness, both to sensibilia as well as to mental phenomena. 
Indeed, as even a cursory glance at Kalidasa’s famous descriptive passages would confirm, the 
strength of his poetry often issues from his powers of minute observation (recall for instance his 
depictions of the gestures of Indumati’s anxious suitors [R 6], of animals exasperated by summer 
                                                
84 yadyapi padārthasya nānāvidhadharmakhacitatvaṃ saṃbhavati tathāpi tathāvidhena dharmeṇa 
saṃbandhaḥ samākhyāyate yaḥ sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādam ādhātuṃ kṣamate | tasya ca 
tadāhlādasāmarthyaṃ saṃbhāvyate yena kācideva svabhāvamahattā rasaparipoṣāṅgatvaṃ vā 
vyaktim āsādayati | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 17, commentary on 1.9.) 
For Kuntaka, rasa is a formal concept referring to an emotion depicted in a work of literature. By 
contrast, for writers like Abhinavagupta, rasa refers to the reader’s experience of a depicted 
emotion (what Kuntaka instead calls āhlāda with almost systematic rigor). Krishnamoorthy’s 
comment on Kuntaka’s use of these terms is illuminating: “As Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls 
observes penetratingly, ‘The word rasa possesses an ambiguity of denotation; a particular rasa is 
said to lie in a given literary work as a sweet taste or a bitter taste may lie in a given food or 
drink. The connoisseur of poetry is also said to have a rasa (a taste) for the poetry he enjoys, 
much as a wine-taster has a taste for wine.’ After Abhinavagupta the two meanings have been 
confounded so often that it is difficult to determine what exactly is meant by any writer in a 
given context. But Kuntaka is blissfully free from this ambiguity. He restricts his usage of the 
word rasa to the first meaning only unlike post-Abhinavagupta writers. He invariably uses words 
like āhlāda to mean the second” (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, xxxviii). 
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heat [RS 1], or of Rama’s mental states on seeing significant landmarks of personal and general 
history [R 13], to list just a few). In Kuntaka’s account, what makes Kalidasa’s description of the 
antelope poetic is therefore not a figure of speech but the kind of notice-taking that yielded it.  
Many of Kuntaka’s remarks on individual verses of Kalidasa reveal that his theory of poetic 
language deeply informs his style of reading. Consider, for example, his analysis of Raghuvaṃśa 
14.70, which describes a sage moments before finding Sita abandoned in the forest: 
One who was on his way  
to gather grass and sticks for the fire  
approached her, following  
the sound of her weeping;  
it was the poet whose grief (śoka),  
surging up at the vision of a bird  
slain by a hunter, had turned to verse (śloka).85 
 
The incident of the bird referenced here marks what the Sanskrit literary tradition sees as its 
originary moment. As the Rāmāyaṇa narrates in its opening pages, Valmiki’s sighting of a bird 
wrenched suddenly from its lover so moved him with grief that the first line of poetry 
spontaneously leapt from his mouth. One way of reading Kalidasa’s verse then would be to take it 
as a reiteration of the Rāmāyaṇa’s general account of poetic creation, or even as a fanciful 
explanation of how Valmiki came to compose the Rāmāyaṇa. On this latter reading, the association 
that Kalidasa makes between Valmiki’s sighting of the bird and his following Sita’s cry would 
have the effect of proposing a new impetus for the epic’s composition: if Valmiki’s compassion 
for a lovelorn bird stirred him to compose the first verse of poetry, then how much more would he 
sympathize with Sita when he finds her in a comparable situation, and how much richer would be 
the poem that results? 
                                                
85 tām abhyagacchad ruditānusārī muniḥ kuśedhmāharaṇāya yātaḥ | 
niṣādaviddhāṇḍajadarśanotthaḥ ślokatvam āpadyata yasya śokaḥ || VJ 1.ś31; R 14.70 || 
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While Kuntaka might not disagree with this interpretation, his own reading certainly shifts 
its point of emphasis, taking the verse less as an instance of metapoetic reflection than as one of 
characterization: 
All that needs to be given here is the synonym “Valmiki” to specify who the sage 
is. But by calling him “the one whose grief, arising at the mere sight of the bird 
slain by a hunter, turned to verse,” we learn that this sage is supremely 
compassionate. The poet thus intends to communicate an essential aspect of the 
mind (antaḥkaraṇaparispanda) of Valmiki when he breaks down on seeing the 
condition of Janaka’s daughter in that situation….86 
 
Issuing directly from Kuntaka’s understanding of language, these comments seek to show how the 
verse predicates the nature of an entity, which in this case happens to be Valmiki (or more precisely 
Valmiki’s mind). Of all the possible names and biographical facts by which the sage could be 
identified, Kalidasa has chosen one that tolls us to a time Valmiki had been moved by another’s 
grief. In Kuntaka’s account, the bird incident therefore does not primarily function as an 
unconnected aside, whether about poetic creation in general (“Valmiki found Sita dejected—and 
by the way, this is how poets compose”) or about the Rāmāyaṇa’s creation (“—and by the way, 
this is how Valmiki came to compose the Rāmāyaṇa”). Rather, it serves to reveal Valmiki’s 
instinctive compassion, an aspect of his nature whose registration develops the depicted emotion 
(“he found her dejected, and if you recall how compassionate Valmiki is, you would realize how 
difficult this must have been for him”); an aspect, moreover, which readers may well overlook in 
versions of the Rāmāyaṇa that are primarily concerned with its sequence of events. 
                                                
86  atra ko’sau munir vālmīkir iti paryāyapadamātre vaktavye paramakāruṇikasya 
niṣādanirbhinnaśakunisaṃdarśanamātrasamutthitaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvam abhajata yasyeti tasya 
tadavasthajanakarājaputrīdaśādarśanavivaśavṛtter antaḥkaraṇaparispandaḥ 
[karuṇarasaparipoṣāṅgatayā sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādakārī] kaver abhipretaḥ | (Kuntaka, 
Vakroktijīvita, 17, commentary on 1.9.) 
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Kuntaka’s concept of vakrokti or “indirect expression” identifies a tendency inherent in all 
poetic language, and exemplified here in Kalidasa’s description of Valmiki, to record details that 
escape (or deviate from) common ways of perceiving and feeling and thus also our habitual ways 
of speaking. As Kuntaka lucidly puts it, “vakrokti is captivating expression that goes beyond well 
known expression.”87 It is true that this going-beyond often appears as a figure of speech. Yet even 
where a figure of speech does turn up in poetry, Kuntaka understands it as the effect of a deeper 
principle of deviation (vakratā): 
It is not the case that word and idea (śabdārthau) exist separately, and are then 
affixed with some alaṅkāra which is different from them. Rather, the expression 
itself, being connected with a strikingness brought about by a deviation, just is the 
alaṅkāra—insofar as alaṅkāra (tat) is simply that which creates great beauty.88 
 
The import of this passage hinges on how we understand the word alaṅkāra. If we take it in its 
conventional sense to mean “ornament” or “figure of speech,” then the second sentence becomes 
almost impenetrable. Kuntaka seems to anticipate this difficulty, for in his final clause he reminds 
us that alaṅkāra literally refers to anything which completes something else, or renders it 
sufficient; hence, in the case of entities like bodies and words, “that which creates great beauty.” 
If alaṅkāra ends up conventionally meaning “figure of speech,” it is presumably because figures 
of speech are typically regarded as the source of poetry’s beauty. Yet for Kuntaka, as we have 
seen, the beauty of poetry does not come from an external element which is superadded to the bare 
statement of an idea, and which could therefore be removed from the statement without 
significantly altering the idea. Poetry’s true alaṅkāra, that in it “which creates great beauty,” must 
                                                
87 vakroktiḥ prasiddhābhidhānavyatirekiṇī vicitraivābhidhā | (Ibid., 20, commentary on 1.10.) 
 
88 śabdārthau pṛthagavasthitau na kenāpi vyatiriktenālaṃkaraṇena yojyete kintu 
vakratāvaicitryayogitayābhidhānamātram evānayor alaṃkāraḥ tasyaiva śobhātiśayakāritvāt | 
(Ibid., commentary on 1.10.) 
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instead be sought at an earlier stage of the poetic process, in a deviation which affects first how an 
entity is conceived (artha) and only subsequently how that conception is expressed in words 
(śabda).  
Therefore, while Kuntaka’s frequent use of words meaning “expression” (ukti, abhidhāna, 
bhaṇiti, etc.) might seem to suggest that vakrokti pertains to a poet’s skill with words, elsewhere 
he clearly indicates that it pertains no less to a poet’s ideas. Both thought and language are 
intimately involved in the process that Kuntaka calls “the poet’s indirect operation” 
(vakrakavivyāpāra), which he describes in an early passage as follows: 
An idea first flashes before the poetic faculty (pratibhā) like a jewel which is no 
better than a chunk taken from raw stone. When this idea meets the indirect speech 
(vakravākya) of a skilled poet, it becomes a poem that delights sensitive readers, 
being as attractive as the jewel when it is polished on a grindstone.89 
 
Kuntaka later returns to this process with a more penetrating formulation, offering two accounts 
of what it is to have a poetic idea which correspond to the delicate and brilliant styles: 
When inspiration strikes (pratibhāyām), entities shine forth by some aspect of their 
nature which has at that moment become clear (tatkālollikhitena parispandena); 
alternatively, the nature of entities is veiled over by a remarkable contrivance 
(kenacid utkarṣeṇa) which is suitable to the context. They then set out on the path 
to expression in a manner governed by the poet’s intention, since only when objects 
are thus set down in words capable of communicating the poet’s specific idea do 
they give pleasure to the mind.90 
 
                                                
89 prathamaṃ ca pratibhāpratibhāsamānam aghaṭitapāṣāṇaśakalakalpamaṇiprakhyam eva vastu 
vidagdhakaviviracitavakravākyoparūḍhaṃ śāṇollīḍhamaṇimanoharatayā 
tadvidāhlādakārikāvyatvam adhirohati | (Ibid., 8–9, commentary on 1.7.) 
 
90 pratibhāyāṃ tatkālollikhitena kenacit parispandena parisphurantaḥ padārthāḥ 
prakṛtaprastāvasamucitena kenacid utkarṣeṇa vā samācchāditasvabhāvāḥ santo 
vivakṣāvidheyatvenābhidheyatāpadavīm avatarantas 
tathāvidhaviśeṣapratipādanasamarthenābhidhānenābhidhīyamānāś cetaścamatkāritām āpadyante | 
(Ibid., 16, commentary on 1.9.) 
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In both of these passages, the act of expression is crucially preceded by a moment of ideation. The 
difference between the brilliant and delicate styles of poetry is thus grounded not merely in two 
different ways of selecting words but, more radically, in two styles of encountering the world (one 
attentive, the other aestheticized), both of which deviate from our conventional representations of 
it. To write a poem is not just to compose beautiful or effective sentences but to propose a new 
mode of experience. Moreover, while Kuntaka might seem to be reducing all the variety of poetry 
to just a few styles (i.e., brilliant, delicate, and intermediate), he specifies that his concepts don’t 
offer an exhaustive typology but simply indicate two poles and a midpoint on a stylistic spectrum:  
Because the styles are grounded in types of poetic temperament (svabhāva), it 
inevitably follows that they would be divided into a number of subvarieties. 
Nonetheless, since it would be impossible to enumerate all of them, it is reasonable 
to classify them generally according to just three types.91 
 
There are therefore as many possible styles of poetry as there are temperaments in the world.92 
Accordingly, the task of characterizing Kalidasa’s style becomes coupled with that of 
specifying a distinctively Kalidasan mode of experience. I read statement 1.29 of the passage as 
Kuntaka’s attempt to make just such a specification with the aid of a simile: “…great poets travel 
along [this path], like bees traveling along groves of blooming flowers.” Bees offer a model for 
understanding how poets writing in the delicate style encounter the world; as Kuntaka elaborates 
                                                
91  yadyapi kavisvabhāvabhedanibandhanatvād anantabhedabhinnatvam anivāryaṃ tathāpi 
parisaṃkhyātum aśakyatvāt sāmānyena traividhyam evopapadyate | (Ibid., 42, commentary on 
1.24.) 
 
92 While Shulman’s account of Kuntaka’s theory of poetry offers an excellent description of the 
delicate style, it appears to miss the full extent to which Kuntaka is proposing a typology of 
different styles. For instance, when in chapter three Shulman reads of “a mode of poetic 
creativity by no means exhausted or, for that matter, even roughly defined by his discussion so 
far,” he overlooks the fact that this mode has not only been defined precisely but even discussed 
in some detail in VJ 1.49-52. See Shulman, More Than Real: A History of the Imagination in 
South India, 94–95. 
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in his commentary, “the likeness of poets with bees indicates their devotion to collecting the 
essence [of entities], which is akin to the nectar of flowers.”93 Other creatures that pass through 
groves—deer, for example, or people, or even the wind—may certainly catch something of the 
fragrance of flowers from a distance, but only the bee can travel to the flower’s center and taste 
the sweetness hidden there. In drawing out some of the crucial implications of Kuntaka’s image, I 
have found it helpful (if at first it seems somewhat arbitrary) to compare it with a passage of Sri 
Aurobindo, whose writing similarly shifts to a metaphorical register while describing Kalidasa’s 
poems: 
His creations in fact live in a peculiar light, which is not the light that never was on 
sea or land but rather our ordinary sunshine recognisable though strangely & 
beautifully altered. The alteration is not real; rather our vision is affected by the 
recognition of something concealed by the sunbeams & yet the cause of the 
sunbeams; but it is plain human sunlight we see always.94 
 
The two passages are no doubt separated by what seems an abyss, not only because they are written 
many centuries apart but, more significantly, because they offer accounts of different situations. 
While Kuntaka’s simile characterizes the perception of a poet (it is Kalidasa’s eye that penetrates 
to the core of things like a bee entering the chamber of a flower), Aurobindo’s light imagery 
dramatizes the effects that Kalidasa’s poetry has on the reader’s perception (it is we who come 
away from Kalidasa’s poems with refreshed eyes, such that a new radiance seems to emanate from 
the world). It is all the more striking then that both passages should share the same underlying 
intuition about Kalidasa’s poetry; namely, that while it is characterized by a style of perception 
which “alters” or “deviates from” our usual ways of perceiving, it is nonetheless our own world to 
                                                
93 teṣāṃ ca bhramarasādṛśyena kusumamakarandakalpasārasaṃgrahavyasanitā | (Ibid., 44, 
commentary on 1.25-29) 
 
94 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 66. 
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which it gives us new access and not a world of Kalidasa’s fancies. For just as Kuntaka’s poet-bee 
finds in the sweet nectar a rarely accessed but nonetheless real part of the flower, Aurobindo insists 
that the strange and beautiful light illuminating Kalidasa’s works is in fact nothing but “our 
ordinary sunshine.” For both writers, the distinction of Kalidasa’s poetry lies in a peculiar strength 
of characterization—in a power to see the same things we see, but to bring to their surface a 
sweetness that renders them momentarily unfamiliar. 
 
2. Learning from Kalidasa: Kuntaka on the Educative Function of Poetry 
 
My analysis thus far has followed a thread in the Vakroktijīvita which corresponds to 
Kuntaka’s general remark that “a taste of the nectar that is poetry creates pleasure in the mind.”95 
I have tried to show that for Kuntaka, the pleasure of Kalidasa’s poetry derives from the particular 
way it alters our attunement to the world, getting us to notice nuances in it that we tend to pass 
over. I will now shift to a second thread in Kuntaka’s writing on Kalidasa, which follows from his 
remarks on the educative function of literature. Early in his book, Kuntaka reveals to us the kind 
of reader he has in mind when writing about poetry:  
A work of poetry, which is a means for achieving dharma and the other life-ends 
[i.e., success in the four domains of morality, power, enjoyment, and spirituality], 
and which is expressed in a beautiful sequence of words, delights the hearts of 
people of nobility.96 
 
In his commentary on this statement, Kuntaka clarifies that by “people of nobility” (abhijāta) he 
means members of royalty, such as princes: 
                                                
95 kāvyāmṛtarasenāntaś camatkāro vitanyate (VJ 1.5). In his commentary, Kuntaka glosses 
antaḥ with cetasi (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 5.). 
 




It is well known that princes have inherited their wealth, and if on their way to 
taking control of the whole world’s fate they are left to their own devices without 
any good instruction, they would be capable of uprooting all the customary ways 
of dealing with things. For precisely this reason, in order to teach them how to rule 
properly [tat], poets tell the stories of past kings of good conduct who can serve as 
examples.97 
 
Princes assume power with a dangerous but constitutive weakness: entrusted with huge 
responsibilities like maintaining the treasury, arbitrating disputes, and leading military campaigns, 
they yet lack the rich store of experiences that would give them a sense of what does and doesn’t 
work in a given situation. Literature can help fill this lack, introducing princes to a range of 
situations they may face in the future while shielding them from the real-life consequences of being 
involved in those situations. Of course, not all readers of poetry are princes, and “anyone who has 
spent time reading even a fraction of a good poem would acquire much grace in their everyday 
dealings and so receive a worthy benefit.”98 But Kuntaka goes on to reveal that in his mind, even 
these other readers belong in one way or another to the court: 
When the everyday dealings of kings and other members of the royalty are being 
described, all their subsidiaries, such as chief ministers, are also portrayed as being 
skilled in their respective duties, thus offering instruction for conducting oneself in 
all walks of life.99 
 
Each scene in literature involving a king or courtier thus has the potential to shape courtly readers 
into more judicious political actors. These passages suggest that when Kuntaka theorizes poetry, 
                                                
97 rājaputrāḥ khalu samāsāditasvavibhavāḥ samastajagatīvyavasthākāritāṃ pratipadyamānāḥ 
ślāghyopadeśaśūnyatayā svatantrāḥ santaḥ samucitasakalavyavahārocchedaṃ pravartayituṃ 
prabhavantīty etadartham eva tadvyutpattaye vyatītasaccaritacaritarājacaritaṃ tannidarśanāya 
nibadhnanti kavayaḥ | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 4, commentary on 1.3.) 
 
98 sarvaḥ kvacit kamanīyakāvye kṛtaśramaḥ samāsāditavyavahāraparispandasaundaryātiśayaḥ 
ślāghanīyaphalabhāg bhavati | (Ibid., commentary on 1.4.) 
 
99 mahatāṃ hi rājādīnāṃ vyavahāre varṇyamāne tadaṅgabhūtāḥ sarve mukhyāmātyaprabhṛtayaḥ 
samucitapratisvikakartavyavyavahāranipuṇatayā nibadhyamānāḥ sakalavyavahārivṛttopadeśatām 
āpadyante | (Ibid., commentary on 1.4.) 
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the reading situation he instinctively imagines, or at least one that he is often concerned with, is a 
courtly one. 
Kuntaka’s preoccupation with courtly readers and characters is apparent in many of his 
discussions of Kalidasa. Of course, Kalidasa’s poems feature a variety of characters—not just 
courtly personages but also gods, semi-divine creatures, nonhumans, and the men and women of 
ashrams and cities—and as we saw above, Kuntaka is attentive to this variety. Nonetheless, when 
he writes about scenes involving courtly characters, often he not only describes how a particular 
verse or scene styles the reader’s attention but also passes judgment on what is being depicted. To 
illustrate the nature of these judgments, below I have gathered passages from across the 
Vakroktijīvita where Kuntaka examines the following six scenes in Kalidasa’s poetry, each of 
which features members of a court: Raghu’s determination and generosity (R 5); Dilīpa’s failure 
in moral reasoning (R 2); Duṣyanta’s amnesia and grief (A 5 and 6); Rāma’s love and bitterness (R 
13); Kāma’s bad influence (K 2); and Daśaratha’s error (R 9). In elaborating Kuntaka’s arguments 
about these scenes, I have sometimes needed to quote verses of Kalidasa which Kuntaka himself 
doesn’t explicitly cite; these are marked with an asterisk. 
 
Scene 1: Raghu’s determination and generosity. Canto 5 of the Raghuvaṃśa opens with a 
customary display of courtly decorum. King Raghu receives Kautsa with a series of questions 
suggesting that he is prepared to do anything for the sage:  
Does sage Varatantu’s askesis remain unafflicted by obstacles…?  
Are the ashram trees unharmed by the wind and other such agitations…?  
Are the fawns healthy…? 
…Do the ripened rice and grain remain uneaten by the town-cattle that feed  
on straw…? 
	 46 
…My mind longs to carry out your command….100* 
 
Kuntaka’s remarks on this scene draw our attention to a number of extreme circumstances 
surrounding Raghu’s speech: (1) Having gifted away all his wealth, the king is so poor that he 
can’t afford more than a clay pot as the container for Kautsa’s offering.101 (2) Kautsa’s request of 
fourteen crores’ worth of gold to pay off his tuition is especially demanding.102 (3) Since Raghu 
has already conquered the entire earth in Canto 4, there is literally nowhere in the world he could 
go to acquire the money.103 (4) The heap of gold that the god Kubera finally gives Raghu, which 
is like “a quarter of mount Meru,” amounts to “a hundred or a thousand times more” than what 
Kautsa requires.104 
In Kuntaka’s reading, the extremity of these circumstances serves to elicit certain qualities 
of Raghu. Without the first three extremes, which threaten to undermine the king’s hospitality, the 
opening speech would have no occasion to pass the test of action and would therefore remain a 
mere gesture. The constraints thus force Raghu to make good on his word: in order to come up 
with the gold in the face of such abject incapacity, he must prove that he is courageous enough to 
                                                
100 …āpadyate na vyayam antarāyaiḥ kaccin maharṣes…tapaḥ? (R 5.5); kaccin na vāyvādir 
upaplavo vaḥ…āśramapādapānām? (R 5.6); kaccin mṛgīṇām anaghā prasūtiḥ? (R 5.7); 
nīvārapākādi kaḍaṅgarīyair āmṛśyate jānapadair na kaccit? (R 5.9); …mano 
niyogakriyayotsukam me (R 5.11) 
 
101 viśvajidākhyamakhadīkṣādakṣiṇīkṛtasamastasaṃpadaḥ (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 246, 
commentary on 4.1-2.) 
 
102 samāveditacaturdaśakoṭiparimāṇacāmīkarām ācāryaprad[ey?]adakṣiṇām (Ibid., 247, 
commentary on 4.1-2.) 
 
103 caturudadhikāñcīkalāpālaṃkaraṇakāśyapīparivṛḍhasya (Ibid., 246, commentary on 4.1-2.) 
 
104 The first quote is from Kalidasa: …pādaṃ sumeroriva…. (VJ 4.ś6; R 5.18). The second is 
from Kuntaka: prārthitāt śataguṇaṃ sahasraguṇaṃ vā (Ibid., 248, commentary on 4.1-2.) 
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battle the heavens, to consider even the god Kubera “as though he were a neighboring and 
subordinate king.” It is the king’s unrelenting determination to achieve success (jayādhyavasāyaḥ), 
occasioned by a seemingly impossible situation, that for Kuntaka gives the scene “its remarkable 
capacity to delight sensitive readers.”105  
The amount of gold gifted by Kubera presents a similar kind of test. If Raghu were given 
just the required amount, a basic sense of decorum alone would compel him to fulfill Kautsa’s 
request and give him all the gold. The excess gold thus tests the true limits of the king’s generosity: 
because Raghu gifts away even the surplus so freely, “what emerges is an incredible height of 
nobility outshining even the wish-granting trees of heaven, which are inferior in their generosity 
since they are marred by the fault of requiring a desire.”106 The wish-granting trees are typically 
paragons of generosity because they fulfill any wish one might have. Yet one must have a wish in 
the first place before the trees can fulfill it; in this regard Raghu’s generosity exceeds that of the 
trees, since his gift goes above and beyond what Kautsa had initially requested.  
Each extreme circumstance thus distills an essential quality of Raghu, making it “throb 
out.”107 For Kuntaka, the opening of Canto 5 instantiates a more general technique of scene-
construction (prakaraṇa-vakratā) which readers could find in other poetry too: “In the same way 
[as I have done here], sensitive readers should themselves look out for this kind of beauty which 
                                                
105 kuberaṃ prati sāmantasaṃbhāvanayā jayādhyavasāyaḥ kāmapi sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādakāritāṃ 
pratipadyate | (Ibid., 247, commentary on 4.1 and 2.)  
 
106 sarvasya viśrāṇāt…kalpanākalaṅkakadarthitārthavitaraṇānuccatarān kalpatarūnapi 
tiraskurvāṇaḥ sa kopyaudāryasīmāviśeṣaḥ samujjṛmbhate (Ibid., commentary on 4.1 and 4.2.) 
 
107 yatra niryantraṇotsāhaparispandopaśobhinī pravṛttir vyavahartṝṇām…|| VJ 4.1 || 
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flows with emotion (i.e., the beauty resulting from this technique) in the works of great poets.”108 
If the beauty of such scenes “flows with emotion,” it is because extreme circumstances often give 
rise to the emotions worthy of literary representation. The emotional range of daily life is typically 
narrow: it is not every day that people are driven to intense determination, rage, love, grief, or 
terror. That is why literature often stages situations that exceed the conditions of everyday life, 
since often it is by the pressure of extreme circumstances that one’s nature expresses itself to the 
fullest. 
 
Scene 2: Dilipa’s failure in moral reasoning. The king Dilipa also encounters a set of extreme 
circumstances that reveal his nature, in Canto 2 of Raghuvaṃśa. When Dilipa seeks Vasishta’s 
help to ensure the continuation of his lineage, the sage instructs him to honor the magical cow 
Nandini, tending to all her needs until she is satisfied. After twenty-one days pass with no 
significant obstacles, Nandini creates an obstacle of her own in order to test the king’s mettle: in a 
rare moment when Dilipa loses focus, she wanders into a cave and simulates being attacked by a 
lion. The king draws an arrow to shoot the lion but finds that his hand has been mysteriously 
paralyzed—“as though its deed had been set down in a painting”*—and that a physical contest has 
turned into a rhetorical one.109 
The ensuing debate tests Dilipa’s ability to distinguish genuine arguments from spurious 
ones. While all the lion’s arguments seem reasonable, they simply use the language of reason to 
justify a desired result. The king’s task is to counter these sophistical arguments with sound 
                                                
108 evam eṣā mahākaviprabandheṣu prakaraṇavakratāvicchittiḥ rasaniṣyandinī sahṛdayaiḥ svayam 
utprekṣaṇīyā | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 248, commentary 4.1 and 2.) 
 
109 karaḥ…citrārpitārambhaḥ… || R 2.31|| 
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reasoning that would recommend the proper course of action, however perilous that may be—in 
this case, to offer himself in place of the cow. But resisting the lion’s seductive logic is not easy, 
as Kalidasa’s narrative voice suggests:  
Having spoken this much, the lion stopped; 
but by his echo which filled the cave, it seemed 
the mountain too boomed the same thoughts 
to the king with affection.*110  
 
If the echo sounds affectionate, it is because it rings with the alluring subtext of the lion’s speech. 
For in addition to justifying why he is right to eat the cow, the lion’s arguments also show Dilipa 
a way to avoid a premature death while at the same time protecting his honor. It is more likely the 
king than the narrator, then, who imagines the echo as the mountain’s affectionate voice. 
In Kalidasa’s poem, Dilipa is ultimately successful in resisting the lion’s false arguments 
that would save his life: when he drops his bow and willingly submits to his own death, Nandini 
puts off her disguise and honors the king, eventually granting him an heir in Raghu. For Kuntaka, 
however, one of Dilipa’s responses has a crucial flaw, which goes unremarked even by Nandini. 
In 2.49 the lion proposes that the loss of a single cow might be compensated by a gift of other 
cows: 
So you fear that your teacher,  
the very image of fire, 
shall be enraged at a crime  
committed against this one cow.  
But you can quell his anger 
by presenting him crores’ worth 
of cows with udders full as brimming pots.111 
 
                                                
110 etāvad uktvā virate mṛgendre pratisvanenāsya guhāgatena | śiloccayo’pi kṣitipālam uccaiḥ 
prītyā tam evārtham abhāṣateva || R 2.51 || 
 
111 athaikadhenor aparādhacaṇḍād guroḥ kṛśānupratimād bibheṣi |  
śakyo’sya manyur bhavatā’pi netuṃ gāḥ koṭiśaḥ sparśayatā ghaṭoghnīḥ || 
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The lion’s logic here distorts the nature of Dilipa’s situation in two ways: first, it suggests that the 
king’s deeds should be motivated by a fear of adverse consequences rather than the inherent dignity 
of actions; second, it presumes that Nandini’s life is suitable to be exchanged. While the king 
adequately responds to the first distortion (“For a man to let perish what is meant to be protected, 
then stand before his master while he remains unhurt—this is impossible”*),112 in Kuntaka’s view 
his response to the second distortion misses the point: 
How can the sage be placated  
by a gift of other cows?  
Know this cow to be no inferior  
to [her mother] Surabhi;  
you could only have attacked her  
by the strength of Shiva.113 
 
In order to expose the troubling implication of the king’s response, Kuntaka rephrases it as follows: 
“‘If it were ever possible to match this cow with other cows, then it might indeed be admissible 
for the sage and me to consider giving up on the protection of this life.’”114 In other words, by 
invoking Nandini’s superiority to other cows, Dilipa implies that certain cows are intrinsically 
more worth protecting than others. Yet the true error in the lion’s argument consists not in its 
underestimation of Nandini’s life, but in the presumption that life can be evaluated at all and even 
exchanged. As a king who must ensure the well-being of all creatures in his dominion, Dilipa 
                                                
112 …sthātuṃ niyoktur na hi śakyam agre vināśya rakṣyaṃ svayam akṣatena || R 2. 56 || 
 
113 katham nu śakyānunayo maharṣir viśrāṇanād anyapayasvinīnām |  
imām anūnāṃ surabher avehi rudraujasā tu prahṛtaṃ tvayāsyām || R 2.54 || 
 
114 ityanyāsāṃ gavāṃ tatprativastupradānayogyatā yadi kadācit saṃbhavati tatas tasya muner 
mama cobhayorapyetaj jīvitaparirakṣaṇair apekṣyam upapannam iti (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 71, 
commentary on 1.57) 
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should instead have argued that each life, regardless of whose, is valuable in its singularity. For 
Kuntaka, “[his] statement thus has a great unfittingness.”115 
 
Scene 3: Dushyanta’s amnesia and grief. Kalidasa bases his drama Abhijñānaśākuntala on an 
episode recited in the Mahābhārata. In both versions of the story, the king Dushyanta elopes with 
Shakuntala, a young woman he meets in the forest on a hunting trip, before returning to his court 
in Hastinapura. Some months later, when Shakuntala arrives at Dushyanta’s court pregnant with 
his child, he bizarrely “forgets” her, refusing to acknowledge he has even seen the girl. Kalidasa’s 
most significant change to the original story concerns the nature of this refusal: “whereas the 
reason for the forgetting is untold in the epic, the poet [has created] a curse spoken by the sage 
Durvasa.”116 In Kalidasa’s play, the sage casts this curse when Shakuntala fails to show him 
hospitality (wrapped up as she is in the thought of Dushyanta) and, enraged, he intends to teach 
her how it feels to be neglected: 
You fail to notice me, vessel of askesis, as I approach!  
The man whom you contemplate with undivided attention 
shall forget you, even when reminded, 
like one intoxicated forgets a story he has told before.117 
 
For Kuntaka, Kalidasa’s invention of the curse is another example of the artistry involved in scene-
construction (prakaraṇa-vakratā). But what is so artistic about this invention? That is, what effects 
does it generate in Kalidasa’s play?  
                                                
115 [iti tātparyaparyavasānād] atyantam anaucityayukteyam uktiḥ | (Ibid.) 
 
116 …duṣyantasya vismaraṇakāraṇam itivṛttāgaditam api…muner durvāsasaḥ śāpam utpāditavān 
kaveḥ | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 249, commentary on 4.3 and 4.) 
 
117 vicintayantī yam ananyamānasā taponidhiṃ vetsi na mām upasthitam | 
smariṣyati tvāṃ sa na bodhito’pi san kathāṃ pramattaḥ prathamaṃ kṛtāmiva || A 4.1 || 
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We find one answer in the final sentence of Kuntaka’s remarks on Abhijñānaśākuntala: “If 
this scene [i.e. the scene of the curse]…weren’t included, then the distastefulness of Dushyanta’s 
inexplicable forgetting would result in the misfortune of the play’s deformation….”118 Kuntaka’s 
analysis here accords well with that of recent scholars who also approach Kalidasa’s play by 
relating it to its precursor in the Mahābhārata, including Wendy Doniger and Romila Thapar.119 
There are of course important differences between Kuntaka and these modern readers. Most 
significantly, the latter tend to prefer the original story, because it portrays Shakuntala as a strong 
woman capable of defending herself and makes no excuses for Dushyanta, permitting us to direct 
our rage at him; by contrast, Kuntaka prefers Kalidasa’s version because it portrays Dushyanta as 
a righteous king, saving his character and shielding him from our rage. All these readers 
nonetheless agree that the curse introduced by Kalidasa has the privative effect of absolving 
Dushyanta of any willful cruelty towards Shakuntala.  
Yet sanitizing Dushyanta is not the only consequence of Kalidasa’s plot-change. In 
Kuntaka’s reading, the curse also makes the play “a vessel for depositing literary emotions” such 
that “the whole play acquires a remarkable beauty”; that is, the circumstances precipitated by the 
curse produce states of mind that are entirely absent in the original and that moreover “give 
                                                
118 avidyamāne punar etasmin [utpādyalavalāvaṇyalalāmni] prakaraṇe 
niṣkāraṇavismaraṇavairasyam [itihāsāṃśasyeva rūpakasyāpi] virūpakatāpattinimittatām 
avagāhate | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 251, commentary on 4.3-4.) 
 
119 See Romila Thapar, Sakuntala: Texts, Readings, Histories (Columbia University Press, 2011), 
73–74, and Wendy Doniger, The Ring of Truth and Other Myths of Sex and Jewelry (Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 74–83. 
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pleasure to sensitive readers.”120 Most of Kuntaka’s analysis of Śākuntala is devoted to identifying 
the new states of mind made possible by Kalidasa’s version of events.  
The most famous of these appears near the beginning of Act 5, when Dushyanta hears a 
woman in his palace sing the following words: 
Haṃsapadikā:  
Bee! After kissing the mango-blossom  
like that, panting for its fresh honey,  
how could you now have forgotten it,  
resting at ease inside a mere lotus?121 
 
The song fills Dushyanta with an inexplicable sense of compunction, prompting him to ask 
himself, “Hearing a song with such a meaning, though not far from anyone I love, why am I 
suddenly filled with sorrow?”* The audience knows that if Hamsapadika’s reproach of a neglectful 
bee disturbs Dushyanta, it is because at some level he remembers his own neglect of Shakuntala. 
Dushyanta is shut out from this crucial knowledge, and must therefore formulate his own 
remarkable hypothesis: 
When even a happy man is disturbed  
on seeing visions beautiful, and hearing sweet words, 
perhaps then he remembers with his soul,  
though not his wakeful mind, affections  
of another birth rooted in the heart.122 
                                                
120 evaṃvidhasya saṃvidhānakasya rasanidhānakalaśāyamānasya [māhātmyād] akhilasyāpi 
nāṭakasya kāpi (vicchittiḥ) | (…Kuntaka’s list of various scenes…) parasparaṃ prakāśībhavad 
anargalānurāgaprāgbhārasaṅgād atīva] sahṛdayāhlādakāri | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 250, 
commentary on 4.3-4.) 
 
121 ahiṇavamahuloluvo tumaṃ taha paricumbia cūamaṅjarīm | 
kamalavasaimettaṇivvudo mahuara vimhario si ṇaṃ kahaṃ || A 5.1 || 
(Skt. chāyā: abhinavamadhulolupas tvam tathā paricumbya cūtamañjarīm | 
kamalavasatimātranirvṛto madhukara vismṛto ‘sy enām katham ||) 
 
122 rājā (ātmagatam)—kiṃ nu khalu gītam evaṃvidhārtham ākarṇyeṣtajanavirahād ṛte’pi 
balād utkaṇṭhito’smi | athavā | 
ramyāṇi vīkṣya madhurāṁśca niśamya śabdān 
paryutsuko bhavati yatsukhito’pi jantuḥ | 
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It is clear from Dushyanta’s words that his memory of Shakuntala has not been razed out entirely; 
as Kuntaka writes, “although the sage’s curse has blocked the memory of her, an impression of his 
lover tremble[s] forth.”123 In addition to shifting the blame from Dushyanta, then, the curse allows 
Kalidasa to explore in his writing the workings of a passive domain of thinking (cetas), 
inaccessible to the “waking” or conscious mind (bodha) while nonetheless influencing it. Or as 
Krishnamoorthy puts it in his account of Kuntaka’s analysis, it is not just a question of guilt-
clearing but also a “question of probing the inmost depths underlying the psychology” of 
Dushyanta.124 
At another moment in his analysis, Kuntaka has us attend to Dushyanta’s state of mind in 
Act 6 when, after seeing the ring he had gifted Shakuntala, he suddenly remembers her. Shakuntala 
had lost this ring on her way to Dushyanta’s court and was consequently unable to remind him of 
their love. When it finally reaches the court by an unlikely route—Shakuntala’s finger, a river, the 
belly of a fish, the hands of a fisherman, and finally the hands of the king’s officers—Shakuntala 
is long gone, and Dushyanta is “[ruined] by the intensity of an insufferable fever of separation.”125 
The chamberlain describes the king’s state of mind in words that Kuntaka quotes for their 
exemplarity: 
He refuses to wear beautiful ornaments: 
only one shining gold bangle adorns his left wrist. 
                                                
taccetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvaṃ 
bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni || A 5.2 || 
 
123 muniśāpāpasāritapreyasīsmṛter api tadadhivāsanāpi ca parisphurantī… | (Kuntaka, 
Vakroktijīvita, 250, commentary on 4.3-4.) 
 
124 Krishnamoorthy, “Kālidāsa in the Eyes of Kuntaka,” 131. 
 
125 …duḥsahavirahajvarapātāvegavikala[tvam] | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 251, commentary on 
4.34.)  
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His lower lip is red from sighs, 
his eyes wearied from insomnia. 
On account of his own radiance, he is  
like a brilliant gem cut to perfection: 
reduced, though it doesn’t seem that way.126 
 
Kuntaka doesn’t explain in detail why Dushyanta’s sadness should so “give pleasure sensitive 
readers.” We might guess, however, that here too it has partly to do with Kalidasa’s treatment of 
memory. Perplexed by the belatedness of his recollection, Dushyanta wonders aloud what could 
have caused his amnesia: “Was it a dream? Or an illusion? Or a mental glitch? Or did my fortune 
diminish after completely exhausting itself?”*127 He makes another attempt at understanding his 
amnesia in Act 7, where he describes the episode with an astonishing simile:  
Suppose a man were to say ‘there is no elephant’  
when one is before his eyes;  
were to doubt himself when it passes by;  
then, having seen footprints,  
were convinced that one had been there.  
Such was my mind’s transformation.”*128 
 
The simile astonishes precisely because it corresponds to no conceivable experience, failing to 
deliver on the concreteness it seems to promise. For one could reasonably struggle to perceive a 
flash of lightning, an eye’s glint, or a hummingbird’s wing, registering these only by the traces 
they leave behind; not so an elephant. I take the bluntness of Dushyanta’s choice of example to 
stress the unconscionability of forgetting a loved one. We often remember those we love suddenly 
                                                
126  pratyādiṣṭaviśeṣamaṇḍanavidhir vāmaprakoṣṭhārpitaṃ 
bibhrat kāñcanam ekam eva valayaṃ śvāsoparaktādharaḥ | 
cintājāgaraṇapratāmranayanas tejoguṇād ātmanaḥ 
saṃskārollikhito mahāmaṇiriva kṣīṇo’pi nālakṣyate || A 6.6 || 
 
127 svapno nu māyā nu matibhramo nu kliṣṭaṃ nu tāvatphalam eva puṇyam || A 6.10 || 
 
128 yathā gajo neti samakṣarupe tasminn apakrāmati saṃśayaḥ syāt | 
padāni dṛṣṭvā tu bhavatpratītis tathāvidho me manaso vikāraḥ || A 7.31 || 
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and in absentia—stumbling on old gifts or letters, flipping through albums, hearing a name 
mentioned in passing—when it seems both impossible and unforgivable that we ever failed to 
acknowledge them while they were in our presence. While Durvasa’s curse may seem a magical 
cause of Dushyanta’s amnesia, external to the workings of his mind, the condition it creates in him 
in fact amounts to a bizarre exaggeration of a recognizable experience.129 Here as before, Kuntaka 
highlights a state of mind that the curse uniquely generates (in this case Dushyanta’s grief at having 
forgotten), demonstrating that Kalidasa’s invention not only “touches up” Dushyanta’s character 
but also makes possible the depiction of new emotions that give pleasure to sensitive readers by 
resonating with their experience—much as Hamsapadika’s song moves Dushyanta by resonating 
with his.130 While Kuntaka’s analysis doesn’t interfere with readings that rightly emphasize the 
sexism haunting Shakuntala’s story, it presses us to also consider these other complexities in 
Kalidasa’s play. 
 
                                                
129 Cf. Mark Freeman, “‘Too Late’: The Temporality of Memory and the Challenge of Moral 
Life,” Journal für Psychologie 11 (2003): 54–74. Freeman’s discussion of the relations among 
time, memory, and morality strike me as especially pertinent to Dushyanta’s situation. Consider 
for instance the following passage: “There is something missing now, in my immediate 
experience. This something is that future which, in due time, will come along and allow me to 
see what it is that seems to have gone on. This is often when the trouble begins. Looking 
backward, suddenly cognizant of the inexorable limits of my earlier view of things, I may be 
taken by the sheer pain of knowing what I couldn’t see, what I couldn’t anticipate” (Ibid., 61). 
 
130 The idea of “touching up” comes directly from Kuntaka’s description of how Kalidasa has 
changed the Mahābhārata’s version of the Shakuntala story: “When a writer develops a beautiful 
radiance by means of an excellent new embellishment, it helps bring about the same 
indescribable beauty we find in a ruined, old painting that has been restored again by a single 
brushstroke.” <pravaranavasaṃskārakāraṇaramaṇīyakāntiparipoṣaḥ 
rekhārājamānapurātanatruṭitacitradaśāspadasaubhāgyam anubhavati |> (Kuntaka, 
Vakroktijīvita, 249, commentary on 4.3-4.) 
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Scene 4: Rama’s love and bitterness. To illustrate his claim that delicate poetry “resonates with 
the minds” of sensitive readers (statement 1.26 of the passage examined in section 1), Kuntaka 
points us to a set of verses in Raghuvaṃśa Canto 13: “When Rama has killed off Ravana and is 
returning on the sky-car named Pushpaka, he describes to Sita the hardships he underwent in each 
of several locations while his heart was suffering from their separation. All his sentences [there] 
serve as examples.”131 If these sentences are exemplary for their resonance (saṃvāda), it is because 
of the complex states of mind they record. Consider for instance 13.28, quoted in full by Kuntaka: 
Remembering at night your trembling embrace  
which I’d once enjoyed, fearful Sita, 
I somehow endured the cloud’s thundering  
as it passed through the caves.132 
 
Rama here remembers a time he remembered Sita, thus relating three moments: the moment of 
speaking (present), the moment of enduring solitude (recent past), and the moment of being 
embraced by Sita (distant past). While it is possible to represent these moments as distinct points 
on a timeline, Rama’s thoughts do not respect such a clean divide between past and present. For 
in describing Sita as “fearful,” Rama clearly has in mind Sita of the distant past, whose fear of 
thunder made her cling to him. Yet Rama’s use of the vocative (bhīru, “O fearful one!”) suggests 
he is talking about Sita in the present, as though the intensity of his memory has so overwhelmed 
him that for a brief moment—the moment of calling out to Sita—that memory becomes his present 
reality. The peculiar temporality of reminiscence is made even more explicit in verse 35:  
Here by the Godavari, retired from the hunt, 
                                                
131 atrodāharaṇāni raghau rāvaṇaṃ nihatya puṣpakeṇāgacchato rāmasya sītāyās 
tadvirahavidhurahṛdayena mayāsminn asmin samuddeśe kimapy evaṃvidhaṃ vaiśasam 
anubhūtam iti varṇayataḥ sarvāṇy eva vākyāni | (Ibid., 46, commentary on 1.25-29.) 
 
132 pūrvānubhūtaṃ smaratā ca rātrau kampottaraṃ bhīru tavopagūḍham | 
guhāvisārīṇyativāhitāni mayā kathaṃcid ghanagarjitāni || R 13.28 || 
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my fatigue carried off by wind from the waves, 
alone, my head resting on your lap, 
I remember, asleep among the reed bowers.133* 
 
The fourteenth-century Sanskrit commentator Mallinatha glosses “I remember asleep” (smarāmi 
suptaḥ) with the more grammatical expression “I remember that I slept” (supta iti yat tat smarāmi), 
replacing Kalidasa’s ambiguous phrasing with one that clearly distinguishes between the 
remembered moment and the moment of remembering.134 However, it is precisely the blurring of 
these moments that makes Kalidasa’s words adequate to the lived experience of reminiscence. For 
here too Rama’s memory has so absorbed him that the distinction between past and present 
momentarily vanishes. The syntax likewise expresses this ambiguity: the compounds crowded in 
the first three quarters of the verse lack a temporal marker, as if the experience they report were 
purified of tense. 
Whereas the memories in verses 28 and 35 derive their intensity from Rama’s love for Sita, 
the intensity of the memory recorded in verse 59 arises from a different emotion: 
This is that city of the king of Nishada where 
after removing my crest jewel  
I tied up my matted hair, and Sumantra cried, 
“Kaikeyi, your wishes have come true!”135 
 
What strikes Kuntaka here is “the fact that [Rama] should not only remember so small a remark 
as this but also repeat it….” Rama’s exact recollection of words uttered more than fourteen years 
                                                
133 atrānugodaṃ mṛgayānivṛttas taraṅgavātena vinītakhedaḥ | 
rahas tvadutsaṅganiṣaṇṇamūrdhā smarāmi vānīragṛheṣu suptaḥ || R 13.35 || 
 
134 Kālidāsa, Raghuvaṃśa (Raghuvaṁśam of Kālidāsa, Sanjivini Commentary of Mallinatha and 
Chandrakala Hindi Commentary), ed. Shrikrishnamani Tripathi (Varanasi: Chaukhamba 
Surbharti Prakashan, n.d.), 441. 
 
135 puraṃ niṣādādhipates tad etad yasmin mayā maulimaṇiṃ vihāya | 
jaṭāsu baddhāsvarudat sumantraḥ kaikeyi kāmāḥ phalitās taveti || R 13.59 || 
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earlier points to a residual bitterness which he hasn’t managed to overcome, even as he is on the 
verge of reclaiming his kingdom. When he repeats Sumantra’s words to Sita, then, he isn’t simply 
recounting an autobiographical fact but reliving the experience of being uncrowned, harboring its 
sting in the present. According to Kuntaka, “Rama is described” elsewhere in the Raghuvaṃśa “as 
one possessing the virtues of a great and faultless man”; by contrast, the depiction of Rama in 
verse 59 “brings a great unfittingness” to the work, since it introduces a pettiness unworthy of a 
king and therefore unworthy of being represented in literature.136  
 
Scene 5: Kama’s bad influence. Because all its characters are mythic or divine, the 
Kumārasaṃbhava may seem the farthest removed among Kalidasa’s works from human life. 
Nonetheless, Kuntaka finds in Canto 3 a representation of the court, understanding the relationship 
between Indra and Kama as that between a king and his friend or adviser (and thus somewhat 
resembling the relationship between Agnimitra and Gautama, or Dushyanta and Madhavya): “At 
the moment when Indra, king of the gods, desires to defeat his enemy called Taraka, who has 
devoted all his might to trespassing on the three worlds, he is addressed by Manmatha [i.e., Kama] 
as follows: 
What devoted wife, troubling you with her faithfulness,  
has entered your fickle mind with her beauty; 
what wide-hipped woman, whom you wish would  
give up her shame and wrap her arms freely about your neck?”137 
                                                
136 atra raghupater anarghamahāpuruṣasaṃpadupetatvena varṇyamānasya kaikeyi kāmāḥ phalitās 
tava ityevaṃvidhatucchatarapadārthasaṃsmaraṇaṃ tadabhidhānaṃ cātyantam anaucityam 
āvahati | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 71, commentary on 1.57.) 
 
137 trailokyākrāntipravaṇaparākramasya tārakākhyasya ripor jigīṣāvasare surapatir 
manmathenābhidhīyate— 
kām ekapatnīṃ vrataduḥkhaśīlāṃ lolaṃ manaś cārutayā praviṣṭām | 
nitambinīm icchasi muktalajjāṃ kaṇṭhe svayaṃgrāhaniṣaktabāhum || VJ 1.ś125; K 3.7 || (Ibid., 
72, commentary on 1.57.) 
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The language Kuntaka uses to introduce these words suggests that, at least in Kalidasa’s portrayal, 
the difference between divine and human courts is merely one of scale: both function according to 
the same basic principles, both answerable to the same criteria of judgment, and for Kuntaka this 
means there is a problem with the way that Kama speaks to Indra: 
[His statement] pertains to the performance of improper deeds, and it is said in such 
a way [as to suggest] that even Indra, though he stands as ruler of the three worlds, 
is given to entertaining such thoughts. 
 
From the epics and puranas it is well known that Indra often abuses his power, engaging in petty 
wars and antics in order to satisfy his personal desires. However, it is not Kama’s place to remind 
either Indra or the audience of those desires: in Indra’s case, such speech encourages the very 
behavior that good advisers should be discouraging; in the case of the audience, it mars an 
otherwise sound depiction of model behavior (i.e., a ruler’s tactfully dealing with a genuine threat 
to his kingdom). Kama’s statement “thus brings a great unfittingness.”138 
 
Scene 6: Dasharatha’s error. Canto 9 of the Raghuvaṃśa retells an episode of the Rāmāyaṇa 
whose events might be summarized, as Kuntaka demonstrates, in a single sentence: “When 
Dasharatha was occupied in the hunting ground along the edges of the riverbank, he lost focus and 
killed the son of a blind old ascetic.”139 An attempt to justify Dasharatha’s accident might go 
something like this: 
                                                
138 ityavinayānuṣṭhānaniṣṭhaṃ triviṣṭapādhipatyapratiṣṭhitasyāpi 
tathāvidhābhiprāyānuvartanaparatvenābhidhīyamānam anaucityam āvahati |  (Ibid. 
 
139 taraṅgiṇītīralekhāsv ākheṭavāṭodyatena pramādyatā daśarathena rājñā 
sthavirāndhatapasvibālavadho vyadhīyata [iti ekavākyaśakyapratipādanaḥ…ayam arthaḥ] | (Ibid., 
259, commentary on 4.7-8.) 
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For many days and nights, Dasharatha’s mind had been constantly under the 
influence of various kinds of hunting, such that it had neglected all other activities; 
such was the greatness of his desire for hunting….140  
 
But for Kuntaka, such a justification is weak, and the appropriate response to the story should be 
moral outrage: 
Living creatures of that kind should not be killed. Therefore, the fact that this man, 
who is the pinnacle of the solar lineage which is famous for displaying good 
conduct and entrusted with providing fearlessness in all the worlds; this man who 
has thoroughly studied all the disciplines, who values his good fame; Dasharatha, 
the king who graced half the throne of heaven—the fact that this man has done such 
a deed which must not at all be done, and which is yet exemplified by the great sage 
[i.e., Dasharatha], at first strikes us as not at all right.141 
 
Now, Kalidasa also offers something of a justification for Dasharatha’s error in verse 74: 
“Even the wise misstep when they are blinded by dust.”142 But this should be sharply distinguished 
from Kuntaka’s hypothetical justification, which we might imagine as coming from someone with 
a deficient moral sense. What is remarkable about Kalidasa’s extended retelling of the story is that 
it inspires sympathy for Dasharatha without minimizing his egregious error or explaining it away. 
Most of Kuntaka’s analysis of the scene demonstrates how exactly Kalidasa’s poetry 
simultaneously inspires shock and forgiveness in the reader. Kuntaka directs us to three verses that 
demonstrate Dasharatha’s hunting prowess as well as his innate compassion:  
That fearless archer, his hands deft from excellent training, 
                                                
140anekanaktaṃdinānubandhivividhamṛgayāvyāpāraparavaśīkṛtāntaḥkaraṇakavalitasakalataditara 
vyāpāravyāvṛttyavasara [prasaradabhyāsarasasodarātmaka] mṛgayānurāgagarimātaḥ | (Ibid.) 
 
141 prāṇy etādṛgrūpo na pratihanyeta tadā sadācārasaṃpādanacaṇe 
tribhuvanābhayadīkṣāvidhikāriṇi kiraṇamālinaḥ kule 
tilakkāyamānasyākhilavidyāpārāvārapāradṛśvanaḥ kīrtidhanasya dhanya (daśaratha) nāmno 
dharitrīpateḥ pavitritatridivādhipārdhāsanasya tathāvidhākaraṇīyakaraṇaṃ maharṣiṇāpy 
udāhriyamāṇam anupapannaprāyam eva pratibhāsetāpātataḥ | (Ibid., 259–60, commentary on 
4.7-8.) 
 
142 …apathe padam arpayanti hi śrutavanto’pi rajonimīlitāḥ || R 9.74 || 
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turned into quivers the tigers that leapt right at him from the caves: 
they were like trees blooming at their tips, cleft by the wind;  
their mouths filled with arrows were the quivers’ openings.143 (R 9.63) 
 
When the king strong as Indra took aim at a stag, 
a doe stood protecting it with her body. Seeing this 
the archer, his mind soft with compassion (for he was a lover), 
withdrew his arrow, though it had been drawn to his ear.144 (R 9.67) 
 
A peacock with its radiant fan flew up beside his horse. 
He didn’t even aim his arrow, for suddenly  
his mind went to his lover’s mass of hair 
dappled with a torn garland, its band having slipped in passion.145 (R 9.73) 
 
We see that while Dasharatha doesn’t hesitate to inflict harm on aggressive animals like tigers, at 
times he treats more vulnerable animals with tenderness. Such moments show that Dasharatha’s 
error cannot be attributed to his nature, which is in fact deeply compassionate; for instance, the 
sight of the loving doe triggers memories of Dasharatha’s own experiences with love, which urge 
him not to kill the stag. Verse 67 more explicitly traces out these relations of perception, memory, 
and action: Dasharatha’s sudden memory of a lover’s hair so overwhelms his perception of the 
peacock that his hand freezes. It is illuminating to compare this verse to 9.73, which describes the 
moment Dasharatha kills the boy in similar terms: 
The loud, clear sound of a pot filling  
arose from the Tamasā’s water. 
Thinking it is the trumpeting of an elephant! 
Dasharatha released an arrow into the sound.*146 
                                                
143 vyāghrān abhīr abhimukhotpatitān guhābhyaḥ phullāsanāgraviṭapāniva vāyurugṇān | 
śikṣāviśeṣalaghuhastatayā sa dhanvī tūṇīcakāra śarapūritavaktrarandhrān || VJ 4.ś25; R 9.63 || 
 
144 lakṣyīkrtasya hariṇasya hariprabhāvaḥ prekṣya sthitāṃ sahacarīṃ vyavadhāya dehāt | 
ākarṇakṛṣṭam api kāmitayā sa dhanvī bāṇaṃ kṛpāmṛdumanāḥ pratisaṃjahāra || VJ 4.ś26; R 9.67 || 
 
145 api turagasamīpād utpatantaṃ mayūraṃ na sa rucirakalāpaṃ bāṇalakṣīcakāra | 
sapadi gatamanaskaś chinnamālyānukīrṇe rativigalitabandhe keśahaste priyāyāḥ || VJ 4.ś27; R 
9.73 || 
 
146 kumbhapūraṇabhavaḥ paṭur uccair uccacāra ninado’mbhasi tasyāḥ | 
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Both verses share the basic structure of a recognitional slippage: Dasharatha’s sense falls on one 
thing (a peacock’s fan, water being drawn) but his mind registers something else (an elephant’s 
cry, his lover’s hair), altering his course of action. It is possible that the two memories differ in 
intensity: whereas Dasharatha’s memory of his lover’s hair might simply accompany his 
awareness of the peacock fan without replacing it, his memory of an elephant’s cry completely 
overrides any perception of water being drawn. Yet the more significant difference concerns the 
consequences of these slippages, that the same kind of slippage which in one instance takes life in 
another saves it. While the very fact of the killing may thus provoke a response of outrage, 
Kalidasa’s portrayal of it gets us to sympathize with Dasharatha despite the gravity of his crime. 
The same slippage which saved a peacock and killed a boy also appears at the formal level 
of Kalidasa’s writing—a fact that Kuntaka doesn’t explicitly acknowledge, though it accords well 
with his analysis. Each of the first fifty-four verses of Canto 9 concludes with a punning device 
called yamaka, where a repetition in sound (what is given to hearing) fails to produce a 
corresponding repetition in sense (what is supplied by memory). Here are some examples: 
daśadigantajitā raghuṇā yathā śriyam apuṣyad ajena tataḥ param | 
tam adhigamya tathaiva punar babhau na na [mahīna][m ahīna]parākramam || R 
9.5 ||* 
 
kusumajanma tato navapallavās tadanu ṣaṭpadakokilakūjitam | 
iti yathākramam āvirabhūn madhur dru[mavatī][m avatī]rya vanasthalīm || R 9.26 
||* 
 
atha nabhasya iva tridaśāyudhaṃ kanakapiṅgataḍidguṇasaṃyutam | 
dhanur adhijyam anādhir upādade na[ravaro] [ravaro]ṣitakesarī || R 9.54 ||* 
 
                                                
tatra sa dviradabṛṃhitaśaṅkī śabdapātinam iṣum visasarja || R 9.73 || 
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Although this device is most commonly known as yamaka, Udbhaṭa’s name for it—
punaruktavadābhāsa, or “the semblance of a redundancy”—is more suggestive in the present 
context, since the experience of listening to Kalidasa’s yamakas is precisely that of an acoustic 
glitch: we think we are hearing the same word twice but are in fact met with entirely different 
words. By the time Kalidasa asks us to sympathize with Dasharatha in 9.74, then, we cannot help 
doing so, since we have committed the same fatal error fifty-four times.147 
 
Across these analyses, Kuntaka shows a remarkable consistency in his approach, two features of 
which I would like to highlight here. The first concerns his manner of encountering characters: 
when Kuntaka meets Raghu, Dilipa, Dushyanta, Rama, Indra, Kama, and Dasharatha, he sees each 
one primarily as a possible model for ideal conduct, differing in this regard from Vedantadesika 
and Aurobindo. While the differences among the three readers will grow clearer in the coming 
chapters, I offer just two examples here as a quick preview: Vedantadesika is interested in Maricha 
of the Rāmāyaṇa not for how well he can model the behavior that one should follow or avoid, but 
rather for what his mental states reveal about the workings of the imagination;148 likewise, 
Aurobindo writes about Pururavas not as an ideal king but in order to explore the nature of the 
political revolutionary. It may be that to encounter literary characters as models for conduct, the 
social order represented in a text must reflect, or be taken to reflect, that of its readers. The second 
notable feature of Kuntaka’s approach is the subtlety of his didactic theory of literature. In each of 
                                                
147 This explanation adds to the ways that Gary Tubb has proposed we understand Kalidasa’s 
yamakas in R 9, in his essay “Kāvya with Bells On” in Bronner, Shulman, and Tubb, Innovations 
and Turning Points, 162–71. 
 
148 While it is likely that Vedantadesika also encounters Kalidasa’s characters this way (as I will 
suggest in chapter 3), I use the Maricha scene as my example here because Vedantadesika 
explicitly comments on it. 
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the discussions of Kalidasa examined above, Kuntaka is interested not so much in obvious 
examples of virtue as in the borderline cases, where the right way of thinking, acting, or speaking 
is not entirely clear. The generosity exemplified by Raghu consists not just in his readiness to meet 
requests but in his willingness to go above and beyond what is asked of him; since Dilipa ends up 
outwitting the lion, it is easy for readers to pass over his mistake in formulating an argument that 
is only apparently sound, instead of the one Kuntaka thinks he should have made; the pleasure that 
Kalidasa’s readers may take in nourishing vengeful thoughts is sanctioned, rather than questioned, 
by the depiction of Rama’s residual bitterness; and while cultivating an informal relationship with 
one’s superiors might seem a good way to win their favor, Kama really should have maintained a 
sense of professionalism with Indra. In each of these cases, Kuntaka is interested in distinguishing 
what he considers the right way of doing things not simply from the wrong way, but from the 
wrong way that masquerades as right. Nor is Kuntaka opposed to the depiction of admirable 
characters committing errors, as his analyses of the mistakes of Dushyanta and Dasharatha make 
clear. What matters in such cases is that errors be acknowledged as such. Dushyanta must therefore 
be shown to suffer from unbearable guilt, just as Kalidasa’s narrator must save Dasharatha’s 
reputation not by minimizing his mistake but rather by reminding readers that even the best among 
us sometimes falter. While the didacticism of Kuntaka’s approach may at first seem to simplify 
Kalidasa’s poetry, it in fact has the effect of cultivating attention to the subtleties (or to certain 
subtleties) of Kalidasa’s characterizations. 
 
3. Kalidasa and the Pedagogy of Pleasure 
The Vakroktijīvita gives us two portraits of Kalidasa. The first shows us a Kalidasa whose 
poetry generates pleasure in readers by altering how they pay attention to the world; the second 
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shows us a Kalidasa whose numerous courtly scenes teach readers how to conduct themselves 
properly. Kuntaka offers a number of indications of how we might understand the relationship 
between these portraits. Some of these we have already encountered, in the moments when 
Kuntaka uses the language of pleasure and attention to describe Kalidasa’s characterization of 
kings—for instance, when Kuntaka writes that the way Kalidasa imagines Dushyanta’s mental 
states “gives pleasure to sensitive readers,” or that in Kalidasa’s portrayal of Raghu, the king’s 
generosity “throbs out.” Such statements suggest that the nuances of noble conduct are among the 
things to which Kalidasa’s poetry can direct our attention. Indeed, Kuntaka explicitly says as much 
right after he points out the flaws in how Kalidasa has depicted Dilipa, Rama, and Kama: 
I have made these observations of [Kalidasa] because of the innate beauty of his 
verses which are stamped with a natural delicateness (saukumārya); such 
observations have not been made of other poets, who are known for their merely 
acquired skill in writing poems.149 
 
As we saw in section 1, “delicateness” in Kuntaka’s theory refers not just to an effortless feel in 
the poetry we happen to be reading, or a simplicity in the style. It also refers to a heightened 
attentiveness which, when turned on the nature of the mind (antaḥkaraṇaparispanda), brings to 
light the subtleties of thinking in all its complexity as remembering, feeling, judging, noticing, 
imagining, doubting, and so on. If Kuntaka is especially interested in pointing out Kalidasa’s rare 
lapses in characterization, it is because Kalidasa shows us these subtleties as few other poets do, 
so that his poetry is particularly well suited to educating readers.  
                                                
149 etac caitasyaiva kaveḥ sahajasaukumāryamudritasūktiparispandasaundaryasya paryālocyate 
na punar anyeṣām āhāryamātrakāvyakaraṇakauśalaślāghinām | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 72, 
commentary on 1.57.) 
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We find another indication of how the two portraits of Kalidasa relate to each other in the 
following passage, in which Kuntaka explains what he means by “deviation in a work” 
(prabandha-vakratā), or the artistry involved in selecting and arranging scenes: 
For an example of deviation in a work, consider any composition such as a drama, 
which has been written by a great poet and might be based on a story from the 
Rāmāyaṇa. What appears to us at first is a beautiful description of a great man that 
includes the other five varieties of deviation and thus captivates the minds of 
sensitive readers. But in the final analysis, what is achieved is an ethical lesson 
concerning what one should or should not do, such as “one should act like Rama, 
but not like Ravana.”150 
 
In Kuntaka’s ideal scenario, the pleasure and the teaching of Kalidasa’s poetry would be two 
aspects of a single experience of reading. A prince, say, might feel himself simply to be taking 
pleasure in hearing about Raghu’s unparalleled generosity, whereas in fact the story has started 
burrowing into his memory without his realizing it, already shaping his moral impulses. Such 
passages suggest that while each of Kuntaka’s remarks on Kalidasa taken by itself may seem to 
advance only one of the two accounts outlined above, both accounts in fact belong to the same 
reading, since pleasure is integral to the mechanism through which Kalidasa’s poetry instructs its 
readers. 
  
                                                
150 prabandhe vakrabhāvo yathā kutracin mahākaviviracite rāmakathopanibandhe nāṭakādau 
pañcavidhavakratāsāmagrīsamudayasundaraṃ sahṛdayahṛdayahāri mahāpuruṣavarṇanam 
upakrame pratibhāsate | paramārthatas tu vidhiniṣedhātmakadharmopadeśaḥ paryavasyati 
rāmavad vartitavyaṃ na rāvaṇavad iti | (Ibid., 38, commentary on 1.21.) 
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A Note on Kuntaka’s Theory of Literature 
There is perhaps a temptation here to identify Kuntaka’s view on the educative function of 
poetry with the didacticism that Asvaghosha famously articulates near the end of Saundarananda 
(“Handsome Nanda”), comparing his poetic presentation of the Buddhist teaching of liberation to 
“bitter medicine mixed with honey.”151 Kuntaka himself makes a similar point early in his book: 
“People of nobility…desire success but fear an intellectual challenge because they are soft-
minded.…Because a work of poetry gives pleasure to people of nobility at the same time as it 
urges them to proper action, it comes to serve as a means for achieving the four aims of life [i.e., 
morality, wealth, pleasure, and spirituality].”152 Here Kuntaka appears to share Asvaghosha’s idea 
that the pleasurable aspects of poetry are extrinsic to the principles it illustrates, serving only to 
render those principles more digestible. Yet it seems to me that these sentences are merely 
rhetorical, intended more to persuade skeptics of the value of poetry than to express Kuntaka’s full 
view on the matter. I feel forced to read them in such a way, since the crude separation they 
presume between form and content is entirely opposed to Kuntaka’s insistence throughout 
Vakroktijīvita that matters of style are inseparable from those of substance. Several passages in the 
first chapter alone converge on this basic premise, including Kuntaka’s definition of poetry as 
“word and idea together”; his claim that poeticity (kavyatā) belongs as much to ideas as to words; 
his interpretation of the word sāhitya (“literature”) in its literal sense of “togetherness”; and his 
definition of a poetic word as “the single expressor of an intended meaning, even where synonyms 
                                                
151 tiktam ivauṣadhaṃ madhuyutam || SN 18.65 || 
 
152 abhijātāḥ [khalu rājaputradayo dharmādyupeyārthino] vijigīṣavaḥ kleśabhīravaś ca, 
sukumārāśayatvāt teṣāṃ | …  abhijātānām āhlādakatve sati pravartakatvāt kāvyabandho 
dharmādiprāptyupāyatām pratipadyate | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 3, commentary on 1.3.) 
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might do.”153 In each of these passages, Kuntaka insists that the features which differentiate poetic 
language from other kinds of speech are not gratuitous or merely seductive, but arise from the 
necessity to express ideas with adequate nuance. And in the remaining chapters of the book, he 
develops this claim by listing the particular ways that poets modify language to generate nuances 
of meaning. If he finds such possibilities for modification (vakratā) at every level of language—
at levels of syllable, suffix, word (chapter 2), sentence (chapter 3), scene, and work (chapter 4)—
it is because at each stage of the creative process, writers are confronted with choices that bear on 
how the objects of their attention are to be depicted. All this implies that for Kuntaka, the pleasure 
we experience while reading doesn’t just come from the formal aspects of language, in the way 
that the sweetness of Asvaghosha’s drug mixture comes solely from honey; rather, it is generated 
by the cognition uniquely called forth by a writer’s words. Continuing with this line of thought 
would of course lead us beyond the domain of poetry to the general idea that using words well 
amounts to thinking well, and vice versa. As Kuntaka himself puts it in one of the finest passages 
of the Vakroktijīvita, 
The goal of literary inquiry154 is to determine whether a given sentence will be able 
to captivate a reader by the force of its vibrancy (parispandamāhātmya). It may be 
true that each of the disciplines [grammar, hermeneutics, logic, and literary inquiry] 
is chief in its own domain, the others being secondary. Even so, the poet’s work—
                                                
153 The first passage is VJ 1.7 ff. (śabdārthau sahitau…kāvyam); the second passage is VJ 1.6 ff. 
(…tattvaṃ sālaṅkārasya kāvyatā) and continues in Ibid., 9, commentary on 1.7 ff. (na 
śabdasyaiva ramaṇīyatāviśiṣṭasya kevalasya kāvyatvaṃ nāpyarthasya); the third appears in 
Ibid., 24, commentary on 1.17 ff. (sāhitayor bhāva iti sāhityam); and the last passage with VJ 1.9 
(śabdo vivakṣitārthaikavācako’nyeṣu satsvapi). 
 
154 While sāhitya usually refers to literature itself, the context clearly indicates that here it refers 
to the discipline concerned with literature (i.e., alaṅkāraśāstra, or “the study of literature,” or 
“literary inquiry”).  
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that is to say, literary work—is the very source of vibrancy in all sentences, and 




                                                
155 idam eva parispandamāhātmyāt sahṛdayahāritāṃ pratipannam iti sāhityasyopayujyamānatā | 
eteṣāṃ yadyapi pratyekaṃ svaviṣaye prādhānyam anyeṣāṃ guṇībhāvas tathāpi 
sakalavākyaparispandajīvitāyamānasyāsya sāhityalakṣaṇasyaiva kavivyāpārasya vastutaḥ 
sarvātiśāyitvam | (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 25, commentary on 1.17.)  
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Chapter 3: Vedantadesika’s Kalidasa 
Poet of Daydreams 
 
Since Vedantadesika’s reading of Kalidasa is reflected mainly in allusive references, it differs from 
the readings of Kuntaka and Aurobindo in the kind of challenge it presents. My task in this chapter 
will be to show that such references do indeed tell us much about how Vedantadesika read 
Kalidasa, and to reconstruct that reading with the help of Vedantadesika’s wider body of writing. 
Unlike the canonical texts of Srivaishnavism on which Vedantadesika has written direct 
commentaries, Kalidasa’s poems don’t command any sort of religious authority; they don’t offer 
Vedantadesika any effective personal prayers, access to metaphysical truths, or assistance in 
leading a religious life. Nothing is gained by unearthing their hidden meanings. Nonetheless, 
Vedantadesika clearly spent a lot of time reading Kalidasa’s poetry: his memory is stored with it, 
as we can tell from the allusions to Kalidasa which turn up throughout his writing. If truth is not 
what Vedantadesika is after in Kalidasa’s poetry, then what drew him to it? Especially given that 
Vedantadesika was first and foremost a theologian, how are we to understand his investment in 
Kalidasa? 
Many have understood Vedantadesika’s relationship to Kalidasa to be confined to the 
domain of poetry (understood in a belletristic sense), and within that domain to be primarily 
agonistic. For instance, a traditional account runs that Vedantadesika’s description of Sita in fifteen 
adjectives (H 2.10) was meant to outdo Kalidasa’s fourteen-adjective description of the yakshini 
(MD 2.22).156 Yigal Bronner and David Shulman paint a similar picture when they characterize 
Vedantadesika’s allusions to Kalidasa in Haṃsasandeśa (“The Message of the Goose”) as attempts 
to supersede him: “It is as if Vedanta Deshika were telling us that the [Meghadūta] had to be 
                                                
156 The account continues that Vedantadesika didn’t succeed, since Kalidasa’s single word śyāmā 
had four different meanings. 
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superseded so that his own composition could emerge in all its uniqueness.”157 Many of 
Vedantadesika’s references to Kalidasa do indeed appear to be competitive in the way these 
accounts suggest; however, not all of them are. As we will see below, we also find Vedantadesika 
deferring to Kalidasa’s wisdom, deepening his thoughts, disagreeing with his statements (which is 
not to say competing with Kalidasa), glossing his expressions, repurposing his images, thinking 
with his metaphors…. For each reference, whatever its tone, what remains to be understood is why 
Vedantadesika engages Kalidasa on the specific point that he does. In section 1, I assemble a 
number of Vedantadesika’s references to Kalidasa selected from across his oeuvre, in order to 
determine first which aspects of Kalidasa’s poetry impress Vedantadesika enough for him to 
reproduce them in his own work. I then look to a range of sources to understand why these aspects 
have impressed him more than others, and why he reproduces them in the particular ways that he 
has: in section 2, I examine the understanding of devotional attention developed in the writings of 
Ramanuja and Vedantadesika, and in section 3, I examine the episodes of trance-like daydreaming 
that turn up repeatedly in Kalidasa’s poetry. The affinities between Kalidasa and Vedantadesika 
that emerge in these sections suggest that if Vedantadesika is interested in Kalidasa’s poetry, it is 
because he finds recorded in it experiences of the imagination that align with his own thinking on 
devotional meditation. In section 4, I look to Vedantadesika’s Haṃsasandeśa for explicit 
confirmation of this suggestion. Last, in section 5, I propose that much of Vedantadesika’s poetry 
should be read not as compositions intended to generate in their audience an aesthetic response but 
as transcripts of his devotional meditations; that is, as his performance of the kind of devotional 
meditation delineated in sections 2, 3, and 4. 
                                                
157 Appayya Dikshita, Nilakantha Dikshita, and Vedanta Deshika, “Self-Surrender,” “Peace,” 
“Compassion,” & “Mission of the Goose”: Poems and Prayers from South India, trans. Yigal 
Bronner and David Shulman (New York: NYU Press, 2009), xxvi. 
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1. The Presence of Kalidasa in Vedantadesika’s Writing 
 
Vedantadesika’s references to Kalidasa, which traditional readers have often taken pleasure 
in pointing out, range from verbatim reproductions of particular phrases to subtle evocations. The 
latter cases present a peculiar sort of challenge: on one hand, they are harder to establish with 
certainty; on the other, their very subtlety might be taken as evidence of how deeply Kalidasa has 
entered the element of Vedantadesika’s thinking (the way a charming friend’s mannerisms, say, 
or a powerful thinker’s thought-style, can rub off on us without our realizing it). By including a 
number of such references below, I am not trying to suggest that each one of them should be 
understood primarily in terms of its relation to Kalidasa, or even that its relation to Kalidasa is 
distinct from its relation to other poets in the tradition (indeed, readers familiar with Sanskrit 
literature may find that some of the lines I wish to draw from Vedantadesika to Kalidasa could 
also be drawn to other poets, such as Asvaghosha, Bana, or Bhavabhuti). Rather, my hope is that 
the references assembled below, varying in degree of subtlety, will together generate an impression 
of the kind of presence that Kalidasa has in Vedantadesika’s writing. 
 
At one point in Chapter 15 of Rahasyatrayasāra (“The Essence of the Three Secrets”), 
Vedantadesika quotes Kalidasa while urging devotees who have surrendered to god (prapannas) 
to keep company with knowledgeable and pious teachers:  
[The devotee should] grow pure in knowledge in the very manner indicated in the 
verse, “Even an idiot becomes intelligent by seeking the company of the wise. 
Muddy water grows clear when it is mixed with the lather of a soapnut.”158  
                                                
158  mando’py amandatām eti saṃsargeṇa vipaścitaḥ |  




Vedantadesika is quoting here from Kalidasa’s Mālavikāgnimitra, but not in the same way that he 
quotes from the Bhagavadgīta or Viṣṇupurāṇa, or even the works of Ramanuja. When 
Vedantadesika references the texts which are authoritative for his tradition, he is typically at pains 
to show how his own conclusions follow from them (however else he may wish to use them). By 
contrast, Kalidasa’s words are brought in simply for their effective presentation of an idea that is 
generally true. If they have any authority in the Rahasyatrayasāra, it is the authority of traditional 
wisdom. Moreover, in reproducing Kalidasa’s maxim in a book of theology, Vedantadesika has 
carried it far from its original context in Act 2 of Mālavikāgnimitra. When Ganadasa addresses it 
there to Queen Dharini, the kind of knowledge he has in mind is not religious but artistic, and 
whatever the maxim’s general truth may be it ends up not holding true for Ganadasa’s situation.159 
Such contextual details are irrelevant to Vedantadesika, who uses Kalidasa’s figure primarily to 
underline his theological point, and while Kalidasa’s words remain unaltered, their 
recontextualization has slightly modified their sense. 
More often than direct quotation, however, what we find in Vedantadesika’s texts is a 
practice of rewriting sentences from Kalidasa’s poetry—that is, a practice of recalling recognizable 
statements of Kalidasa while modifying them in some way. At the start of Mālavikāgnimitra, the 
director makes a statement which is often understood as Kalidasa’s protest against the 
conservatism of traditional critics: 
Not every poem is good simply because it is old,  
                                                
Vedāntadeśika, Rahasyatrayasāra (Srimad Vedanta Desika’s Srimad Rahasya Trayasara with 
Sara Vistara (Commentary) by Sri Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya) (Ubhaya Vedanta Grantha 
Mala, 1980), 461. 
 
159 Gautama’s comment ends up being a joke, so that Agnimitra’s artistic sensibility doesn’t 
seem to have rubbed off on him. 
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nor is it inferior because it is new.  
The wise examine it before deciding which kind it is;  
the fool lets his mind be swayed by the judgments of others.160 
 
Vedantadesika recalls this verse at the start of Yādavābhyudaya, where he similarly reflects on the 
relationship between old and new while proposing a different understanding of that relationship: 
All that is new lies in the past, and all that is old lies in what is to come.  
This pair makes for neither a virtue nor a fault.161 
 
If old and new are not invariably good and bad, it is not only because, as the director of 
Mālavikāgnimitra suggests, such valuations are empirically false; more importantly, the 
distinction itself is ill-conceived. Anything we call new—whether a verse, thought, or metaphor—
is in fact formed out of bits of the past, so that one would be hard-pressed to find in it pure novelty. 
Just as every sentence we speak or write quotes the words that compose it (almost all of which 
preexist us), all exists as new arrangements of the same old elements. There can be no question 
then of the relative merits of new and old since everything is indistinguishably both, and as 
Vedantadesika concludes, it would make little sense to say of absolutely everything that it is a fault 
or a virtue. Shaping his own verse from Kalidasa’s thoughts, Vedantadesika attests to its truth even 
as he writes.  
We find several instances of such rewriting in Vedantadesika’s Haṃsasandeśa (“The 
Message of the Goose”). In Meghadūta, Kalidasa’s yaksha once remarks to the cloud that 
For women, news from a lover brought by a friend  
is only a little inferior to an embrace.162  
                                                
160 purāṇam ity eva na sādhu sarvaṃ na cāpi kāvyaṃ navam ity avadyam | 
santaḥ parīkṣyānyatarad bhajante mūḍhaḥ parapratyayaneyabuddhiḥ || MA 1.2 || 
 
161 tadātve nūtanaṃ sarvam āyatyāṃ ca purātanam | 
na doṣāyaitad ubhayaṃ na guṇāya ca kalpate || Y 1.6 || 
 




Vedantadesika recalls this statement twice in the Haṃsasandeśa, once in tepid acknowledgement 
(“Isn’t it true that just the arrival of a beloved’s message gives women joy?”)163 and another time 
in what verges on disagreement (“For lovers, finding a messenger is greater fortune than embracing 
the beloved”).164 In the latter instance, Vedantadesika echoes Kalidasa by comparing the 
satisfactions of communicating with a distant beloved to those of actually embracing the beloved; 
however, whereas Kalidasa’s statement rings true, Vedantadesika’s rewriting of it is astonishingly 
counterintuitive. For while the chance to send tidings to one’s beloved is indeed gratifying, how 
could it be more so than an actual embrace? Yet that is exactly what Vedantadesika’s narrator is 
suggesting, and I shall try to make better sense of that suggestion in section 4. 
Some of Vedantadesika’s rewritings do not reformulate Kalidasa’s ideas so much as they 
draw attention to his relationship to Kalidasa. Consider Vedantadesika’s version of Meghadūta 
1.5. After telling us that the yaksha is about to talk to a cloud, Kalidasa’s narrator anticipates how 
implausible the scenario might seem and offers the following explanation:  
Those whom love has ruined suffer to the core,  
unable to tell thinking from unthinking.165  
 
Vedantadesika’s rewriting of this sentence likewise appears after we are told Rama is about to talk 
to a goose: 
Those whose minds are afflicted with separation  
suffer so much as to make requests to clouds, mountains,  
trees, and the like. What shall we say, then,  
of something capable of sensation?166  
                                                
163 kiṃ na strīṇāṃ janayati mudaṃ kāntavārtāgamo’pi || H 2.30 || 
 
164 kāntāśleṣād adhikasubhagaḥ kāmināṃ dūtalābhaḥ || H 1.4 || 
 
165 kāmārtā hi prakṛtikṛpaṇāś cetanācetaneṣu || MD 1.5 || 
 
166 viśleṣeṇa kṣubhitamanasāṃ meghaśailadrumādau 
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What is the narrator getting at here? Shulman and Bronner take him to be implying that “Rama’s 
choice of messenger…makes better sense” than the yaksha’s choice of an insentient cloud, and 
that Vedantadesika’s verse therefore “includes a slight ‘dig’” at Kalidasa.167 For Steven Hopkins, 
by contrast, the narrator’s rhetorical question means as much as “Why not a goose,” for “have not 
lovers in the past, crazy with love, asked insensible things…to bear their messages?”168 The verse 
would then read as an appeal to tradition, as an acknowledgement that Kalidasa has made possible 
a certain kind of thought-experiment (“has built a door for speech,” as Kalidasa might say); a 
thought-experiment, moreover, which Vedantadesika commits himself to exploring in 
Haṃsasandeśa. Whatever its tone—whether Vedantadesika is here looking to supersede Kalidasa 
or to acknowledge him as an antecedent (or to acknowledge him by superseding him)—the verse 
announces the Haṃsasandeśa as a kind of response to Kalidasa’s poem. Again, in section 4 I will 
examine specifically what kind of response it is. For now, I would simply like to note that in the 
four instances examined thus far, what Vedantadesika takes from Kalidasa are general statements, 
which in his own writing he goes on to affirm, deny, or somehow qualify.  
 
However, not all of Vedantadesika’s borrowings are on the order of statements. A number of 
expressions in his devotional prayer Bhagavaddhyānasopāna (“Staircase of Meditation on God”), 
for instance, reproduce images from Kalidasa’s description of Parvati in Kumārasambhava, such 
                                                
yācñādainyaṃ bhavati kimuta kvāpi saṃvedanārhe || H 1.5 || 
 
167 Appayya Dikshita, Nilakantha Dikshita, and Vedanta Deshika, “Self-Surrender,” “Peace,” 
“Compassion,” & “Mission of the Goose”: Poems and Prayers from South India, xxv. 
 
168 Hopkins, The Flight of Love, 147. 
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as “legs curved and tapering.”169 Such borrowing should be distinguished from the quoting and 
rewriting of statements we saw above, since here Vedantadesika is not responding to any claim 
amenable to a criterion of correctness (e.g., “it’s good to hang around good people,” “old isn’t 
better than new,” “news from the beloved is almost as good as embracing the beloved,” “the 
lovesick don’t think clearly”); indeed, it makes little sense to agree or disagree with “legs curved 
and tapering.” What Vedantadesika takes from Kalidasa here is rather a “shard of poetry,” as 
Marielle Macé would call it, “whose memory has left its aspect and silhouette in his mind.”170  
Borrowing such shards or fragments is in fact Vedantadesika’s most common way of 
referencing Kalidasa. Often what he borrows is Kalidasa’s manner of creating a specific affect, as 
we see in his depictions of fatherhood and motherhood in Canto 4 of Yādavābhyudaya. 
Vedantadesika describes Nanda’s excitement at Krishna’s birth as follows: 
Nanda couldn’t get enough  
of seeing his face, 
 
beautiful with its innocent smile 
radiant with the jewelled light of earrings 
letting out confused syllables.171 
 
                                                
169 Kalidasa: “vṛttānupūrve ca na cātidīrghe jaṅghe” (K 1.35); Vedantadesika: “citrākārām 
kaṭakarucibhiś cāruvṛttānupūrvām…jaṅghām” (Bhagavaddhyānasopāna 3).  
Another instance is “thighs beautiful as banana stalks”: Kālidāsa: “ekāntaśaityāt 
kadalīviśeṣāḥ…jātās tadūrvor upamānabāhyāḥ” (K 1.35); Vedāntadeśika: 
kāmārāmasthirakadalikāstambhasaṃbhāvanīyam…ūruyugmam (Bhagavaddhyānasopāna 4). 
 
170 Macé, “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being,” 222. 
 
171 nirvyājamandasmitadarśanīyaṃ nīrājitaṃ kuṇḍalaratnabhāsā | 
nandas tadānīṃ na jagāma tṛptiṃ mugdhākṣaraṃ prekṣya mukhaṃ tadīyam || Y 4.15 || 
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The phrase “couldn’t get enough of” (na jagāma tṛptim) appears in Kumārasaṃbhava 1.27, where 
Kalidasa similarly describes Himalaya’s insatiable joy on seeing his newborn daughter.172 For R. 
L. Narasimhan, Vedantadesika’s verse also recalls the thought which seizes Dushyanta as he 
beholds Bharata: 
Those who get to hold children 
  
as they show their budding teeth 
laughing who knows why, 
letting out unclear but charming words, 
delighting in resting on a lap, 
 
are blessed to be soiled from  
the mud on their bodies.173 
 
Arising from regret at his missed chance at fatherhood (and perhaps from a presentiment of his 
being the father of Bharata), Dushyanta’s words record two of the same details (unaffected smiling 
and babbling) that strike Nanda in his first interactions with Krishna.  
These scenes of fatherhood contrast with the depictions of motherhood we find in the 
characters Yashoda, Mena, and Urvashi. Here is how Vedantadesika depicts Yashoda’s concern 
for Krishna: 
“How will he walk  
on the rough ground 
                                                
172 “Though the mountain-king already had a son, his seeing couldn’t get enough of his 
daughter—like a line of bees, so fond of the mango tree when spring’s flowers are unending.” 
mahībhṛtaḥ putravato ’pi dṛṣṭis tasminn apatye na jagāma tṛptim | 
anantapuṣpasya madhor hi cūte dvirephamālā saviśeṣasaṅgā || K 1.27 || 
A variant of this phrase, na tṛptim āyayau, also appears in R 3.3, where Kalidasa describes 
Dilipa’s anticipation of his first child. 
 
173 ālakṣyadantamukulān animittahāsair avyaktavarṇaramaṇīyavacaḥpravṛttīn | 
aṅkāśrayapraṇayinas tanayān vahanto dhanyās tadaṅgarajasā malinībhavanti || A 7.17 || 
Narasimhan’s comment appears in Vedāntadeśika, Yādavābhyudayam, A Kavya on the Life of 




with feet soft as buds?”  
 
Thus Yashoda 
dripping sweet milk  
found no lifeboat in  
an ocean of worry.174 
 
Vedantadesika here recalls Kumārasaṃbhava 5.4, where Mena’s concern for Parvati likewise 
results from fathoming the danger the world poses to her defenseless child. When Parvati resolves 
to perform severe austerities in order to win Shiva, Mena wonders why she can’t just stay at home 
and pray: 
The gods are worshipped in houses!  
My child, how great is  
the difference 
 
between ascetic discipline  
and your body!  
 
A flower petal might withstand 
the foot of a bee 
but not that of a bird.175 
 
So too, Vedantadesika’s expression “dripping sweet milk” recalls Pururavas’ words to Ayus in 
Vikramorvaśīya 5.12. There Kalidasa presents Urvashi’s flow of milk as her instinctive response 
to seeing her son: 
Here comes your mother  
her gaze fixed upon you;  
the blouse she wears is saturated  
with her loving flow of milk.176 
                                                
174 kathaṃ vrajec charkarilān pradeśān padbhyām asau pallavakomalābhyām |  
iti snutastanyarasā yaśodā cintārṇave na plavam anvavindat || Y 4.67 || 
 
175 manīṣitāḥ santi gṛheṣu devatās tapaḥ kva vatse kva ca tāvakaṃ vapuḥ | 
padaṃ saheta bhramarasya pelavaṃ śirīṣapuṣpaṃ na punaḥ patatriṇaḥ || K 5.4 || 
 
176 iyaṃ te jananī prāptā tvadālokanatatparā | 




What Vedantadesika borrows in Yādavābhyudaya 4.67 are thus Kalidasa’s ways of rendering 
maternal concern. 
Such borrowings appear not only in Vedantadesika’s kāvyas—that is, poems written in the 
genres Kalidasa also wrote in—but also in his devotional hymns (stotras). In Godāstuti (“Praise 
for Goda”), Vedantadesika addresses the poet-saint Andal as follows: 
“Friend, 
your body is so beautiful!  
 
How did an ancient man 
who lies on a snake 
who rides a bird 
 
become your husband  
of choice?” 
 
Such mocking words  
of your friends 
prove your love is true.177 
 
The characterizations of Vishnu given by Andal’s friends redescribe attributes which are typically 
considered magnificent: infiniteness, the eagle Garuda, and the serpent Adisesha. When 
Vedantadesika writes that these unflattering characterizations “prove her love is true (samucita),” 
he means they furnish a context for Andal to prove the steadfastness of her love. A similar context 
is described in detail in Kumarasaṃbhava 5.65-84, where a brahmin passerby (who ends up being 
Shiva in disguise) tests Parvati’s love by redescribing Shiva’s attributes—his beginninglessness as 
obscure parentage, Nandi as a senile bull, his third eye as a deformity, and so on.178 The brahmin’s 
                                                
177 nāgeśayaḥ sutanu pakṣirathaḥ kathaṃ te jātaḥ svayaṃvarapatiḥ puruṣaḥ purāṇaḥ | 
evaṃvidhāḥ samucitaṃ praṇayaṃ bhavatyāḥ saṃdarśayanti parihāsagiraḥ sakhīnām || Godāstuti 
13 || 
 
178 alakṣyajanmatā (K 5.72); vṛddhokṣa (K 5.70); vapur virūpākṣam (K 5.72). 
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redescriptions issue from the perspective of common opinion (“People will laugh!”179 he once 
says), drawing on its power to urge conformity, and thus highlight the courage Parvati shows in 
disregarding what people think and asserting her love for Shiva. It is similarly Andal’s courage in 
love that Vedantadesika brings out by showing her friends mocking Vishnu. 
In these verses on Nanda, Yashoda, and Andal, Vedantadesika uses Kalidasa’s expressions 
(or his versions of them) in contexts similar to those of their original appearance. In other instances, 
however, he borrows a Kalidasan expression but significantly alters the kind of context in which 
it is used. The Raghuvaṃśa famously opens with the narrator admitting his sense of inadequacy to 
his task: 
A fool after a poet’s fame, 
I shall become a laughing-stock 
 
like a midget  
his arms raised up  
 
intent on a fruit  
only a tall man can reach.180 
 
Vedantadesika recalls Kalidasa’s metaphor in verse 25 of Śaraṇāgatidīpikā (“Light on Self-
Surrender”), using the same words for most of its crucial elements:  
In the same way a dwarf  
abandons holding up his arms 
and requests a tall man  
for the fruit 
 
Lord whom  
the yogis contemplate! 
 
so a wise man  
                                                
179 mahājanaḥ smeramukhaḥ bhaviṣyati || K 5.70 || 
 
180 mandaḥ kaviyaśaḥprārthī gamiṣyāmy upahāsyatām |  
prāṃśulabhye phale lobhād udbāhuriva vāmanaḥ || R 1.3 || 
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abandons all the arduous methods  
placing you in their stead.181  
 
In both verses, the dwarf image conjures an experience of striving where we are pushed to our 
limits and still we find we have come up short. But whereas Kalidasa shows us the dwarf prior to 
the point of exhaustion (which I imagine would occur in the “Or else…” [athavā…] of R 1.4), 
Vedantadesika shows him to us precisely at that moment, when he can no longer jump or even 
hold up his arms and requests the help of a tall passerby. Moreover, the kind of striving which the 
dwarf image intends in Śaraṇāgatidīpikā is religious: the dwarf’s admission of his own incapacity 
corresponds to that moment in the devotee’s life when she admits her utter helplessness and 
surrenders to god. 
 We find a similar repurposing of a Kalidasan expression in verse 5 of Gopālaviṃśati 
(“Twenty Verses on the Cowherd God”), which returns us to the moment Krishna is caught stealing 
butter:  
He has stuck his hand in the pot  
to steal the delicious butter 
 
he sees his mother  
trembling as she holds a leash 
for she is angry— 
 
may he protect us!— 
 
his foot wavering 
he neither moves away  
nor stays put 
 
suddenly he closes his eyes  
cowherd impostor 
                                                
181 udbāhubhāvam apahāya yathaiva kharvaḥ prāṃśuṃ phalārtham abhiyācati yogicintya | 
evaṃ suduṣkaram upāyagaṇaṃ vihāya sthāne niveśayati tasya vicakṣaṇas tvām || 
Śaraṇāgatidīpikā 25 || 
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protector of the universe.182 
 
The phrase “neither moves away nor stays put” recalls Kalidasa’s words in Kumārasaṃbhava 
5.85, where Parvati discovers that the brahmin whom she has been scolding for insulting Shiva is 
none other than Shiva himself: 
Having seen him 
her thin beautiful body trembling 
 
raising her lifted foot  
to make a step 
 
like a river, turbid  
by the meeting of its own current  
with a mountain  
 
the daughter of the king of mountains  
neither went nor stayed put.183 
 
Neither-going-nor-staying functions similarly in both verses: Krishna and Parvati both experience 
a sudden disorientation caused by some unforeseen circumstance, and we meet them before they 
have fully recovered from it. For Parvati, recognizing Shiva means many things at once, each 
accompanied by a different set of emotions. Here is one way of imagining the thoughts which 
dawn on her simultaneously, competing to be expressed in a course of action: (a) “My rage at the 
brahmin is no longer justified” (embarrassment, amusement); (b) “I’m face-to-face with the man 
I love” (excitement, bashfulness); (c) “I’ve been made the butt of a joke” (humiliation, anger; 
                                                
182 hartuṃ kuṃbhe vinihitakaraḥ svādu haiyaṅgavīnaṃ dṛṣṭvā dāmagrahaṇacaṭulāṃ mātaraṃ 
jātaroṣām |  
pāyād īṣatpracalitapado nāpagacchan na tiṣṭhan mithyāgopaḥ sapadi nayane mīlayan viśvagoptā || 
Gopālaviṃśati 5 || 
 
183 taṃ vīkṣya vepathumatī sarasāṅgayaṣṭir nikṣepaṇāya padam uddhṛtam udvahantī | 
mārgācalavyatikarākuliteva sindhuḥ śailādhirājatanayā na yayau na tasthau || K 5.85 || 
This connection was first pointed out to me by Dr. S. Padmanabhan of The University of 
Madras. 
	 85 
indicated by her trembling); (d) “Does this mean I can stop my ascetic practice?” (disappointment 
at the anticlimax, relief). The simile of turbid water gets precisely at this paralyzing jumble of 
thoughts which has made it almost impossible for Parvati to decide whether to go or stay. Krishna’s 
disorientation is similarly occasioned by the sudden appearance of Yashoda. But what paralyzes 
him isn’t so much confusion as the impossibility at this point of avoiding being seen: he wishes to 
escape somehow, but neither staying put nor making a dash for it will help his cause. And so he 
closes his eyes, in the way students avoid eye contact with their teachers thinking they have 
somehow made themselves less visible. If this seems a strange occasion to request Krishna for his 
protection, we might recall the other sense in which Krishna neither goes nor stays, the paradoxical 
sense of his constant but concealed divine presence which is accessible through devotional 
meditation. 
 
In this second set of examples, what Vedantadesika has borrowed from Kalidasa aren’t statements 
or propositions but pre-propositional fragments (legs curved and tapering, laughing who knows 
why, loving flow of milk, neither going nor staying…), no less significant for being pre-
propositional. For each carries with it a style of perceiving or feeling which Vedantadesika absorbs 
into his own poetry either through emulation or modification. In reproducing these fragments, 
Vedantadesika draws our attention to what Kuntaka also identified as the distinctive feature of 
Kalidasa’s delicate style, its registration of those aspects of things which “reveal the remarkable 
grandeur of [their] nature.”184 Indeed, Vedantadesika doesn’t just inherit particular expressions 
from Kalidasa but a general practice of conjuring vivid sensations and states of mind. For even 
                                                




where the influence of Kalidasa barely shows itself in the words, we can often sense a Kalidasan 
manner of selecting details. To cite one last instance, when Vedantadesika imagines Lord 
Varadaraja “rising from his bed in the morning” 
wearing on his throat  
the imprint of a gold bangle  
made by Lakshmi’s wild embraces 
 
the sensations he conjures (the warmth and give of god’s skin, the sudden passion in which 
Lakshmi must have pressed into it) presuppose a startling proximity to his objects of description, 
the kind of proximity we’ve come to expect from Kalidasa—which is to say, the almost 
embarrassing proximity that Dushyanta has to Shakuntala as he spies on her in Kanva’s ashram.185 
(It is the same proximity that embarrassed certain readers of Kumārasaṃbhava Canto 8, where 
Kalidasa intimately describes the love-making of “Shiva and Parvati, parents of the world.”) 
Kalidasa’s most significant gift to Vedantadesika is the practice of vivid description. 
Since Vedantadesika was first and foremost a religious writer, his investment in Kalidasa’s 
poetic style should at first puzzle us; if it didn’t, we might risk uncritically assuming that writing 
poetry was little more to him than a pastime, at best supplementary but inessential to his theological 
concerns. While poetry had long been central to Srivaishnava practice and thinking, most 
Srivaishnava poetry was composed in religious genres, such as hagiography or some variety of 
devotional lyric (whether pācuram or stotra). Why did Vedantadesika find it necessary to look 
beyond these poetic forms and write in genres and styles that weren’t usually taken up for religious 
                                                
185 anibhṛtaparirambhair āhitām indirāyāḥ kanakavalayamudrāṃ kaṇṭhadeśe dadhānaḥ | 
phaṇipatiśayanīyād utthitas tvaṃ prabhāte [varada satatam antarmānasaṃ saṃnidheyāḥ] || 
Varadarājapañcāśat 47 || 
Vedantadesika here recalls Kalidasa’s description of Kama, whose “throat bears the mark of 
Rati’s bangle” <rativalayapadāṅke…kaṇṭhe || K 2.64 ||>. 
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expression? Several scholars of Vedantadesika have posed versions of this question, and their 
answers tend to follow one of two lines: (1) poetry afforded Vedantadesika a form enabling a freer 
exploration of theological ideas than prose; (2) poetry helped Vedantadesika make his theological 
ideas more digestible and even alluring.186 These may be plausible as general speculations as to 
why Vedantadesika wrote poetry at all; however, they are less helpful in understanding why he 
wrote poetry the way he did, in accounting for certain specific choices he made, particularly for 
his choice to write like Kalidasa. What stretched Vedantadesika beyond the mainstays of 
Srivaishnava poetry (direct appeal to God, enumeration of his attributes, reportage of a devotional 
speaker’s mental states, narration of wondrous events) and drew him to the descriptive language 
of sensation? To understand that, we need to understand something of Vedantadesika’s religious 
thinking, starting with the theological tradition on which it builds. 
 
2. On Devotional Meditation: Vivid Remembering in Ramanuja and Vedantadesika 
 
Near the end of Vedārthasaṅgraha (“Summary of the Meaning of the Vedas”), the 
eleventh-century theologian Ramanuja identifies bhakti, or devotion to god, as the most powerful 
means to escape the inevitable suffering of ordinary life. Yet the transformative devotion 
Ramanuja has in mind isn’t just a feeling of piety or religious fervor, which is typically opposed 
to thinking (or knowing, or understanding, or cognizing): “The word bhakti refers to a kind of 
delight, and delight is nothing other than a kind of cognition (jñāna).” In characterizing delight as 
                                                
186 The first view is articulated in Friedhelm Hardy, “The Tamil Veda of a Śūdra Saint: The 
Srivaisnava Interpretation of Nammalvar,” in Contributions to South Asian Studies, ed. Gopal 
Krishna (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979); Hopkins, Singing the Body of God; Appayya 
Dikshita, Nilakantha Dikshita, and Vedanta Deshika, “Self-Surrender,” “Peace,” 
“Compassion,” & “Mission of the Goose”: Poems and Prayers from South India. The second in 
Hardy, “The Tamil Veda of a Śūdra Saint: The Srivaisnava Interpretation of Nammalvar”; Rao, 
Re-Figuring the Ramayana as Theology. 
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a kind of cognition, Ramanuja is in effect challenging “the common-sense view” that “pleasure is 
achieved by a special kind of cognition, and is thus a different thing entirely”; that is, he is 
challenging any view that excludes feelings and emotions from pure acts of cognition.187 Here is 
how he puts the point: 
Cognitions of objects are of the same nature (lit. “have the same basis”) as pleasure, 
pain, or indifference. … The cognition of a certain object, which is thought to 
produce pleasure—such a cognition of the object simply is pleasure. We don’t 
discern a separate term beyond that, since by the cognition alone (tenaiva) it is 
possible to say whether one is happy.188 
 
When we think, “There’s my friend,” the cognition itself has an affective tone—excitement, 
perhaps, or relief—which we don’t experience independently of the thought. Every cognition 
records a state of affairs at the same time as it records a disposition towards that state of affairs. 
Accordingly, if bhakti refers to a disposition of the heart (“a kind of delight”), it is the disposition 
indissociable from a particular cognition—namely, that cognition whose content is the ground of 
being, or god. Bhakti is the affective tone of contemplating the ground. Ramanuja’s point here is 
that if we took the larger view of things—if we were convinced to the core that all things participate 
in the unified whole that is god—we would find ourselves automatically overcome with 
devotion.189 
                                                
187 bhaktiśabdaś ca prītiviśeṣe vartate | prītiś ca jñānaviśeṣa eva |…sukhaṃ ca 
jñānaviśeṣasādhyaṃ padārthāntaram iti hi laukikāḥ | (Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṅgraha (Rāmānuja’s 
Vedārthasaṃgraha), ed. J. A. B. van Buitenen (Pune: Deccan Collage Postgraduate and 
Research Institute, 1956), 170, section 141.) 
 
188 [etad uktaṃ bhavati] – viṣayajñānāni sukhaduḥkhamadhyasthasādhāraṇāni … | yena ca 
viṣayaviśeṣeṇa viśeṣitaṃ jñānaṃ sukhasya janakam ityabhimataṃ tadviṣayaṃ jñānam eva 
sukhaṃ, tadatireki padārthāntaraṃ nopalabhyate | tenaiva sukhitvavyavahāropapatteś ca | (Ibid.) 
 
189 “The one who has brahman as the content of cognition is joyful” <brahma yasya jñānaviṣayo 
bhavati sa sukhī bhavati> (Ibid., 171, section 142.) 
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Cultivating bhakti is therefore less about forcefully inducing a mood or emotion in 
ourselves (we are powerless to do such a thing) than about holding in mind a certain state of affairs, 
about cultivating an abiding attention to god. That is why, in the ninth chapter of 
Rahasyatrayasāra, Ramanuja’s intellectual heir Vedantadesika identifies cultivating bhakti with 
contemplation: 
The practice of bhakti (bhakti-yoga) amounts to a special kind of contemplation 
(dhyāna), which takes as its object the various forms of god…and which is attended 
by an unsurpassed delight. This contemplation (atu tāṉ) has the form of 
remembrance (smṛti) that is continuous like a flow of oil, and a vividness equal to 
that of direct perception…. It is a special continuity of cognition, culminating in 
the ultimate conviction.190 
 
The attitude of devotion is brought about by contemplation, which Vedantadesika characterizes as 
an act of memory (smṛti). But memory here doesn’t just refer to a power of retention—that faculty 
by which, for instance, we are at any moment capable of reciting the alphabet, even if most of the 
time we aren’t thinking about it at all. More precisely, it refers to a power of conscious 
remembering, an abiding-with or holding-in-mind-of something in the present moment. The simile 
of oil gets at the requisite steadiness (dhruvatva) of such remembering: whereas our everyday 
thinking has the texture of water being poured, which sprays in different directions and is 
susceptible to the slightest influences, thinking in devotional remembrance has the ropelike 
viscosity of a stream of oil.191 Moreover, for the remembrance of god to have such a consistency, 
                                                
190 bhaktiyogamāvatu [ananyaniṣṭhaṉāy ananyādhīnaṉāy ananyaśeṣabhūtaṉāna] pakavāṉuṭaiya 
svarūpādikaḷai viṣayamākavuṭaittāy niratiśayaprītirūpamāṉa dhyānaviśeṣam. atu tāṉ 
tailadhāraiyaip pōle nirantaramāṉa smṛtirūpamāy sākṣātkāratulyamāna vaiśadyattaiyuṭaittāy 
[paramapatattukku prayāṇam paṇṇum divasam uṟutiyāka nāḷtōṟum anuṣṭikka vaḷarntu varuvatāy] 
antimapratyayāvadhiyāna jñānasantativiśeṣam (Vedāntadeśika, Rahasyatrayasāra (Srimad 
Vedanta Desika’s Srimad Rahasya Trayasara with Sara Vistara (Commentary) by Sri Uttamur 
T. Viraraghavacharya), 325, chapter 9.) 
 
191 The helpful counter-image of water being poured was given to me by Dr. S. Padmanabhan of 
The University of Madras. 
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it can’t be vague or weak but must grip us, attaining a “vividness (vaiśadya) equal to that of direct 
perception.” 
How is it possible for remembering to approximate perceiving, let alone match it?192 For 
doesn’t memory by its very nature pale in comparison to what appears before the eyes? In making 
sense of this criterion of vividness, it is helpful to consult the passage in Ramanuja’s Śrībhāṣya 
(“The Divine Commentary”) from which Vedantadesika’s comment on bhakti takes inspiration: 
Contemplation has the form of an uninterrupted continuity of remembrance like a 
flow of oil. For as scripture teaches us, steady remembrance is the means to spiritual 
release: “The remembrance is steady; when one finds [such] remembrance, it is the 
seer’s release from all knots.” And that remembrance has the same form as seeing. 
…And remembrance comes to have the form of seeing by a high intensity of the 
imagination (bhāvanā-prakarṣāt).193 
 
Here Ramanuja similarly identifies meditative remembrance with perception. But attentive to the 
strangeness of what he is proposing, he immediately goes on to explain himself: remembrance 
comes to have the form of seeing by a high intensity of the imagination. Remembering becomes 
seeing through bhāvanā, or the mind’s capacity to conjure a vivid mental reality, bringing faint 
impressions more clearly into view. Ramanuja is proposing that when this capacity is exercised to 
its utmost—to a degree rarely attested in everyday experience, though perhaps approximated in 
                                                
 
192 For an illuminating exploration of this question, see Marcus Schmücker, “On Rāmānuja’s 
Identification of ‘Steady Remembrance’ (Dhruvānusmṛti) with ‘Direct Seeing’ (Darśana),” in 
Cracow Indological Studies, Vol. 8, ed. Marzenna Czerniak-Droźdżowicz (Krakow: Księgarnia 
Akademicka, 2006), 201–17. 
 
193 dhyānaṃ ca tailadhārāvadavicchinnasmṛtisantānarūpam dhrūvā smṛtiḥ smṛtilambhe 
sarvagranthīnāṃ vipramokṣaḥ iti dhruvāyāḥ smṛter apavargopāyatvaśravaṇāt | sā ca smṛtir 
darśanasamānākārā | …bhavati ca smṛter bhāvanāprakarṣāt darśanarūpatā | (Vedāntadeśika, 
Tattvaṭīkā (Madras: Kabeer Printing Works, 1938), 159; ibid., 161.) 
 
	 91 
dreams and art—memory starts taking on a vividness akin to that of perception. In what remains 
of this section, I want to focus on how Vedantadesika develops Ramanuja’s astonishing claim.  
In some fine pages of Tattvaṭīkā (“Annotations on the Truth”), Vedantadesika glosses 
Ramanuja’s key concept of bhāvanā with the following expression: “saṃskāra, which is born of 
experience.”194 The word saṃskāra often refers to a mark left by past experience on the soul, latent 
in it even if it is not always fully present to the mind (e.g. Dushyanta’s presentiment of Shakuntala 
in A 5.2). Vedantadesika can’t mean saṃskāra in quite this sense, since the word wouldn’t then be 
an acceptable gloss for bhāvanā. We learn what he does mean by it from a significant passage of 
Saṅkalpasūryodaya (“The Dawn of Determination”). Act 7 of this allegorical play opens with a 
monologue spoken by a character called Samskara, who has been preparing the wise man’s soul 
(puruṣa) for meditation: 
Samskara: I am the son of Experience, called Samskara. I am the artist of King 
Discrimination, and have studied the whole set of sciences. After defeating 
Visvakarma, artist of the gods, and Maya, artist of the asuras, I betook myself to 
rest and slept for a long time. And in that time, Passion and Languor, two great 
forces sent by Great Delusion, took advantage of the opportunity and sought to kill 
me, seeing that I was a friend to Clarity. Then was I suddenly awakened by 
Comparison and Association, servants sent by Queen Benevolence (sumati), who 
was herself goaded on by God’s compassion. Now that the enemies have fled on 
all sides, being crowded out, I’ve been commanded by Will-Power, general of King 
Discrimination, to do what pleases the king, who for some reason wants to see a 
picture of the universe. And with my attention focused on painting the picture (tat), 
I executed it as commanded. Power abides with those who act at the right moment. 
And so,  
 
Covering the wise man’s mind—the painting-wall—by means of 
inspiration, I’ve painted the universe, characterized by both its holy 
and unholy parts. (1) 
 
Saṃskāra is here represented not as a latent mark but as a latent potential of the mind, a faculty 
capable of lifting marks of past experience out of oblivion and into consciousness. This faculty is 
                                                
194 bhāvanā anubhavajanyaḥ saṃskāraḥ | (Vedāntadeśika, Tattvaṭīkā, 170.) 
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moreover the source of all kinds of artistic activity, and might therefore be translated as 
“imagination.” For as Samskara tells us, he is an artist who has studied “the whole set of sciences,” 
which apparently includes the arts of architecture, poetry, and painting: achitecture, because the 
imagination is superior to the immortal architects Visvakarma and Maya; poetry, because it is 
activated by the same associative instinct that generates the poet’s similes; and painting, because 
it is entrusted with covering the mind’s walls with vivid pictures of the universe (pictures so vivid 
that, as Will-Power will remark on seeing them, “things past, future, and present appear as though 
they were present before us”).195 In glossing Ramanuja’s word bhāvanā with saṃskāra, then, 
Vedantadesika is suggesting that the faculty required for devotional meditation is the same one 
responsible for artistic creation. Meditation no less than art involves conjuring a vivid mental 
reality, so that the work of a devotee ends up looking very much like that of an artist. 
 While Vedantadesika’s identification of the meditative faculty with the artistic faculty 
seems to aestheticize the practice of meditation, other parts of his analysis serve to naturalize it. 
After glossing bhāvanā with saṃskāra, Vedantadesika considers whether it is really possible (apart 
from the allegorical scenario staged in Saṅkalpasūryodaya) to achieve that “high intensity of the 
                                                
195 saṃskāraḥ—ahaṃ khalv anubhavāmuṣyāyaṇaḥ saṃskāranāmā devasya vivekasya 
śikṣitasarvavidyākalāpaḥ śilpī devaśilpinaṃ viśvakarmāṇam asuraśilpinaṃ mayaṃ ca vijitya 
viśramābhilāṣī ciram asvāpsam | tāvac cedam antaram āsādya mahāmohaprayuktābhyāṃ 
madhukaiṭabhābhyāmiva mahābalābhyāṃ madhyamacaramaguṇābhyāṃ sattvamitram asāv iti 
jighāṃsitaḥ | nūnam aprabuddhataiva puruṣeṣu pratipakṣajanasya hastāvalambaḥ | tataś cāhaṃ 
prabodhitaḥ sahasaiva paramapuruṣadayācoditayā devyā sumatyā 
sahadṛṣṭisadṛśadṛṣṭisaṃjñābhyāṃ dāsībhyāṃ niravakāśatayā tatas tataḥ palāyite pratipakṣe 
kenāpi hetunā viśvacitraṃ didṛkṣaymāṇasya devasya mahārājavivekasya senāpatinā vyavasāyena 
svāmisaṃmatam ādiṣṭo’smi | yathādiṣṭaṃ ca tadāhitadṛṣṭir anvatiṣṭham | avasarānukūlavṛttīnāṃ 
khalv adhikāriṇām ādhipatyaṃ pratitiṣṭhati | tataś ca 
viduṣaś cintanāṃ śaktyā citrabhittiṃ vitanvatā | 
śuddhāśuddhavibhāgārhaṃ viśvaṃ vilikhitaṃ mayā || S 7.1 || (Vedāntadeśika, 
Saṅkalpasūryodaya (Samkalpasuryodaya of Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha with the Commentaries of 
Prabhāvilāsa of Ahobala and Prabhāvalī of Nṛsiṁharāja), ed. V. Krishnamacharya, vol. 2 
(Adyar, Madras: Vasanta Press, 1948), 608.) 
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imagination (bhāvanā-prakarṣa),” wherein what the mind visualizes on the basis of memory 
attains the clarity of perception. To be sure, such intense visualization is an exceptional state of 
mind; however, for Vedantadesika it isn’t as outlandish as one might think: “Here we should take 
as examples the imaginings of the fearful, lovers, and the like.”196 In extreme mental states such 
as terror and lovesickness, the images conjured by memory can become so compelling that they 
are mistaken for reality. Vedantadesika recalls a passage from Rāmāyaṇa 3.36-37 where Maricha 
recounts two hair-breadth escapes from Rama’s fatal arrows. As Maricha tells Ravana, he has since 
become an ascetic in order to keep out of harm’s way; 
But now behind every tree I seem to see Rama clad in bark-cloth and black hides, 
wielding his bow like Death himself with noose in hand. Or rather, thousands of 
Ramas do I see in my fear; this whole wilderness, Ravana, has become nothing but 
Rama to me. It is Rama I see, lord of rakshasas, even when no one is near.197 
 
Fear has so consumed Maricha that he can no longer distinguish what he remembers from what he 
sees. We might also recall here Macbeth’s “dagger of the mind,” a figment similar to Maricha’s 
imagined Ramas but conjured more in apprehension than in fear:  
Is this a dagger which I see before me, 
The handle toward my hand? … 
Or art thou but 
A dagger of the mind, a false creation 
Proceeding from the heat-oppressèd brain? (2.i.33-39)  
 
Such examples of disturbed mental states show that the “high intensity of the imagination” desired 
by Ramanuja isn’t entirely foreign to ordinary (or at least conceivable) experience. Yet, as 
Vedantadesika notes, there is an important difference between the disturbed imagination and the 
                                                
196 bhītakāmukādipratibhāś ca atra nidarśitavyāḥ | (Vedāntadeśika, Tattvaṭīkā, 170.) 
 
197 Vālmīki, Rāmāyaṇa (Ramayana III: The Forest), trans. Sheldon Pollock (New York: NYU 
Press and the JCC Foundation, 2006), 224–25. 
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devotional imagination: “In instances such as the passage that starts ‘Behind every tree I see him,’ 
a perceptual error is involved owing to a defect of the mind. But in devotional meditation (iha) 
there is no such defect or obstacle, since such contemplation is in accordance with scripture.”198 
The vivid mental world conjured in devotional meditation isn’t simply a compelling fiction like 
the hallucinations of Maricha and Macbeth; it is a transcendent reality, screened from empirical 
perception but known through the revealed word.  
The other example offered by Vedantadesika is the lover’s imagination (kāmukapratibhā): 
“As others too have remarked, ‘When one is overwhelmed by a feeling such as desire, something 
which once was seen, being contemplated (dhyāyamāna), attains the condition of being before 
one’s eyes, even though it is absent.’”199 With the lover’s daydream, we are one step closer to the 
devotee’s meditation.200 
 
                                                
198 vṛkṣe vṛkṣe ca paśyāmi ityādiṣu bhrāntimiśratvaṃ doṣāyattam; iha tu yathāśrutacintanān na 
doṣabādhāv [iti bhāvaḥ] | (Vedāntadeśika, Tattvaṭīkā, 171.) 
 
199 parair apy ucyate—“dṛṣṭaṃ parokṣam api dhyāyamānaṃ sākṣādbhāvam āpannaṃ 
kāmādyupaplave” iti | (Ibid., 170–71.) I haven’t been able to locate Vedantadesika’s source for 
this quotation. 
 
200 My preference for imagination as the English translation of bhāvanā here (instead of other 
possibilities such as reproduction or re-experience, which do a better job of emphasizing the 
degree to which memory is involved in bhāvanā but which I don’t feel natural using in a 
sentence) is due largely to the examples Vedantadesika uses to explain himself. It is as if I asked 
him “What do you mean by bhāvanā?” and, dissatisfied that the formal definition “saṃskāra, 
born of experience” was lacking in concreteness, he pointed to an artist painting, then to Maricha 
hallucinating, then to a lover daydreaming, so that I thought to myself, “Ah, he’s talking about 
the imagination.” I have yet to fully work out the specific relations among the Sanskrit words 
around memory, attention, and the imagination which Ramanuja and Vedantadesika wish to 
relate and sometimes even to identify, including dhyāna, smṛti, bhāvanā, saṃskāra, and 
pratibhā. Yet even philosophy done in English has found the boundaries between imagination 
and memory, memory and attention to be porous (Thomas Hobbes, for instance, claimed to find 
no essential difference between the imagination and memory). 
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3. On Daydreaming: Vivid Remembering in Kalidasa  
When one is overwhelmed by a feeling such as desire, something which once was seen, 
being contemplated, attains the condition of being before one’s eyes, even though it’s absent. … 
Centuries before Vedantadesika, Kalidasa had already explored this premise throughout his 
writing, in characters hosting a mental reality which is, at least momentarily, more compelling than 
the objective world they inhabit. In Raghuvaṃśa 12, after Hanuman tells Rama that he has found 
Sita, Rama is described contemplating her as follows: 
And [Hanuman] showed Rama the jewel  
of recognition, his task accomplished. 
It was like the heart of Sita 
taken shape and come there on its own. 
Setting the jewel on his heart,  
touching it and closing his eyes,  
he felt the thrill of clasping his beloved 
without touching her breasts.201 
 
Sita’s cool and hard jewel gives Rama the same delight he once felt touching her warm and soft 
body. In Rama’s hands, the jewel thus becomes a powerful aid to the imagination, allowing it 
momentarily to conjure sensations in the absence of the stimuli which in normal circumstances 
could alone yield them.  
We find another instance of daydreaming in Act 3 of Vikramorvaśīya, where Galava tells 
his fellow acting student Pallava how Urvashi messed up her lines in a play: 
Galava: Urvashi was playing the role of Lakshmi when Menaka, playing the role 
of Varuni, asked her, “Friend, assembled here are kings who are the most noble 
men in the three realms, and among them Keshava. On which of them has your 
heart fixed itself?” 
Pallava: And then? And then? 
                                                
201 pratyabhijñānaratnaṃ ca rāmāyādarśayat kṛtī | 
hṛdayaṃ svayam āyātaṃ vaidehyā iva mūrtimat || 
sa prāpa hṛdayanyastamaṇisparśanimīlitaḥ | 
apayodharasaṃsargām priyāliṅgananirvṛtim || R 12.64-5 || 
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Galava: Then, when she should have spoken, “On Purushottama,” instead she said, 
“On Pururavas.”202 
 
While such a slip of the tongue might be unsurprising in casual conversation, it is astonishing in 
the context of a live performance. For acting demands precisely that we make the effort to conceal 
our minds, passing out of (or at least suspending) our customary selves in order to make room for 
a new one. If in spite of that effort Urvashi has blurted out what is on her mind, it is because 
contemplating her beloved has saturated her awareness. 
The capacity of daydreams to transport, disorient, and paralyze turns out to be a central 
theme in Abhijñānaśākuntala. Its centrality is suggested as early as the prologue, where the 
director begins by announcing the play about to be performed: “Today we are to present a new 
play called The Recognition of Shakuntala, whose plot has been set by Kalidasa. So let an effort 
be made by every actor.”203 Between this announcement and the actual performance, Kalidasa 
gives us the following exchange: 
Director: Just sing a song about the summer, only recently begun and most fit to 
be enjoyed. For now 
 
are the days when it is soothing to bathe in waters, 
when forest breezes are fragrant 
                                                
202 dvitīyaḥ—lacchībhūmiāe vaṭṭamāṇā uvvasī vāruṇībhūmiāe meṇaāe pucchidā | sahi samāadā 
ede telokkasupurisā sakesavā a loavālā | kadam assiṃ de bhāvāhiṇivesotti | 
prathamaḥ—tado tado | 
dvitīyaḥ—tado tāe purisottametti bhaṇidavve purūravetti ṇiggadā vāṇī | 
(Skt. chāyā: dvitīyaḥ—lakṣmībhūmikāyāṃ vartamānorvaśī vāruṇībhūmikāyāṃ vartamānayā 
menakayā pṛṣṭā | sakhi samāgatā ete trailokyasupuruṣāḥ sakeśavāś ca lokapālāḥ | katamasmiṃs te 
bhāvābhiniveśa iti |  
prathamaḥ—tatas tataḥ | 
dvitīyaḥ—tatas tayā puruṣottama iti bhaṇitavye purūravasīti nirgatā vāṇī |) 
Kālidāsa, Vikramorvaśīya (The Vikramorvaśīyam of Kālidāsa), ed. M. R. Kale (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1967), 136–38.) 
 
203 sūtradhāraḥ: adya khalu kālidāsagrathitavastunā navenābhijñānaśākuntalākhyena 
nāṭakenopasthātavyam asmābhiḥ | tatpratipātram ādhīyatāṃ yatnaḥ | 
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having touched the trumpet flowers,  
when sleep comes most easily in shade 
and it is loveliest when day turns to night. 
  
Actress: Here you are (she sings)— 
 
Women tender of heart  
adorn themselves with  
sirisha flowers 
with delicate stamen-tips 
kissed gently by bees. 
 
Director: Well sung, lady! Ah, all around the audience appears as though it were 
painted in a picture (ālikhita iva), for the raga has tied up the movements of their 
minds. Now, then, what work shall we perform to honor them? 
Actress: Noble sir, didn’t you already announce that a new play called The 
Recognition of Shakuntala is to be performed? 
Director: Lady, good thing you reminded me! I must have forgotten it just now. 
How? 
 
I was forcefully stolen away  
by your song’s attractive raga— 
Just like this king Dushyanta  
by a swift antelope. …204 
 
                                                
204 sūtradhāraḥ: tad imam eva tāvad acirapravṛttam upabhogakṣamaṃ grīṣmasamayam adhikṛtya 
gīyatām | saṃprati hi 
subhagasalilāvagāhāḥ pāṭalasaṃsargasurabhivanavātāḥ | 
pracchāyasulabhanidrā divasāḥ pariṇāmaramaṇīyāḥ || A 1.3 || 
naṭī: tahā (iti gāyati) 
īsīsicumbiāhiṃ bhamarehiṃ suumārakesarasihāiṃ | 
odaṃsaānti daamāṇā pamadāo sirīsakusumāiṃ || A 1.4 || 
(Skt. chāyā: tathā 
īṣadīṣaccumbitāni bhramaraiḥ sukumārakesaraśikhāni | 
avataṃsayanti dayamānāḥ pramādāḥ śirīṣakusumāni ||) 
sūtradhāraḥ: ārye sādhu gītam | aho rāgabaddhacittavṛttir ālikhita iva sarvato raṅgaḥ | tad idānīṃ 
katamatprakaraṇam āśrityainam ārādhayāmaḥ | 
naṭī: ṇaṃ ajjamissehiṃ paḍhamaṃ evva āṇattaṃ āhiṇṇāṇasaundalaṃ ṇāma apuvvaṃ ṇāḍaaṃ 
paoeṇa adhikariadutti | 
(Skt. chāyā: nanv āryamiśraiḥ prathamam evājñaptam abhijñānaśākuntalaṃ nāmāpūrvaṃ 
nāṭakaṃ prayogeṇādhikriyatām iti |) 
sūtradhāraḥ: ārye samyag anubodhito’smi | asmin kṣaṇe vismṛtaṃ khalu mayā | kutaḥ | 
tavāsmi gītarageṇa hāriṇā prasabhaṃ hṛtaḥ | 
eṣa rājeva duṣyantaḥ saraṅgeṇātiraṃhasā || A 1.5 || 
 
	 98 
The director notes with delight the general stunning effect of the actress’ song (which I therefore 
imagine to be tuned in a raga like Khamas or Nand), only to realize a few moments later that he 
too has been mildly stunned, having forgotten what he just said.  
The director’s lapse in attention in fact foreshadows several such episodes of lapsing that 
punctuate the play. Most consequential among these is Shakuntala’s inopportune daydreaming at 
the start of Act 4, which Priyamvada describes to Anasuya as follows:  
Our friend, her face resting on her left hand, appears as though she were painted in 
a picture (Skt. ālikhiteva). Since her thoughts are on her husband, she doesn’t even 
notice herself, let alone a visitor.205  
 
Kalidasa here has Anasuya speak the same words that the director used to describe the stunned 
audience, thus analogizing the experiences of being lost in reverie and being carried away by 
music. In another description of Shakuntala’s daydreaming, offered incidentally by sage Durvasa 
in the curse he casts on her, we find two more characterizations of her mental state:  
Contemplating him with undivided attention [1],  
you don’t notice me [2], vessel of askesis, as I approach…206  
 
While the second characterization reiterates the theme of attentional failure, the first (vicintayantī 
yam ananyamānasā, lit. “contemplating him with a mind that has no other object”) is suggestive 
of successful concentration, drawing as it does on a vocabulary of spiritual practice (cf. Krishna’s 
words in Bhagavadgīta 9.22: ananyāś cintayanto mām, “contemplating me with no other 
                                                
205 vāmahatthovahidavaaṇā ālihidā via piasahī bhattugadāe cintāe attāṇaṃ pi ṇa esā vibhāvedi  
kiṃ uṇa āāntuaṃ |  
(Skt. chāyā: vāmahastopahitavadanālikhiteva sakhī bhartṛgatayā cintayātmānam api naiṣā 
vibhāvayati kiṃ punar āgantukam |) (Kālidāsa, Abhijñānaśākuntala (The Abhijñānaśākuntalam 
of Kālidāsa), ed. M. R. Kale (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), 123.)  
 
206 vicintayantī yam ananyamānasā taponidhiṃ vetsi na mām upasthitam … || A 4.1 || 
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object…”). Distraction is portrayed here not as the opposite of attention but as its conjoined twin, 
most visible from the perspective of those things which attention must neglect.  
Reviewing the examples examined thus far, one could say the following: while Kalidasa’s 
depictions of Urvashi, the audience in Śākuntala, and Shakuntala show us what daydreaming looks 
like from the outside—to those who witness it without sharing in it—his depictions of Rama and 
Śākuntala’s director give us the “insider’s perspective,” as it were, reminding us what it feels like 
to be swept up in another version of reality. These two perspectives bleed into each other in Act 6 
of Śākuntala, where Kalidasa tactfully unseams the customary solitude of daydreams by 
externalizing the daydreamer’s mind in art. When Dushyanta finally sees the ring of recognition, 
his remembrance of Shakuntala occurs in part as an intense visualization, a mental imaging of his 
earliest memories of her, which he is moved to set down on a canvas. We learn just how intense 
Dushyanta’s visualization is from how other characters react to his painting. Here is what 
Madhavya says about it: 
Oh my, the body sure has a natural grace. Well done, my friend, well done. What 
more is to be said? Suspecting her soul has entered it, I am filled with the urge to 
talk to her.207 
 
Sanumati, observing the painting as an unseen witness, likewise praises it: 
Ah, [the king] has skill using a paint-brush! I think my friend is standing right in 
front of me.208  
 
Both remarks express an astonishment at the lifelikeness of the king’s painting, recalling Will-
Power’s comment in Saṅkalpasūryodaya on seeing one of Samskara’s paintings: “Things past and 
                                                
207 he he bhōḥ | svabhāvamādhuryākṛtiḥ khalu | sādhu vayasya sādhu | kiṃ bahunā | 
svāntānupraveśaśaṅkayālāpanakutūhalaṃ mām janayati | (Kālidāsa, Abhijñānaśākuntala (The 
Abhijñānaśākuntalam of Kālidāsa), 226.) 
 
208 aho vayasyasya vartikārekhāyā nipuṇatā | jāne sakhy agrato me tiṣṭhati | (Ibid.) 
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future appear as though they were present to us.”209 Dushyanta, for his part, is so gripped by his 
painting that he actually does address it, calling out to a bee in it that hovers near Shakuntala’s lip. 
And since Sanumati and Madhavya don’t immediately acknowledge that the king has lost touch 
with reality, for a few moments they too seem to have bizarrely fallen into his daydream. The first 
character to snap out of it is Madhavya, who drags the king out along with him: 
Madhavya: (Laughing to himself) He just went mad and, by hanging around him 
I’ve become just like him! (Aloud) But surely this is just a painting. 
King: How a painting?…Friend, why have you done me this cruelty?  
 
With a heart filled with her alone 
I was feeling the pleasure of seeing her  
as though she were before my eyes, 
when you aroused my memory (smṛti) 
and turned my lover  
once more into a painting.  
 
He sheds tears.210 
 
Dushyanta’s use of smṛti here highlights the same ambiguity in the concept of attention that we 
noted above. For another way of saying the second half of the verse—a way that to some people 
might come more naturally—would be, “you interrupted my remembrance (smṛti) and turned my 
lover once more into a painting.” All such situations can be described just as well from the 
perspective of attention as that of distraction; in each case, what remains to be understood is 
                                                
209  api bhūtāni bhāvīni bhavantīva bhavanti naḥ || S 7.5 || 
 
210 mādhavya: (prahasya | ātmagatam) eso dāva ummatto | ahaṃ  pi edassa saṅgeṇa īdisavaṇṇo via 
saṃvutto | (prakāśam) bho cittaṃ kkhu edaṃ | 
(Skt. chāyā: eṣa tavad unmattaḥ | aham apy etasya saṅgenedṛśavarṇa iva saṃvṛttaḥ | bhoḥ citraṃ 
khalv etat |) 
Rājā: kathaṃ citram | 
… 
rājā: vayasya kim idam anuṣṭhitaṃ paurobhāgyam | 
darśanasukham anubhavataḥ sākṣādiva tanmayena hṛdayena | 
smṛtikāriṇā tvayā me punar api citrīkṛtā kāntā || A 6.21 || 
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distracted from what, attentive to what, with what intensity? While the world we share with others 
makes demands on our attention almost unrelentingly, daydreamers have somehow found the 
means (the right mood, a conducive setting, time to spare, sufficient imaginative intensity) to tune 
it out and attend to their own mental creations. But the shared world always has the final say, and 
the higher the mind’s flight, the more painful the fall. That is why when Dushyanta is told that 
what he’s looking at is just a painting, he deems the reminder an act of cruelty.  
One of the striking features of the Meghadūta is that it gives us the lover’s daydream but 
witholds the crude and sore return to reality. To be sure, the yaksha is by no means spared the pain 
of that return; as we learn in 2.44 it has been a consistent feature of his exile: 
I see your body in the vines,  
your glance in the fearful look of the deer,  
the beauty of your face in the moon,  
your hair in the peacocks  
with their burden of feathers,  
your eyebrow-movements 
in the slender river-waves,  
but—you must be upset with me!— 
in no one place do I find  
the likeness of you.211 
 
These words read like the daydreamer’s counterpart to Maricha’s “behind every tree I see him” 
speech, used by Vedantadesika to illustrate the power of the disturbed imagination. Like Maricha, 
the yaksha has experienced an enhancement of his imaginative powers thanks to an extreme state 
of mind. But whereas Maricha’s imagination becomes too powerful, making absent entities seem 
present to him against his will, the yaksha’s imagination hasn’t become powerful enough. He in 
fact desires to imagine his beloved into presence with the help of various substitutes (much as 
                                                
211 śyāmāsv aṅgaṃ cakitahariṇotprekṣaṇe dṛṣṭipātaṃ 
vaktracchāyāṃ śaśini śikhināṃ barhabhāreṣu keśān | 
utpaśyāmi pratanuṣu nadīv īciṣu bhrūvilāsān 
hantaikasmin kvacidapi na te caṇḍi sādṛśyam asti || MD 2.44 || 
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Rama tried to do with Sita’s jewel, Dushyanta with the painting of Shakuntala, and presumably 
Shakuntala with Dushyanta’s ring) but only partially succeeds, since in the end his imagination 
proves too weak to shut out the overwhelming fact of his beloved’s absence.  
But when it comes to the most sustained imaginative flight of the poem—the yaksha’s 
presumption that the cloud is his friend, capable of sending a message to his beloved—we find 
that the final say goes not to reality but to the daydreamer. It is true that the narrator gives the poem 
a voice of reality, undermining the yaksha’s perspective most forcefully in the very lines that 
introduce it:  
How ill-suited is a cloud 
a jumble of vapor, light, water, and wind 
 
to the stuff of messages 
which only beings with life and minds should handle.  
 
In his passion the yaksha didn’t understand this 
and so beseeched the cloud. 
 
Those whom love has ruined suffer to the core 
unable to tell thinking from unthinking.212 
 
But unlike Madhavya, the narrator never shocks the daydreamer back into reality, falling silent as 
soon as the yaksha starts speaking. Both yaksha and audience are thus allowed to remain in thrall 
of the daydream at least until the end of the poem.  
Enthrallment is only possible, of course, if the daydream itself is sufficiently gripping. I 
find that the success or failure of the Meghadūta hangs on how we have come to think of the cloud 
by the end of a given reading of the poem, on whether it remains to us as the narrator described it, 
                                                
212 dhūmajyotiḥsalilamarutāṃ saṃnipātaḥ kva meghaḥ 
saṃdeśārthāḥ kva paṭukaraṇaiḥ prāṇibhiḥ prāpaṇīyāḥ | 
ityautsukyād aparigaṇayan guhyakas taṃ yayāce 
kāmārtā hi prakṛtikṛpaṇāś cetanācetaneṣu || MD 1.5 || 
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“a jumble of vapor, water, light, and wind,” or whether instead we see the cloud as the yaksha sees 
him, as a friend and messenger. When the poem succeeds (when we succeed in reading it), its 
effect on us resembles that of Dushyanta’s painting on Madhavya and Sanumati: the yaksha’s 
description of the cloud’s route so compels us that we start assenting to the daydream’s premise, 
however outlandish it may have seemed to us at first. Lovesickness has brought the poet out in the 
yaksha in the same way that it brought out the painter in Dushyanta, but to a greater extent; for 
nowhere in Kalidasa are the limits of the imagination, in both duration and intensity, more 
thoroughly explored than in the character of the yaksha. That is why, I take it, Bronner and 
Shulman wish to call the Meghadūta Kalidasa’s “strongest and most sustained metapoetic 
statement.”213 It is also why Vedantadesika’s most significant engagement with Kalidasa comes 
as a response to this poem. 
 
4. Daydreaming as Meditation: Imaginative Exercises in the Messenger Poems 
 
I have been trying to understand why Vedantadesika, a writer who is first and foremost a 
religious thinker, would be as invested as he is in the poetry of Kalidasa, a poet who shows little 
interest in theology or religious sentiments. In section 1, I identified which aspects of Kalidasa’s 
poetry were most often taken up by Vedantadesika: surveying the references to Kalidasa scattered 
throughout his oeuvre, I argued that Vedantadesika isn’t primarily drawn to any viewpoint or 
“message” of Kalidasa but to pre-propositional fragments in Kalidasa’s poetry—fragments on the 
order of expressions, images, and metaphors—and more generally to the capacity of Kalidasa’s 
writing to conjure vivid sensations. However, it still wasn’t clear why Vedantadesika should be 
                                                
213 Bronner and Shulman, “‘A Cloud Turned Goose,’” 11. In a similar vein, Kaviraj has 
remarked that “the reality of the journey transcends the unlikelihood of its beginning,” in 
Kaviraj, “The Theory in the Poem: Alienation Themes in Meghadūta,” 39. 
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fascinated by this aspect of Kalidasa’s poetry. In reading Vedantadesika’s texts on devotional 
meditation (section 2) alongside Kalidasa’s depictions of daydreaming (section 3), certain thematic 
connections between the two writers have begun to emerge, which might be summed up as follows: 
(1) both Kalidasa and Vedantadesika are interested in the imagination’s potential to conjure a 
world whose reality rivals that of the everyday world; (2) both writers see the imagination reaching 
this potential in extreme states of mind, such as lovesickness; (3) both identify the imagination 
thus intensified as one of the sources of artistic creation. That these are facts born of our 
observation doesn’t make them any less true; however, their use as data for understanding 
Vedantadesika’s investment in Kalidasa would be more convincing if we could somehow confirm 
that Vedantadesika also saw them. We find such confirmation in the Haṃsasandeśa (“Message of 
the Goose”), where Vedantadesika’s interest in Kalidasa most visibly intersects with his religious 
thinking. For in this poem, Vedantadesika casts his reflections on devotional meditation into 
depictions of daydreaming similar to the ones we find in the Meghadūta. In what follows, I will 
be interested in what these depictions can tell us about Vedantadesika’s relation to Kalidasa. 
 
In both the Haṃsasandeśa and the Meghadūta, as in so many works of messenger poetry, we meet 
characters who are engaged in various imaginative exercises intended to make absent beloveds 
seem present. Late in the Meghādūta, for example, in a speech occurring entirely within the 
yaksha’s imagination, the cloud reports to the yaksha’s beloved one of the techniques by which 
the yaksha has simulated reuniting with her: 
He enters (viś) your body with his: 
yours so thin and thin his,  
his too hot and hot yours,  
his welling with tears as you shed tears,  
yours ever longing just as his longs,  
yours releasing hot sighs and his even more sighs.  
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With these imaginings does your distant lover  
enter your body, his path blocked by cruel fate.214 
 
In the Haṃsasandeśa’s companion to this verse, Vedantadesika has Rama similarly “enter” 
(nirviś) Sita by a technique of the imagination:  
Seeing that our bodies touch in the southern wind,  
our gazes unite (dṛṣṭi-saṃyoga) in the moon,  
we have one home in the world,  
on the earth we are joined in a single bed,  
we have the expanse of a beautiful canopy  
in the sky decorated with stars,  
O most beautiful one, I reach (or “delight in”; nirviś) you  
who have become distant.215 
 
In both verses, the physical sense of entering another’s body is prohibited by the distance 
separating the two pairs, for just as the cloud refers to the yaksha as dūravartin (“one who is 
distant”), Sita is described as dūrībhūtā (“one who has become distant”). “Entering” must therefore 
take on another sense, which Rama and the yaksha arrive at in different ways. The yaksha enters 
his lover by supposing her body to host the same emotional responses as his, as though the two 
were connected in a mystical sympathy. For instance, when he cries, he supposes that his tears are 
an instinctive response to those shed by his distant beloved; or when he sighs, he supposes that 
each sigh is unconsciously repeated in her. Such mutual responsiveness is premised on the idea 
that to love someone is to take on her inner life, so that “entering” comes to mean something like 
                                                
214 aṅgenāṅgaṃ pratanu tanunā gāḍhataptena taptaṃ 
sāsreṇāśrudrutam aviratotkaṇṭham utkaṇṭhitena | 
uṣṇocchvāsaṃ samadhikatarocchvāsinā dūravartī 
saṅkalpais tair viśati vidhinā vairiṇā ruddhamārgaḥ || MD 2.42 || 
 
215 dehasparśam malayapavane drṣṭisaṃbhedam indau 
dhāmaikatvam jagati bhuvi cābhinnaparyaṅkayogam | 
tārācitre viyati vitatiṃ śrīvitānasya paśyan 
dūribhūtām sutanu vidhinā tvām aham nirviśāmi || H 2.40 || 
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“accessing another’s mind.” In Vedantadesika’s poem, Rama still enters Sita in a way, but by 
means of a different movement of the imagination: he expands the meaning of the words “touch,” 
“contact,” “home,” “bed,” and “canopy” (sparśa, saṃyoga, gṛha, talpa, vitāna), allowing them 
through the power of metaphor to mean more than what they customarily signify. In doing so, the 
sentence “I enter (reach) you” ends up holding true, but only in a special sense.216  
While the imaginative exercises recorded in these verses have presumably been performed 
sometime in the past—sometime before the yaksha spots the cloud and Rama the goose—the 
present of each poem is filled with the performance of yet another imaginative exercise; namely, 
the use of a messenger or intermediary as a substitute for oneself. The yaksha gives us his 
understanding of this exercise in Meghadūta 2.43, where he imagines the cloud introducing his 
message to his beloved as follows: 
‘Once he longed to say in your ear  
what could have been spoken aloud 
in front of your friends, 
for he desired to touch your face. 
Now, though he is beyond earshot  
and unviewable to your eyes, 
through my mouth  
he says to you the following words  
which have been composed with longing: …’217 
 
In Haṃsasandeśa 2.32, Rama has the goose greet Sita in similar fashion: 
‘Once your ornaments and body lotions  
                                                
216 I am inspired by Yigal Bronner and David Shulman’s thought to read these verses together; 
however, my account of their differences slightly diverges from theirs. See “‘A Cloud Turned 
Goose’: Sanskrit in the Vernacular Millennium,” The Indian Economic & Social History Review 
43, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 26–27. 
 
217 śabdākhyeyaṃ yad api kila te yaḥ sakhīnāṃ purastāt 
karṇe lolaḥ kathayitum abhūd ānanasparśalobhāt | 
so’tikrāntaḥ śravaṇaviṣayaṃ locanābhyām adṛśyas 
tvām utkaṇṭhāviracitapadaṃ manmukhenedam āha || M 2.43 || 
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were an obstacle to him;  
now the power of fate 
has led you to a distant island. 
Having placed you in the path of his eyes,  
as though he were very close,  
he who is faring well speaks thus, my lady,  
by the mouth of his friend: …’218 
 
Both verses begin by juxtaposing a past moment, when even a negligible distance from the beloved 
seemed significant, with a present in which the beloved is beyond the range of sight and hearing; 
both conclude with the suggestion that a messenger is capable of dulling the pain of separation. 
But in Vedantadesika’s version of the scenario, we are given an additional detail concerning the 
sender of the message: Rama has composed his words to Sita while visualizing her, “having placed 
Sita in the path of his eyes.” I take this detail to indicate the crucial role that visualization plays in 
this imaginative exercise as Vedantadesika understands it. For if the use of an intermediary is to 
succeed in simulating direct communication, both addresser and addressee must be made to feel 
they are in each other’s presence. For Sita, that feeling would arise by being addressed in the voice 
of Rama, as opposed to the mediating voice of indirect speech (as critics often point out, much 
lyric poetry derives its power from a first-person voicing which simulates the presence of a live 
speaker). For Rama, the feeling of presence is achieved by making Sita vivid to him through an 
act of visualization. 
Vedantadesika makes a similar specification about visualization in his version of 
Meghadūta 2.22. There the yaksha describes his beloved to the cloud as follows: 
One who is slender and dark,  
who has pointed teeth,  
whose lip is like a ripe red fruit,  
                                                
218 yasyā yasmin vyavadhir abhavad bhūṣaṇālepanādiḥ 
nītām enāṃ niyativibhavād antarīpaṃ davīyaḥ | 
pratyāsīdanniva nayanayor vartmani sthāpayitvā 
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who is emaciated,  
who has the trembling eyes of a fawn  
and a sunken navel,  
who walks slowly due to her heavy hips,  
who is slightly hunched over due to her breasts,  
who seems she could have been  
the very first woman that Brahma created…219 
 
Here is how Vedantadesika rewrites Kalidasa’s verse in Haṃsasandeśa 2.10: 
 
She is my seeing: 
her eyes are shaped like fish;  
her brows are curved; her hair is beautiful;  
she is thin; she bends over by the weight of her breasts;  
she is radiant as burning gold; she is young;  
her gait resembles yours; 
her waist is thin as a Vedic altar;  
her limbs are superlative;  
having learned the ocean called love,  
she seems the superior patron goddess for it.220 
 
That the particular adjectives used to describe the women are different should be unsurprising, 
since Sita and the yakshini are different characters. The more significant difference concerns the 
strange way Vedantadesika has Rama begin his description of Sita: sā me dṛṣṭiḥ—“she is my 
vision,” or even “she is my seeing.” One way of getting around the strangeness of this expression 
would be to take it as a hyperbolic metaphor meaning something like “she is as precious to me as 
my vision.” However, the emphasis placed throughout the poem on the actual sense of sight 
                                                
219 tanvī śyāmā śikharidaśanā pakvabimbādharoṣṭhī 
madhye kṣāmā cakitahariṇīprekṣaṇā nimnanābhiḥ | 
śroṇībhārād alasagamanā stokanamnā stanābhyāṃ 
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220 sā me dṛṣṭiḥ śapharanayanā sannatabhrūḥ sukeśī 
tanvī tuṅgastanabharanatā taptajāmbūnadābhā | 
bālā yuṣmatpratimagamanā vedimadhyā varāṅgī 
śrṅgārākhyaṃ nidhim adhigatā śreyasī devateva || H 2.10 || 
The idea here is that, since Sita is so beautiful, she seems a more suitable divinity of love 
than Kama himself. 
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discourages such an interpretation. If instead we took it to mean something like “she is all that I 
see,” the sentence would tell us something about how Rama speaks the words that follow. It would 
suggest that Rama’s description of Sita isn’t just a list of words that he has kept stored in memory 
but issues from a visualization of Sita in the present moment; a visualization so intense, moreover, 
that Rama is moved to describe it as seeing. Vedantadesika’s insistence on visualization in both of 
these rewritings seems less to undermine Kalidasa’s depictions of daydreaming (at least we need 
not take it that way) than to render explicit the mental processes already at work in those depictions, 
offering something like a gloss on them.  
Perhaps the most complex explorations of the imagination in these poems appear in those 
verses where Rama and the yaksha imagine their beloveds imagining them. In H 2.61, for instance, 
Rama imagines that Sita has been using his ring as a substitute for himself: 
Again and again, by turns  
she puts my ring on her lotus-hand 
and her body thrills,  
hair standing on end; 
she keeps it on her head  
bereft of its jewel 
and enjoys it there;  
when her breasts 
grow burdened with pain  
from the grief inside, caringly 
she rests it upon them.221 
 
This verse recalls at least two moments in Kalidasa’s poetry. The first of these appears in 
Raghuvamsa 12.65 (examined above in section 3), where Rama similarly uses Sita’s crest-jewel 
as a substitute for her. If we fancifully took Vedantadesika’s Rama as an extension of Kalidasa’s 
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character, we could say that Rama here is imagining Sita as his emotional mirror. The second 
moment appears in Meghadūta 2.27, where the yaksha imagines his beloved daydreaming about 
him in much the same way that he has been daydreaming about her:  
Or she marks on the ground  
the remaining months of the term  
which was set on the day of our separation,  
counting them with flowers  
laid in the doorway;  
or she delights in our lovemaking 
keeping in her heart how it begins; 
such are women’s diversions  
when their lovers are away.222 
 
In such verses, Vedantadesika and Kalidasa depict daydreaming on two levels, showing us the 
beloved’s imaginative exercises while at the same time portraying imagining-one’s-beloved-
imagining-oneself as itself a kind of imaginative exercise. 
Throughout this chapter I have been using a variety of words to write about the imaginative 
life of humans, some of which may at first seem to clash (such as daydream and exercise). This 
variety is a consequence not of imprecision but of the range of genuine experiences of the 
imagination recorded in the works I’ve been examining. For instance, while the imagination 
overwhelms consciousness in characters like Maricha, Shakuntala, and Urvashi, the situation is 
reversed in Vedantadesika’s Saṅkalpasūryodaya, where Imagination answers to Will-Power 
(vyavasāya), obediently painting images on the mind’s wall. Accordingly, while expressions like 
daydream, reverie, hallucination, and being carried away correspond to experiences where the 
imagination assails us against our will, words like technique, exercise, contemplation, and 
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meditation correspond to experiences where imaginative intensity is desired but must be effortfully 
sought out. Dushyanta’s experience fluctuates between these two extremes: his painting of 
Shakuntala owes its lifelikeness to his imaginative mastery, but that painting comes to assert a 
mastery of its own over Dushyanta, so thoroughly absorbing him that he can’t distinguish his 
mental creation from reality.  
The experience of characters in the messenger poems is similarly variable. The most 
obvious examples here are the yaksha and Rama: for each lover, lovesickness has so intensely 
activated his imagination that he starts speaking to a nonhuman; however, in the course of his 
monologue, he comes to describe a number of imaginative techniques he uses to shut out the 
harshness of his solitude. Less obvious but more illuminating (more illuminating on what is distinct 
in Haṃsasandeśa) is the example of Vedantadesika’s Sita. At times Sita seems completely passive 
to her imagination, as when she starts speaking to her ornaments (H 2.12); at other times, she 
seems to be semiconsciously using her imagination to dull the pain of her grief, as when she rests 
Rama’s ring on different parts of her body (H 2.16). While such instances find precedents in the 
Meghadūta (specifically in verses where Kalidasa depicts the yakshini’s pining), in Haṃsasandeśa 
2.22 Vedantadesika records an experience of the imagination that is entirely absent in Kalidasa’s 
poem: 
When the restraining of all mental states  
has quelled her stream of  
thoughts on the world outside,  
her mind shall be fixed on me alone,  
as per the writings on love: 
by a high intensity of her imagination 
which heeds none else, 
she shall be practicing unwavering meditation 
with a mind pliant from dissolving within.223 
                                                
223 cetovṛttiṃ śamayati bahiḥ śārvabhaume nirodhe 
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Again we find Sita substituting an inner reality for the external world that grieves her. But here 
that substitution results neither from a cognitive error owing to delirium nor from a temporary 
coping tactic used to drown out the harsh conditions of her kidnapping. Rather, it is achieved in 
tranquility by an advanced yogic technique: Sita clears her mind of all its representations of “the 
world outside” (bahiḥ), allowing it to turn “within” (antaḥ) and, more pliant than before, to 
concentrate fully and lovingly on Rama. The second half of the verse specifies the nature of this 
concentration: it amounts to an “unwavering meditation” on Rama, and is brought about not only 
through the negative labor of restraining habitual patterns of thought but also through a positive 
effort—as Vedantadesika writes, repeating almost verbatim an expression we encountered in 
Ramanuja’s Śrībhāṣya, “by a high intensity of the imagination (bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣāt).” That 
Vedantadesika reproduces Ramanuja’s theological term in his description of Sita’s pining is 
crucial. It suggests that what Vedantadesika gives us in Haṃsasandeśa 2.22 is an illustration not 
just of the lovesick imagination running on overdrive but indeed of devotional meditation; or, put 
differently, that Vedantadesika sees devotional meditation as continuous with the domain of 
imaginative experience that messenger poetry is in its very nature committed to exploring.224 
Vedantadesika may even be suggesting that devotional meditation just is the lovesick 
imagination running on overdrive. Pursuing that line, we could venture the following shorthand 
notations: To be a devotee is to be a lover-in-separation; to be a lover-in-separation is to be a 
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Kalidasa and Vedantadesika, see Yigal Bronner, “Birds of a Feather: Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa’s 




daydreamer; and to be a daydreamer is to be a poet (that is, to be able to conjure a compelling 
inner reality by the power of one’s imagination). And these formulations wouldn’t be misleading 
either, so long as they were accompanied by two important qualifications. The first concerns the 
status of will: whereas lovers are assailed by daydreams against their will, devotees are to practice 
devotional meditation by a deliberate technique. Indeed, it is precisely because daydreams are so 
wayward that they often prove disastrous for Kalidasa’s characters: both Urvashi and Shakuntala 
are cursed for succumbing to them, and while Kalidasa doesn’t specify the negligence for which 
the yaksha has been doomed to solitary confinement, it is reasonable to surmise based on what we 
learn about the yaksha’s temperament, and as many traditional readers have surmised, that his 
negligence too was the result of attentional failure.225 By contrast, the kind of imaginative 
meditation that interests Vedantadesika is an ideal to be achieved.  
The second qualification concerns the epistemological value of the imagination: while the 
imagination distorts reality for sufferers of daydreams, in devotional meditation it delivers the 
devotee to a higher reality, as Vedantadesika notes in his remark on Maricha’s hallucinations. To 
me, this notion of a higher reality is key to understanding Vedantadesika’s counterintuitive claim 
in Haṃsasandeśa 1.4 that “finding a messenger is greater fortune than embracing the beloved.” 
While embracing the beloved is perhaps the highest form of intimacy possible in the world of 
everyday experience, for Vedantadesika the everyday world is to be distinguished from the 
ultimate reality of god. That reality is accessed not through our common ways of sensing and 
understanding but through a transcendental exercise of the imagination. 
                                                
225 This is in fact how one dominant tradition of reading Kalidasa understood the yaksha’s curse. 
For a survey of some of the ways the narrative situation of Meghadūta had traditionally been 
understood, see Kālidāsa, Meghadūta (Meghasandeśa of Kālidāsa with the Commentaries 
Pradīpa of Dakṣiṇāvartanātha, Vidyullatā of Purṇasarasvati, Sumanoramaṇī of Parameśvara), 




5. Reading as Meditation: Vedantadesika’s Performance of Devotion 
 
If Vedantadesika is invested in Kalidasa’s poetry, it isn’t just because of a general interest 
he happens to have in poetry, or because he wants to render his theological ideas more attractive 
or palatable. Rather, for Vedantadesika, the kind of poetry that Kalidasa writes engages the same 
mental faculty as the one involved in devotional meditation. This link is what allows 
Vedantadesika to braid together in his poems Kalidasa’s poetry of vivid sensation with his own 
practice of devotional meditation. I will conclude this chapter by indicating how specifically 
Vedantadesika conceives of this braiding-together, focusing on two instances in his writing where 
he explicitly reflects on his own poetic practice.  
The first of these occurs in the conclusion of Haṃsasandeśa. In the final verse, 
Vedantadesika offers an understanding of his poem in the form of an elaborate conceit:    
This jewel, the Message of the Goose, was fashioned  
by Venkatesa, whose mind is excellent in the sciences and in art;  
it has been polished many times on the grindstone of the mind;  
it is a means of attaining those things which are best;  
it is a friend to Rama and Sita’s union;  
may good people see it, reviving within them  
that ear which is a faultless eye.226 
 
What may seem to be a single metaphor comparing the Haṃsasandeśa to a jewel is in fact a 
complex of several metaphors. When Vedantadesika writes that his poem “has been polished many 
times on the grindstone of the mind,” he is suggesting that it is comparable to any jewel that might 
come under the tools of a lapidary. Here Vedantadesika appears to affiliate himself with poets 
                                                
226 vidyāśilpapraguṇamatinā veṅkaṭeśena klṛptaṃ 
cintāśoṇollikhitam asakṛc chreyasāṃ prāptihetum | 
sītārāmavyatikarasakhaṃ haṃsasaṃdeśaratnaṃ 
paśyantv antaś śṛavaṇam anaghaṃ cakṣur ujjīvya santaḥ || H 2.50 || 
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writing in the tradition of Sanskrit kāvya, where repetition and precision are central values of 
composition (we may recall that Kuntaka also used the lapidary metaphor in his account of the 
poetic process); in the same stroke, he appears to distinguish himself from devotional poets such 
as the Alvars, whose verses are imagined to flow from them as spontaneously as juice flows from 
pressed sugarcane (here I recall Vedantadesika’s own description in Dehalīśastuti of the poetic 
process of the first three Alvars).227 However, these inferences are complicated by the words that 
immediately follow. For when Vedantadesika writes that his jewel-poem “is a means of attaining 
those things which are best,” he is comparing his poem not just to any jewel but specifically to the 
wish-fulfilling jewel known as the cintāmaṇi, suggesting that while the Haṃsasandeśa is a 
carefully crafted poem, it is nonetheless a kind of stotra—that is, the kind of poem whose recitation 
produces talismanic effects for devotees of god.  
In my reading, the verse’s second half offers an account of how exactly Haṃsasandeśa is 
simultaneously a work of kāvya (in being carefully crafted to generate aesthetic effects) and a 
devotional prayer (in promising to yield benefits for pious readers). Vedantadesika writes that his 
jewel-poem is a “friend to Rama and Sita’s union.” To what sort of jewel is Vedantadesika 
comparing his poem here? It can’t be any jewel polished by the jeweler, since not every jewel is a 
                                                
227 Here is Kuntaka’s account: “An idea first flashes before the poetic faculty like a jewel which 
is no better than a chunk taken from raw stone. When this idea meets the indirect speech of a 
skilled poet, it becomes a poem that delights sensitive readers, being as attractive as the jewel 
when it is polished on a grindstone.” <prathamaṃ ca pratibhāpratibhāsamānam 
aghaṭitapāṣāṇaśakalakalpamaṇiprakhyam eva vastu vidagdhakaviviracitavakravākyoparūḍhaṃ 
śāṇollīḍhamaṇimanoharatayā tadvidāhlādakārikāvyatvam adhirohati |> (Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, 
8–9, commentary on 1.7.) 
Vedantadesika’s account appears in a verse addressed to the deity at Tirukkoyilur: “You are 
sweet as the sugarcane on the Panna’s banks; your nectar came out by the squeezing of those 
first poets with Poykai at their head.” <kāsārapūrvakavimukhyavimardajanmā … 
paṇṇātateḳṣusubhagasya raso bahus te |> (Dehalīśastuti 7) 
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friend to Rama and Sita’s union. Nor can it be the wish-fulfilling jewel, at least not for Rama or 
Sita, since we can’t quite say that Message of the Goose (or even the goose’s message) actually 
brings their union to pass. What the poem has rather done is to make Sita and Rama vivid to 
devotees reading the poem, assisting an imagined union between readers and the divine couple 
(i.e., it fosters “Sita and Rama’s union” with devotees, as opposed to a union between Sita and 
Rama).228 The poem assists devotees with this imagined union in the same way that Sita’s crest-
jewel helps Rama embrace Sita in his imagination (R 12.64), or that Rama’s bejeweled ring allows 
Sita to stage her union with him (H 2.16). I take it that Vedantadesika is comparing Haṃsasandeśa 
to such jewels, suggesting that his poem functions as an aid to the devotional reader’s imagination.  
That suggestion is developed in the final line: “may good people see it, reviving within 
them that ear which is a faultless eye.” In wishing that “good people” see his poem-jewel, 
Vedantadadesika implies that there is a special kind of seeing which is to be distinguished from 
mere seeing. Good seeing could belong to the eye of the lapidary, who is able to distinguish the 
genuine from the fraudulent article; alternatively, it could belong to the eye of a daydreamer like 
Rama, who takes Sita’s jewel not merely for a jewel but as the basis of a vividly imagined scenario. 
The logic of the metaphor urges that there is likewise a special kind of reading, which is to be 
distinguished from mere reading. This special reading engages an inner ear, which is somehow 
also a kind of eye (if I am right in sensing the metaphor collapse at this point into a literal 
                                                
228 While this interpretation may at first seem strained, its strength lies in making full sense of 
both sides of the metaphor. The plausibility of this reading is also acknowledged by U. 
Viraraghavacharya, in his commentary on the poem: “It is a friend to Rama and Sita’s union; 
that is, it is an aid to an embrace of Sita and Rama by readers, in the mind” <sītārāmayoḥ 
adhyetṛṛṇām manasi vyatikarasya taiḥ saṃśliṣya vartanasya sahāyabhūtam>. (Vedāntadeśika, 
Haṃsasandeśa (Hamsa Sandesa, One of Sri Vedanta Desika’s Kavyas with Commentary 
“Sanjeevana” in Sanskrit & Tamil), ed. Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya (Madras: Ubhaya 
Vedanta Grantha Mala, 1973), 128.) 
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identification between seeing and hearing). Vedantadesika seems to be suggesting that good 
readers will follow the words of his poem not only with their ears or lips or errant bodily eyes but 
also with a “faultless” inner eye, feeling the stress of words on the mind like weight on a muscle, 
allowing the poem to activate and expand their capacity to visualize. To read well is to create vivid 
mental images on the basis of what is heard (or seen as marks on the page), so that reading a poem 
like Haṃsasandeśa would amount to meditating on god. 
The second instance of self-reflection I wish to examine centers on verse 2 of 
Vedantadesika’s Daśāvatārastotra (“Praise for the Ten Incarnations”): 
Its glances devote all their moments 
to searching out the submerged Vedas, 
and it seems to conjure thickets of lotuses 
in the ocean waters; it is playful as it rises  
on the swing of water fighting water  
in the tossing of unimpeded waves, 
this fish-body of god. May it protect us.229 
 
The final words indicate that the speaker is a devotee requesting the blessings of a deity; what 
precedes these words is a complex and vivid image of Vishnu in his incarnation as a fish. How are 
we to read this image? I want to outline two possibilities that suggest themselves before 
introducing Vedantadesika’s own approach to it. (1) We could take the image in the mode of 
praise: in accompanying the prayer with a laudatory description, the speaker might be trying to 
render god more willing to offer his protection. (2) We could detach the image from the context of 
prayer (that is, from the intentions and mood of a devotee-speaker), regarding that context as little 
more than a loose frame for Vedantadesika to practice his art of image-making. We would then be 
                                                
229 nirmagnaśrutijālamārgaṇadaśādattakṣaṇair vīkṣaṇair 
antas tanvadivāravindagahanāny audanvatīnām apām | 
niṣpratyūhataraṅgariṅgaṇamithaḥpratyūḍhapāthaśchaṭā- 
ḍolārohasadohalaṃ bhagavato mātsyaṃ vapur pātu naḥ || Daśāvatārastotra 2 || 
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free to attend to the fish-image as it presents itself to the mind—to attend, that is, to the aesthetic 
impression the image makes on us by itself. We might say that the description impresses on us 
first the deftness of the fish in its searching (for the eyes range so widely and quickly as to create 
the illusion of whole thickets of lotuses) and, second, the courage of the fish in the face of thrashing 
waves (for the customary response to being plunged into a stormy ocean is terror, or if not terror 
then at least strain or exhaustion; defying any such expectation, the fish appears “playful” and 
entirely at ease). Vedantadesika’s verse would thus impart a sense of determined striving, or what 
some Sanskrit theorists would call a taste of the heroic. 
In Act 7 of Saṅkalpasūryodaya, Vedantadesika proposes a way of reading the verse which, 
while resembling these approaches in certain aspects, should be distinguished from both of them. 
Shortly after Imagination’s opening monologue (examined above in section 2), Will-Power, King 
Discrimination, and Queen Benevolence enter the gallery to view his paintings. At one point, Will-
Power makes the following remark on seeing a painting of Vishnu’s avatar as a fish: 
Will-Power: Just look, king and queen, at what we find here: 
 
Its glances devote all their moments  
to searching out the submerged Vedas, 
and it seems to conjure thickets of lotuses 
in the ocean waters; it is playful as it rises  
on the swing of water fighting water  
in the tossing of unimpeded waves, 
this fish-body of god.230 
 
Vedantadesika has essentially reproduced verse 2 of Daśāvatārastotra word for word (the only 
difference turning up in the final three syllables of the Sanskrit, where dṛśyate replaces pātu naḥ 
                                                
230 tāvad imam avalokayatu devo devī ca | idaṃ hi | 
nirmagnaśrutijālamārgaṇadaśādattakṣaṇair vīkṣaṇair 
antastanvadivāravindagahanānyaudanvatīnām apām | 
niṣpratyūhataraṅgariṅgaṇamithaḥpratyūḍhapāthaśchaṭā- 
ḍolārohasadohalaṃ bhagavato mātsyaṃ dṛśyate || S 7.17 || 
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of Daśāvatārastotra). Yet his recontextualization of it tells us something crucial about how he 
understands his own verse. In its new environment in Saṅkalpasūryodaya, the verbal image is still 
both devotional and artistic; yet, strictly speaking, it issues neither from a devotee’s attempt to 
praise god nor from an artist’s intention to please a sensitive reader. Rather, it is Will-Power’s 
astonished response to a picture of god that Imagination has painted on the mind’s walls; or, to 
translate the allegory into literal terms, it is a devotee’s reaction to her own imaginative 
visualization of god. Daśavatārastotra 2 is moreover only one of several images that 
Vedantadesika has lifted from his stotras and reproduced in the gallery-viewing scene.231 These 
recontextualizations prompt us to take the vivid descriptions of god scattered throughout 
Vedantadesika’s poetry as his responses to his own mental paintings conjured in devotional 
meditation.  
It is true that not all of Vedantadesika’s vast and diverse literary oeuvre is premised on an 
understanding of poetry as meditation. For example, his poetry inspired by the Alvars is primarily 
committed to exploring the emotional states of devotional speakers (emotions of pain, wonder, 
gratitude, helplessness), and his poetry of polysemy and verbal pyrotechnics participates more in 
an unbridled play of signifiers than in the creation of vivid sensations. However, a significant strain 
of Vedantadesika’s writing is premised on such an understanding of poetry, and it is this strain that 
the two instances examined above, as well as the conclusions of this chapter, serve to illuminate. 
While the concluding verse of Hamsasandeśa suggests that reading Vedantadesika’s devotional 
poetry of sensation would ideally involve the reader in an act of meditation, Act 7 of 
Saṅkalpasūryodaya suggests that such poetry itself issues from the meditation of a poet-devotee. 
                                                
231 Other examples include Daśāvatārastotra 4, reproduced in S 7.31; Śrīstuti 20, reproduced in 
S 7.25; and Bhūstuti 10, reproduced in S 7.33. 
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We might thus read many of Vedantadesika’s poems as scripts that devotees might use for their 
meditations, or transcripts of his own devotional meditations. In other words, we might read them 
as Vedantadesika’s performance of bhakti. 
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Chapter 4: Aurobindo’s Kalidasa 
Poet of the Earth 
 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Sri Aurobindo (or Aurobindo Ghose, as he was known 
at the time) wrote many pages’ worth of translations and original poetry inspired by Kalidasa, as 
well as a number of essays (all written between 1898 and 1903) for a book-length study he 
provisionally titled “A Proposed Work on Kalidasa.” Many of these texts are incomplete: all of 
the translations but one remain either unfinished or in fragments, and while the pages he wrote for 
his book number more than a hundred, by no standard do they constitute a finished work. Passages 
broken off mid-sentence, paragraphs squeezed into the margins, and stanzas in translation 
“devoured by white ants” (so Aurobindo’s editors inform us) at times leave us guessing what 
thoughts had been interrupted mid-flight, or where floating texts should be reinserted. Nonetheless, 
what we do have provides ample material for investigating the nature of Aurobindo’s early 
engagement with Kalidasa, and in what follows I will examine this fragmentary but significant 
body of writing to understand why Aurobindo turned to Kalidasa at the fin de siècle. In section 1, 
I examine the basic characterization of Kalidasa’s poetry that Aurobindo offers in his essay on the 
Ṛtusaṃhāra. Aurobindo’s assertion that Kalidasa is primarily a poet of the senses is neither 
unprecedented nor controversial; however, the significance of this fact for Aurobindo warrants 
investigation. In section 2, I relate a brief history of sensuousness as a literary critical concept in 
order to contextualize Aurobindo’s remarks on Kalidasa’s sensuous poetry. This history shows 
that sensuousness is not only an aesthetic category but also historical one, belonging to a theory of 
poetry which associates sensuousness with naiveté and primitivism. In writing on Kalidasa’s 
sensuousness, then, Aurobindo is in part attempting to revise the European reception of Kalidasa 
and the Sanskrit literary tradition. However, Aurobindo’s engagement with Kalidasa cannot be 
entirely subsumed under this revisionist project. In sections 3 and 4, I show how Aurobindo’s 
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discussion of sensuousness is also connected to his thinking on ascetic life, especially as developed 
in his writing on Kalidasa’s Vikramorvaśīya. While asceticism has often been understood as an 
apolitical withdrawal from life, Aurobindo finds in Kalidasa’s play, as well as the myth that it 
dramatizes, the outlines of an ascetic practice that not only affirms life but transforms it. I will 
conclude by briefly suggesting what place Kalidasa might have had in Aurobindo’s later thought.  
 
1. “The Seasons” and Kalidasa’s Poetry of the Senses 
 
Scholars since at least the nineteenth century have questioned whether Ṛtusaṃhāra (“The 
Round of Seasons” or simply “The Seasons,” as Aurobindo translates it) is the genuine work of 
Kalidasa, both for historical and literary critical reasons. Among the seven works most commonly 
attributed to Kalidasa, it is the only poem never mentioned in Sanskrit rhetorical treatises, and the 
only one of Kalidasa’s four non-dramatic works on which the major fourteenth-century 
commentator Mallinatha didn’t write a commentary. Moreover, many have considered the 
Ṛtusaṃhāra to be aesthetically inferior to the other six canonical works of Kalidasa.232  
In his essay on “The Seasons,” Aurobindo argues that the poem is indeed the genuine work 
of Kalidasa, albeit an immature work of Kalidasa’s youth. Since “external evidence…is in itself 
of little value unless received from definite and contemporary or almost contemporary sources,” 
sure evidence of the poem’s authenticity must come from the text itself:  
We have to judge, first, by the presence or absence of the essential and indefinable 
self of Kalidasa which we find apparent in all his indubitable work, however 
various the form or subject, and after that on those nameable characteristics which 
are the grain and fibre of his genius and least imitable by others.233 
                                                
232 For a summary of the debate over the Ṛtusaṃhāra’s authenticity in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, see A. Berriedale Keith, “The Authenticity of the Rtusamhara,” 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1912, 1066–70. 
 
233 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 28. 
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Aurobindo here distinguishes between two tests: an intuitive “test of personality” and a concrete 
test of stylistics. While the test of personality is more decisive, its judgements depend on the 
“fineness of [one’s] literary palate” and so can’t be backed up with arguments (personality being 
“as fugitive to imitation as to analysis”). What can be put into language, however, are certain 
“nameable characteristics” of Kalidasa’s definitive work, and it is in listing these that Aurobindo 
reveals what he regards as the essential features of Kalidasa’s poetry:  
his force of vision, his architecture of style, his pervading sensuousness, the 
peculiar temperament of his similes, his characteristic strokes of thought and 
imagination, his individual and inimitable cast of description.234  
 
These features form a basic list of criteria by which one can judge the authenticity of “The 
Seasons.”  
Aurobindo’s list largely confirms what previous readers also noticed in Kalidasa’s poetry. 
For instance, when Aurobindo speaks of Kalidasa’s distinctive “cast of description” and 
“architecture of style,” he is getting at those qualities of the delicate style which Kuntaka called 
“clarity” (prasāda) and “beauty” (saundarya).235 Likewise, in remarking on the distinction of 
Kalidasa’s similes, Aurobindo is in fact conscious of reiterating a widely held traditional view: 
“that characteristic of the poet…which most struck the ancient critics, upamāsu kālidāsaḥ, 
Kalidasa for similes, is everywhere present even in such early and immature work.”236 Yet for 
                                                
 
234 Ibid., 29. 
 
235 See VJ 1.31 and 1.32. 
 
236 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 34. The view is registered, for instance, in 
this popular verse: “Kalidasa’s simile, Bharavi’s weight of meaning, Dandin’s grace in diction—
all three are found in Magha.” <upamā kālidāsasya bhāraver arthagauravam | daṇḍinaḥ 
padalālityam māghe santi trayo guṇaḥ ||> 
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Aurobindo “the most fundamental and important” characteristic of Kalidasa’s work is not the 
artistry of his similes but his “force of vision”:  
In continuous gift of seizing an object and creating it to the eye [Kalidasa] has no 
rival in literature. A strong visualizing faculty such as the greatest poets have in 
their most inspired descriptive moments, was with Kalidasa an abiding and 
unfailing power.237 
 
This “visualizing faculty” is evidenced in Ṛtusaṃhāra as the many “strokes of vivid description” 
which make “the seasons live before our eyes as we read.” To illustrate what he means, Aurobindo 
takes several images from across Ṛtusaṃhāra and reproduces them in his own poetic prose: 
Summer is here with its sweltering heat…. Yonder lies the lion forgetting his 
impulse and his mighty leap; his tongue lolls and wearily from time to time he 
shakes his mane; the snake with lowered head panting and dragging his coil labours 
over the blazing dust of the road…But the rains come, and what may be yonder 
writhing lines we see on the slopes? It is the young water of the rains…. We watch 
the beauty of the mountains streaked everywhere with waterfalls, their high rocks 
kissed by the stooping clouds and their sides a gorgeous chaos of peacocks….238   
 
Rather than directly translate a few exemplary verses from Ṛtusaṃhāra (as he will do later in the 
essay to make a different point), or paraphrase Kalidasa’s images in the neutral voice of a critic, 
Aurobindo here assumes the voice of a reader experiencing the poem in real time. That this 
readerly voice could just as well belong to one present at the scenes described suggests the 
transportive capacity of Kalidasa’s poetry, a feature which distinguishes Kalidasa from other 
descriptive poets in the Sanskrit literary tradition: 
These descriptions which remain perpetually with the eye, visible and concrete as 
an actual painting, belong in the force with which they are visualized and the 
magnificent architecture of phrase with which they are presented, to Kalidasa alone 
among Sanskrit poets. Other poets, such as Bana or even Bhavabhuti, overload their 
description with words and details; they have often lavish colouring but never an 
                                                
237 Ibid., 15. 
 
238 Ibid., 34–35. 
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equal power of form; their figures do not appear to stand out of the canvas and 
live.239 
 
Here again Aurobindo confirms the insight of earlier readers of Kalidasa—in this case of 
Vedantadesika, who also connects the intense visualization characteristic of Kalidasa’s poetry with 
the art of painting. 
 Kalidasa’s vividness of description also sets him apart from the two other “chief poets” of 
the Sanskrit tradition, Valmiki and Vyasa: “His poetry has…never been, like the poetry of Valmiki 
and Vyasa, a great dynamic force for moulding heroic character or noble or profound 
temperament.”240 Since Kalidasa’s poetry issues from a “rich sensuous temperament,” it “troubles 
itself little with problems, issues & the rest”; that is, it doesn’t dramatize the complex ethical and 
political problems that we find in the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata.241 His poetry is thus of a  
fundamentally different type, a poetry not of moral and intellectual life but of sensuous life: “The 
delight of the eye, the delight of the ear, smell, palate, touch, the satisfaction of the imagination 
and taste are the texture of his poetical creation.”242  
The status of this “sensuousness” at first seems ambiguous in Aurobindo’s writing. On one 
hand, sensuousness is precisely what makes Kalidasa “rank with the highest” world-poets: 
“Kalidasa is the great, the supreme poet of the senses, of aesthetic beauty, of sensuous emotion”; 
on the other hand, it is an aspect of Kalidasa’s poetry which Aurobindo is at pains to defend or 
somehow qualify at several points, as in the following remark: 
                                                
239 Ibid., 35. 
 
240 Ibid., 9; ibid., 14. 
 
241 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 29; ibid., 52. 
 
242 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 17. 
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[Kalidasa’s] sensuousness is not coupled with weak self-indulgence, but is rather a 
bold and royal spirit seizing the beauty and delight of earth to itself and compelling 
all the senses to minister to the enjoyment of the spirit rather than enslaving the 
spirit to do the will of the senses.243 
 
Aurobindo here opposes a weak sensuousness to a sensuousness he associates with strength and 
self-control. Spirit in Kalidasa’s poetry isn’t enslaved by the senses (which are themselves servile 
to the passions) but rather masters them. Kalidasa’s work is thus to be distinguished from that of 
the early Keats: “[Kalidasa] never relaxed into the cloying and effeminate languour of sensuous 
description which offends us in Keats’ earlier work.”244 Here Aurobindo is in fact echoing a 
common nineteenth-century criticism of Keats; Victorian critic Matthew Arnold, for example, 
remarked that “Keats as a poet is abundantly and enchantingly sensuous; the question with some 
people will be, whether he is anything else.”245 Keats’ example helps Aurobindo distinguish 
between two kinds of sensuousness: whereas Keats’ sensuousness is cloying, languorous, and 
effeminate, Kalidasa’s is “vigorous,” “aspiring,” and masculine, “[satisfying] the sensuous 
imagination without enervating the virile chords.”246 What must sensuousness mean, or represent, 




                                                
243 Ibid., 14; ibid., 31. 
 
244 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 31. 
 
245 Matthew Arnold, “John Keats,” in The English Poets: Wordsworth to Rossetti, ed. Thomas 
Humphry Ward (Macmillan, 1894), 428. 
 
246 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 31. 
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2. Sensuousness and the History of Art 
It was around a century prior to Aurobindo’s essays that Kalidasa’s poetry first encountered 
a European readership, with William Jones’ translation of Abhijñānaśākuntala in 1789. Two years 
later, Georg Forster translated Jones’ text into German, introducing Kalidasa to a number of 
intellectuals who were already deeply interested in questions of literature, culture, and antiquity, 
including J.W. Goethe (1749-1832), J.G. Herder (1744-1803), and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). 
While the early German reception of Abhijñānaśākuntala has been well documented in 
scholarship, my reconstruction of it in what follows will try to emphasize certain assumptions 
about art and history that help furnish an intellectual context for Aurobindo’s remarks on 
Kalidasa.247 In particular, I will focus on Schiller’s influential essay “On Naïve and Sentimental 
Poetry” (1795), because it helps us understand the meaning of sensuousness as a literary critical 
concept. 
In this text, Schiller distinguishes between two kinds of relationship that humans can have 
with nature. Naïve describes the condition of entities at one with nature, being more or less 
governed by necessity; these include “plants, minerals, animals, and landscapes,” as well as 
“children, …country folk and the primitive world.”248 By contrast, sentimental specifically names 
the condition of entities endowed with reason and thus with the potential for freedom and morality 
(here Schiller unsurprisingly has in mind modern Europeans). While reason marks the 
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advancement of moderns, it has also led to their expulsion from nature, as well as that peculiar 
shade of sadness one often feels in face of the naïve: “a humble flower, a brook, a mossy rock, the 
chirping of birds, the humming of bees, and the like…depict at once our lost childhood, something 
that remains ever dearest to us, and for this reason they fill us with a certain melancholy.”249 
Schiller further characterizes this melancholy as a kind of homesickness, in an elaborate figure 
which reads like a variation on the parable of the prodigal son: 
We then see in nonrational nature only a more fortunate sister who remained at 
home with her mother, while we stormed out into an alien world, arrogantly 
confident of our freedom. With painful urgency we long to be back where we began 
as soon as we experience the misery of culture and hear our mother’s tender voice 
in the distant, foreign country of art.250 
 
Stumbling in the far-off land of culture and artifice, the sentimental son of nature hears (or thinks 
he hears) the faint voice of his mother, which fills him with desire for a lost unity. This desire can 
take two forms. We may long “to change places with nature”—to forsake reason and revert to a 
childlike “sensuous unity,” in which “sense and reason, receptive and spontaneous faculties have 
not yet divided the tasks between them; still less do they contradict one another.”251 Yet while such 
a longing “[flatters] our sensuous character…, a continual penchant for this way of feeling must 
ultimately enervate a person’s character, plunging it into a state of passivity from which no reality 
at all, neither the external life nor the inner life, can emerge.”252 Alternatively, we may pursue our 
longed-for unity not by reverting to childhood but by advancing to a yet unrealized harmony, or 
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what Schiller calls a “moral unity.”253 For if natural entities are endowed with a completeness we 
lack, it is because they lack the freedom we possess:  
We are free and what they are is necessary; we alter, they remain one. Yet only if 
both are combined with one another—only if the will freely adheres to the law of 
necessity and reason maintains its rule in the face of every change in the 
imagination, only then does the divine or the ideal emerge.254 
 
Nature charges us with recovering a lost unity, but we must recover it by advancing rather than 
regressing, by becoming less like nature and more like gods. 
 Most important for Schiller, naïve and sentimental are categories under which all poetry 
may be usefully classified. Since the naïve individual deals frankly with nature, the naïve poet 
“merely follows simple nature and feeling, limiting himself solely to imitation of reality.” By 
contrast, since the sentimental individual feels exiled from nature, mere seeing and transcribing 
cannot satisfy. The sentimental poet therefore “reflects on the impression the objects make upon 
him”; that is, he adds to the naïve poet’s first-level description a second-level account of the 
thoughts and feelings induced in him by the objects described.255 To illustrate the difference 
between these types, Schiller compares two passages drawn from the poetry of the naïve poet 
Homer and the sentimental poet Ariosto. Both Iliad and Orlando Furioso feature episodes where 
opponents in battle unexpectedly set aside their enmity in order to observe codes of conduct 
(whether these are dictated by xenia or chivalry). But whereas Homer narrates the triumph of 
civility “as though he were reporting something commonplace,” Ariosto cannot help interrupting 
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himself to express his admiration: “‘O the noble courage of the ancient rites of knights!’”256 
Schiller would have us note that while poets like Homer appeal to us simply through the vividness 
of their description, poets like Ariosto appeal to us through the ideal content which they add; as 
Schiller elsewhere puts it, “if the former move us through nature, individuality, and a vivid 
sensuality, the latter demonstrate just as great a power over our minds, though not as widespread, 
by means of ideas and a lofty spirituality” (spirit being the seat of thought).257  
 It is true that in Schiller’s essay, naïve and sentimental are still primarily determinations of 
temperament which do not bear a strict correspondence to history, since it is as possible for an 
ancient to be sentimental (e.g., Euripides) as it is for a modern to be naïve (e.g., Shakespeare). 
Nonetheless, the naïve-sentimental typology maps well enough onto an ancient-modern 
periodization that at times Schiller seems to welcome the correspondence—when he writes, for 
instance, that “the ancient poets touch us through nature, through sensuous truth, through living 
presence; the modern poets touch us through ideas.”258 At all events, by the time these concepts 
are taken up by Friedrich Schlegel and the Jena romantics, they have started being used 
unreservedly as historical concepts designating entire ages of poetry. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Jean-Luc Nancy write, “One should never forget, when the term naïve appears in these texts 
[of the Athenaeum] (especially in connection with the naïve poetry of the Ancients), that after 
Schiller this word refers to both naiveté (innocence) and nativity.”259 Child development thus 
                                                
256 Ibid., 198. 
 
257 Ibid., 220. 
 
258 Ibid., 201. 
 
259 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of 
Literature in German Romanticism (SUNY Press, 1988), 49. 
 
	 131 
becomes a dominant model for understanding human history, so that to classify Homer as naïve 
amounts to taking his poetry as indexical for an earlier, childlike era of history. 
For many of Schiller’s German contemporaries, this is a history whose infancy took place 
in India. “All the peoples of Europe, where are they from?” asks Herder, and replies, “From 
Asia.”260 When Novalis writes that he is “homesick for the Indian motherland,” he reminds us of 
Schiller’s sentimental son who so longs to return to the bosom of nature.261 Modern Europeans can 
now see in the artistic productions of Ancient India their own civilizational past, with an emotion 
not unlike what adults may feel flipping through childhood pictures—that is, with a mixture of 
amusement (how cute we were!), admiration (how innocent, how good), and melancholy (how 
much simpler a time…). When Schiller claims, then, that “in the whole of Greek antiquity there is 
no poetical representation of beautiful womanliness or beautiful love which approaches 
‘Śakuntalā’ even from afar,” and Herder that Śākuntala is “an Indian flower, an epic drama and a 
symbol of naïveté,” they are specifically remarking on the perfection with which Kalidasa’s play 
expresses a primitive world.262 The sensuous poetry of Kalidasa represents a period closer to 
nature, a naïve phase of history when art didn’t strain to be classical.  
Aurobindo’s remarks on sensuousness can be best understood as a critique of this view of 
Kalidasa. For Aurobindo, Kalidasa’s poetry does indeed capture the “warm sensuous humanism” 
that predominates in a certain period of Indian history, a time when India was “attempting to find 
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out the utmost each sense could feel.”263 However, he doesn’t understand that sensuousness as an 
indication of naïveté. The temptation to understand it this way may arise from a perception of 
superficial similarities between Kalidasa and a naïve poet of Greek antiquity like Homer: both 
poets belong to antiquity, both write sensuous poetry, both depict interactions between gods and 
mortals. But Aurobindo insists that Kalidasa’s “sensuous humanism” has nothing to do with the 
naïve sensuousness that Schiller detected in Homer—“the humanism of which I speak is not the 
Homeric naturalism”—just as the gods in Kalidasa’s poetry are radically different from Homer’s 
gods who, apart from their powers and immortality, are largely indistinguishable from the human 
characters —“there is little of the sublime or romantic in the essence of the Homeric gods….”264 
Aurobindo is suggesting here that if Kalidasan gods are different from Homeric gods, it is because 
they more closely resemble the gods we find in the romantic poetry of the early nineteenth century: 
Kalidasa’s divine & semidivine personages lose none of their godhead by living on 
the plane of humanity. Perhaps the most exquisite masterpiece in this kind is the 
Cloud Messenger. The actors in that beautiful love-elegy might have been chosen 
by Shelley himself; they are two lovers of Faeryland, a cloud, rivers, mountains, 
the gods & demigods of air & hill & sky…. Here are all the materials for one of 
those intangible harmonies of woven & luminous mist with which Shelley allures 
& baffles us.265 
 
In order to clarify what exactly Aurobindo is getting at in such comments about Shelley, Homer, 
Kalidasa, and gods, I wish to make a few brief remarks here on romanticism, a term so equivocal, 
not just in general but even in Aurobindo’s writing, that it isn’t always easy to tell what is meant 
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by it. Here are some of the many diverse but often overlapping phenomena which the word has 
been taken to cover: an aesthetic sensibility privileging spontaneity and simplicity over technique 
and embellishment (the sense most current in South Asian literary studies); the revolt of emotion 
against reason; the rejection of traditional canons of art, as opposed to classicism’s adherence to 
those canons; fantasies of the supernatural, as in Coleridge’s “deep romantic chasm…haunted by 
woman wailing for her demon-lover” (a sense that Aurobindo occasionally seems to use); a certain 
way of idealizing the classical past; a certain way of responding to the historical and philosophical 
crises characteristic of modernity; nostalgia for a lost enchantment (a point of connection with 
Kalidasa’s “Cloud-Messenger”); and an idealistic faith in society’s perfectibility (a point of 
connection with Aurobindo’s political radicalism and, in a different way, with the exacting 
perfectionism of his later thought).266 Related in complex ways to the last four of these, the sense 
of romanticism I wish to highlight here is an attachment to the idea, already anticipated in Schiller, 
of what Paul de Man describes as “the ascent of a consciousness trapped within the contradictions 
of a half-earthly, half-heavenly nature.”267 Many romantic writers explored such a contradictory 
nature in poems featuring divine or in some way suprahuman beings which, to Aurobindo’s mind, 
resemble the characters that populate Kalidasa’s poems.268 Insofar as Kalidasa too explores human 
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perfectibility in “divine & semidivine personages,” he turns out to be romantic avant la lettre. 
What distinguishes Kalidasa from Shelley and Keats is his success in depicting such characters: 
“Shelley’s Witch of Atlas & Keats’ Cynthia are certainly lovely creations, but they do not live.” 
In their attempts to imagine ideal possibilities for human existence by depicting gods, Shelley and 
Keats have risked “transforming human nature completely,” as Schiller would put it, and “giving 
[themselves] up to the reverie of impossible dreams.”269 By contrast, Kalidasa “insists on 
translating the ideal into the terms of the familiar, sensuous & earthy”: 
While we read, we feel ourselves kin to & one with a more beautiful world than our 
own. These creatures of fancy hardly seem to be an imaginary race but rather 
ourselves removed from the sordidness & the coarse pains of our world into a more 
gracious existence.270 
 
Far from enervating readers, feeding their longing to return to what Schiller calls a “sensuous 
unity,” Kalidasa’s sensuousness renders the romantic ideal concrete and livable. 
For Aurobindo, Kalidasa’s kinship with the romantics is especially pronounced in 
Vikramōrvaśīya, specifically in his characterizations of Pururavas, a mortal king, and Urvashi, the 
goddess with whom he falls in love. After devoting several pages to the “mythopoeic” 
significances of the figure of Urvashi (to which I shall return in section 3), Aurobindo remarks, in 
what seems a sudden trivialization of his preceding analysis, that none of these significances are 
prominent in Kalidasa’s portrayal of her: “Of these outward brilliances Kalidasa’s conception of 
Urvasie is entirely void.…I see nothing of the heavenly courtesan which some over-precise 
commentators insist on finding in her.”271 Unlike the Urvashi of mythology, Kalidasa’s Urvashi is 
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“sweet and noble,” possessing a “childlike petulance” and “sincerity in passion and affection”; 
moreover, she lacks the “grandeur of feeling” and “pomp of poetic ornament” with which Kalidasa 
invests Pururavas. Aurobindo understands this discrepancy in characterization not as flawed but 
indicative of Kalidasa’s dramatic skill: 
In rigidly excluding the grandiose or the coloured Kalidasa has shown, I think, his 
usual unerring dramatic and psychological tact….The first period of a literary race 
when its mind is yet virgin & has to create beauty is invariably simple and classical, 
the last period when its mind is saturated and full of past beauty is always romantic 
and aesthetic. The relations of Urvasie & Pururavus are true to this psychological 
principle. She herself is mere beauty and charm sufficient to itself and commanding 
delight and worship because she is herself, not because of any graces of expression, 
imagination or intellectual profundity. But the mind of Pururavus receiving her pure 
and perfect image steeps her in its own fire and colour, surrounding her with a halo 
of pomp and glory, which reveals himself while seeking to interpret her.272 
 
Aurobindo here describes Pururavas as the very type of the sentimental poet, who cannot resist 
adding to the bare impression which the naïve object has imprinted on his mind. In Aurobindo’s 
reading, then, Kalidasa’s poetry isn’t just more romantic than classical; Kalidasa has intuitively 
grasped the romantic interpretation of history, since his unique rendering of the fable of Pururavas 
and Urvashi has turned it into an allegory for the historical relationship between sentimental and 
naïve ages of poetry. 
Whereas such texts of Aurobindo present a critique of the German romantic reception of 
Kalidasa, elsewhere in his Kalidasa writings Aurobindo appears to be working out a more general 
critique of the Hegelian account of Indian art. Hegel too saw Europe’s nativity reflected in ancient 
India’s cultural products, but conceived of that nativity as a kind of primeval moment in which 
rampant sensuousness (evidenced, for example, in depictions of Hindu gods and goddesses with 
many heads and limbs) existed alongside an understanding of spirit lacking in concreteness (such 
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as the contentless notion of the absolute as brahman): “the primitive artistic pantheism of the East” 
either “becomes bizarre, grotesque, and tasteless, or turns the infinite but abstract freedom of the 
substantive Idea disdainfully against all phenomenal being as null and evanescent.”273 In Hegel’s 
“East,” the sensuous and the spiritual haven’t effectively interacted in a way that could initiate the 
world-process, and “such constant oscillation between the ‘supersensuous’ and ‘wildest 
sensuality,’” as Wilhelm Halbfass puts it, “finds its most visible and striking expression in Indian 
art.”274  
Aurobindo likewise notes such an “oscillation” lying at the heart of the Sanskrit literary 
tradition; however, for him the two poles don’t simply coexist in unbudging stasis but participate 
in a dynamic interplay: 
It is this double aspect of [the] Hindu temperament, extreme spirituality 
successfully attempting to work in harmony with extreme materialism, which is the 
secret of our religion, our life & our literature, our civilization. On the one side we 
spiritualise the material out of all but a phenomenal & illusory existence, on the 
other we materialise the spiritual in the most definite & realistic forms; this is the 
secret of the high philosophic idealism which to the less capable European mind 
seems so impossible an intellectual atmosphere and of the prolific idolatry which 
to the dogmatic & formalising Christian reason seems so gross.275 
 
Aurobindo sees this “double aspect” in much Sanskrit poetry, but especially in the poetry of 
Kalidasa: “of all our great poets Kalidasa best exemplifies this twynatured Hindu temperament 
under the conditions of supreme artistic beauty & harmony.” He sees it at the level of Kalidasa’s 
style: “under his touch the grotesque becomes strange, wild & romantic…; the sublime yields to 
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the law of romance, acquires a mighty grace, a strong sweetness.”276 He also sees it reflected in 
the narratives Kalidasa takes up for poetic treatment, for instance in the Kumārasaṃbhava: “The 
central idea of this great unfinished poem, the marriage of Siva and Parvati, typified in its original 
idea the union of Purusha and Prakriti, the supreme Soul and dynamic Nature by which the world 
is created….”277 Here as before, we see that Aurobindo is in fact attempting to formulate a more 
adequate understanding of Indian literature, critiquing the European reception of it while accepting 
some of its key presuppositions. 
 By presenting passages from Aurobindo’s writings on Kalidasa as responses to the 
arguments of Schiller and Hegel (as opposed to those of British Indologists whose work would 
have been more familiar to Aurobindo, but whose critical judgments tend to rest on less explicit 
theoretical assumptions), I have sought to highlight as clearly as possible the stakes of Aurobindo’s 
revisionist account of Sanskrit literature.278 Aurobindo isn’t just arguing that Sanskrit poetry still 
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makes for good reading, that it was consequential in its contexts of production, or that we should 
learn to appreciate it how its original readers did. Rather, his arguments issue from an influential 
assumption about art, already at work in Schiller’s essay and explicitly formulated in Hegel’s 
Lectures as follows: “It is in works of art that nations have deposited the profoundest intuitions 
and ideas of their hearts; and fine art is frequently the key—with many nations there is no other—
to the understanding of their wisdom and of their religion.”279 Aurobindo’s writings on Kalidasa 
and Sanskrit literature are thus inseparable from a broader defense he is trying to make of Indian 
culture. Indeed, a little more than two decades after his writings on Kalidasa, Aurobindo would 
compose a treatise called A Defence of Hindu Culture, published serially between 1919 and 
1921. At one point in this text, Aurobindo expresses his irritation at the European reception of 
Indian literature by satirizing it, improvising an equally misguided take on the European literary 
tradition: 
The fit parallel to this motive and style of criticism would be if an Indian critic who 
had read European literature only in bad or ineffective Indian translations, were to 
pass it under a hostile and disparaging review, dismiss the Iliad as a crude and 
empty semi-savage and primitive epos, Dante’s great work as the nightmare of a 
cruel and superstitious religious fantasy, Shakespeare as a drunken barbarian of 
considerable genius with an epileptic imagination, the whole drama of Greece and 
Spain and England as a mass of bad ethics and violent horrors, French poetry as a 
succession of bald or tawdry rhetorical exercises and French fiction as a tainted and 
immoral thing, a long sacrifice on the altar of the goddess Lubricity, admit here and 
there a minor merit, but make no attempt at all to understand the central spirit or 
aesthetic quality or principle of structure…. No criticism would be worth making 
on such a mass of absurdities, and in this equally ridiculous philippic only a stray 
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observation or two less inconsequent and opaque than the others perhaps demands 
a passing notice.280 
 
Though not always so passionate in tone, much of Aurobindo’s early engagement with Kalidasa 
shares the polemical force of this passage, aiming more or less explicitly to set the record straight 
on Sanskrit literature.  
At the same time, Aurobindo isn’t just motivated by a polemical desire to correct the 
European account of Indian literary history. In distinguishing himself from other readers of the 
Sanskrit tradition, he is also attempting to work out his own reading of it. The remaining sections 
of this chapter will attend to this constructive aspect of Aurobindo’s writing on Kalidasa. 
 
3. Beyond Sensuousness: Two Ascetic Ideals 
When Aurobindo characterizes the Indian temperament as “twynatured”—“extreme 
spirituality attempting to work in harmony with extreme materialism”—he is arguing broadly 
against two common views. The first, outlined above, is that the sensuousness of Indian art marks 
India’s proximity to the infancy of history. The second view is that the spirituality of Indian 
philosophy is essentially nihilistic. This view appears, for example, throughout the third essay of 
On the Genealogy of Morals, “The Ascetic Ideal,” where Nietzsche characterizes Indian 
philosophy (along with the entire tradition of Western metaphysics) as issuing from a hatred of 
life and the senses: 
As long as there are philosophers on earth, and wherever there have been 
philosophers (from India to England, to take the antithetical poles of philosophical 
endowment), there unquestionably exists a peculiar philosophers’ irritation at and 
rancor against sensuality.… 
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[The ascetic ideal] will, for example, like the ascetics of the Vedanta philosophy, 
downgrade physicality to an illusion.… 
 
But it is not easy for us to take seriously the high valuation placed on deep sleep by 
these people [Indians], so weary of life that they are too weary even to dream—
deep sleep, that is, as an entry into Brahma, as an achieved unio mystica with 
God.281  
 
As early as his writings on Kalidasa, Aurobindo takes issue with this conception of Indian thought: 
The Hindu has been always decried as a dreamer & mystic. There is truth in the 
charge but also a singular inaccuracy. The Hindu mind is in one sense the most 
concrete in the world; it seeks after abstractions, but is not satisfied with them so 
long as they remain abstractions.282 
 
It is true that the ascetic withdrawal from sensuous life forms a large part of the history of Indian 
ideas. For Aurobindo, however, a nihilistic asceticism that denies the world and its claims on us 
can’t be taken to be its essence. In some fine pages on Kalidasa’s Vikramorvaśīya, Aurobindo 
distinguishes between two conceptions of asceticism. The first is a partial conception, the askesis 
practiced by “sages & hermits who would make phenomena dissolve prematurely into the One 
who is above Phenomena.”283 Like Nietzsche, Aurobindo identifies Shankara as the main 
proponent of this conception, the philosopher whose mistrust of the phenomenal world earned him 
the nickname pracchanna-bauddha or “a Buddhist in disguise.”284 For Aurobindo, Shankara 
cannot be taken as the main representative of Indian thinking because he wasn’t accepted as such 
by society at large: 
It is told that the great Shankaracharya in the midst of his triumphant religious 
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activity had to turn aside and learn by personal experience the delights of sensuous 
life and the love of women, because the defect of this experience left him maimed 
for his philosophic task.285 
 
Aurobindo here refers to a popular legend of Shankara’s debate with a philosophical rival, finding 
in it an implicit critique of his philosophy. The story goes that when Shankara faced 
Mandanamishra in heated contest, he was taught that dialectical skill alone would not suffice, that 
in order to win he needed to set aside his monkish asceticism and gain worldly experience by 
entering the body of a king. Aurobindo sees the very popularity of this story as evidence that, 
however convinced Shankara and his followers were of their illusionism, their hostile attitude to 
sensuous life did not meet universal approval.  
The second conception of asceticism, which Aurobindo calls “the highest Indian 
conception of asceticism,” is an askesis motivated not by disillusionment with life and the 
consequent will to deny it but rather by a complete affirmation of the world and its possibilities.286 
Aurobindo finds a model for this second conception in the figure of Narayana, Vishnu’s 
incarnation as the sage who gave birth to the apsara Urvashi.287 The tale of Urvashi’s birth relates 
asceticism and sensuousness in an astonishing, almost incredible way. In Kalidasa’s play, 
Pururavas expresses his astonishment in a remark that Aurobindo translates as follows: 
And yet I cannot think of her 
Created by a withered hermit cold. 
How could an aged anchoret dull & stale 
With poring over Scripture & oblivious  
To all this rapture of the senses build 
A thing so lovely?288 
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In his essay on Vikramorvaśīya, Aurobindo fleshes out the myth that Kalidasa references here only 
in passing, and proposes a different understanding of Narayana than the one implied in Pururavas’ 
image of the “dull anchoret”: 
When Naraian, the primeval and dateless sage of old, entered upon austerities in 
the most secret & desolate recesses of the Snowy Mountains, Indra, prince of the 
air, always hostile to asceticism,…was alarmed for the balance of the world and the 
security of his own rule. He therefore sent the Opsaras to disturb the meditations of 
Naraian. Then…the Opsaras came to Naraian; they were the loveliest of all the 
sisterhood who came…; but Naraian, who is Vishnu the World Saviour when he 
comes in the guise of the ascetic, moved neither by the passion of love nor by the 
passion of anger, smiled in the large & indulgent mood of his world embracing 
nature and opening his thigh took from it a radiant and marvellous creature of 
whose beauty the loveliest Opsaras seemed but pale & broken reflections. 
…Naraian called this daughter of his creation Urvasie (she who lies in the thigh of 
the Supreme, the thigh being the seat of sensuousness).289 
 
The philosopher-sage Narayana dwells far from the world, “in the most secret and desolate 
recesses of the Snowy Mountains.” However, unlike the partial ascetic, Narayana possesses a 
“world embracing nature” and therefore isn’t practicing austerities in the Himalayas to flee the 
world: “the philosopher must be superior to sensuousness not because he is incapable of 
experiencing passion & delight, but because he has fathomed their utmost depth and measured 
their utmost reach….” Accordingly, Narayana responds to the beautiful apsaras not by recoiling 
from them but by producing from his own thigh the more beautiful Urvashi, “by producing out of 
the sensuous in himself a lovelier sensuousness than any that can be brought to tempt him.” For 
“the sensuous world becomes fuller of beauty, richer in colours, shades and suggestions, more 
profound and attractive with each widening of the human ideal”; the fruit of Narayana’s higher 
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asceticism is bizarrely not the world’s dissolution but its transformation.290 That is why Indra, king 
of the gods, fears what might come of Narayana’s meditations: “like all active & conservative 
forces he distrusts the contemplative spirit of philosophy because it is disruptive and tends to cast 
thought & therefore life into solution towards the creation of fresh forms.”  
For Aurobindo, the broad significance of the Urvashi myth is reiterated in the origin-story 
of another group of apsaras. Arisen from the milk-ocean when the “luminous Gods” and “gigantic 
titans” met to churn it, they too were born of cooperation of the spiritual with the sensuous: “good 
must mingle with evil, the ideal take sides with the real, the soul work in harmony with the 
senses…before [their object] can be accomplished; for this object was no less than to evolve all 
that is beautiful & sweet & incredible in life….” Like Urvashi, the other apsaras too have an 
essentially enriching effect on the world: “From the moment that they arose out of the waters of 
the milky Ocean…the beauty and light of them has transformed the world.” 291 Humans feel their 
transformative capacity as the attractive force urging them on to their creative endeavors: 
They dwell too in the life of the soul; for they are the ideal pursued by the poet 
through his lines, by the artist shaping his soul on his canvas, by the sculptor 
seeking a form in his marble; for the joy of their embrace the hero flings his life 
into the rushing torrent of battle; the sage, musing upon God, sees the shining of 
their limbs & falls from his white ideal. The delight of life, the beauty of things, the 
attraction of sensuous beauty, this is what the mystic & romantic side of the Hindu 
temperament strove to express in the Opsara.292 
 
The “beauty of things” leads the artist (whether poet, painter, or sculptor) to perceive potentials 
within the world that aren’t readily apparent; as Aurobindo elsewhere writes, “those who make 
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use of the sixth sense, the poet, the painter, the Yogin,…gather much that is hidden from the 
ordinary observer.”293 Aurobindo thus finds another model for the higher conception of asceticism 
in the artist, who in her own way renders the world “richer in colours, shades, and suggestions.” 
The artist’s enrichment of the world is to be distinguished from the askesis of “the sage musing 
upon God,” who is drawn to a pure “white ideal” and whose efforts are frustrated rather than 
furthered by beauty. Here too, then, Aurobindo is careful to distinguish between two asceticisms, 
one that denies the world and one that affirms it, one that fears the world and one that enriches it, 
one that collapses the world’s differences into an undifferentiated monotone and one that discovers 
in the world more differences of color, shade, and suggestion. We are given a more in-depth 
exploration of this second, artistic form of askesis in Aurobindo’s analysis of Pururavas, to which 
I now turn. 
 
4. The Poet-King: Aurobindo’s Character Sketch of Pururavas 
For Aurobindo, the myth of Pururavas’ love for Urvashi originally symbolized the human 
seeker’s pursuit of the divine ideal. Yet while Kalidasa’s Urvashi mostly departs from that 
symbolism (for reasons outlined in section 2), his depiction of Pururavas deepens it, exploring one 
way that such a seeker might exist in the world. One prominent indicator of Pururavas’ nature in 
Vikramorvaśīya is his manner of speech, which is more poetic than that of any other king in 
dramatic literature: “surely no king before or after, not even Richard II, had such a royal gift of 
language as this grandson of the Sun & Moon.”294 Like Kalidasa, Pururavas almost compulsively 
expresses himself in images. When he sees Urvashi recover from her swoon in Act 1, for example, 
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he breaks out with two images before mentioning Urvashi herself, then concludes with a third 
image that seems to leap from his mouth of its own accord: 
Like a night set free by darkness  
when the moon appears,  
like a tongue of fire at night  
breaking through billowing smoke  
does this beautiful woman appear, 
almost released from her inner swoon— 
like the Ganges, once turbulent  
from thrashing her banks,  
regaining calm.295 
 
Likewise, when Urvashi takes off for the heavens, Pururavas expresses his experience of 
separation as an image: 
As she mounts up to the sky— 
her father’s middle step— 
the divine woman draws 
my heart from my body by force, 
like a royal swan plucks  
a thread from the lotus fiber 
bruising its tip.296 
 
For Aurobindo, the richness of Pururavas’ language in such verses is specifically occasioned by 
his encounter with Urvashi, who is the “touchstone of his nature”: “Now he sees Urvasie and all 
the force of his nature pours itself into his love for her like a river which has at last found its natural 
sea. The rich poetry of his temperament, the sights & images with which his memory is stored…are 
now diverted over this final passion of his life.”297 What is the source of the king’s images, and 
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what compels him to express himself in them?  
In Aurobindo’s reading, Pururavas’ images recall scenes that the king has witnessed in the 
past, even if he did not consciously register them: 
Little things he has seen in Nature, a portion of the bank of a river collapsing into 
the current, the rapid brightening of a dark night by the moon, fire at night breaking 
its way through a volume of smoke, a lotus reddening in early sunlight, a wild swan 
flying through the sky with a lotus fibre in his beak, remain with his inner eye and 
at a touch burst out in poetry.298  
 
Aurobindo here gathers several of Pururavas’ images scattered throughout the play in a single 
sentence, which amounts to no less than a brief sketch for a theory of the poetic image. Pururavas’ 
tendency to express himself in images points to a domain of thinking that precedes the mind’s 
reflection. As the king passes through the world, he collects little perceptions of things and stores 
them as images in his “inner eye.” It may not be till much later that these stored images become 
accessible to the reflective mind, since it does not answer to the summons of the will but releases 
its contents when we least expect it—for example, in face of the beautiful. Pururavas’ images thus 
issue from a passive region of the mind that for the most part lies concealed. 
This habit of storing images is not peculiar to poets like Pururavas but common to 
absolutely everyone. The account of the poetic image outlined above in fact rests on a more general 
theory of memory, which Aurobindo elsewhere elaborates in greater detail: 
The reservoir of past mental impressions, the citta or storehouse of memory, which 
must be distinguished from the specific act of memory, is the foundation on which 
all the other layers stand. All experience lies within us as passive or potential 
memory; active memory selects and takes what it requires from that storehouse.299  
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All specific acts of memory are themselves only possible because of a more profound passive 
memory, a retentive faculty that underlies and thus isn’t easily controlled by the wilfulness of 
recollection. “The active memory is” therefore “like a man searching among a great mass of 
locked-up material.”300 More radically, however, and more relevant to Aurobindo’s analysis of 
Pururavas, the passive memory is the basis not only of recollection but of “all the other layers” of 
the mind, among which Aurobindo includes perception: “we have a habitual way of looking at 
things and the conservative inertia in our nature disposes us to give every new experience the shape 
and semblance of those to which we are accustomed.” 301 Our everyday access to the world is thus 
mediated in the first instance, constituted by the influx of images from past experience which 
permit the recognition of objects and circumstances and guide our disposition towards them.  
Kalidasa illustrates the mediated nature of perception in Act 2 of Vikramorvaśīya, where 
four characters perceive in quick succession a love letter that Urvashi has dropped in the garden 
for Pururavas to read. Manavaka and the king are the first characters to perceive it: 
Manavaka: (Seeing it) Help! Help! What’s this falling right in front of us, like the 
skin sloughed off by a snake? 
King: (Seeing it distinctly) These are just characters written on a birch leaf.302 
 
The third and fourth perceptions of the object belong to the queen Aushinari, who suspects that 
her husband loves another woman, and her maidservant Nipunika. Their speech on seeing the 
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object recalls in its language and structure the exchange between Pururavas and the jester: 
Queen: (Walking) Nipunika, what does the south wind bring in our direction? It 
looks like a worn-out rag. 
Nipunika: (Seeing it distinctly) My lady, it’s actually a birch leaf, and as it whirls 
around I see some characters written on it.303 
 
In none of these four perceptions is the object experienced as a mere crowding of visual sensations 
gathered by the eye. Rather, in each exchange, the first person to perceive the object sees it in the 
first instance as an image drawn from memory by its resemblance with the present (as a snake’s 
skin for the jester, as a rag for the queen). The imagistic nature of everyday perception is 
highlighted for a final time in Act 2 when Manavaka sets out in search of the letter and, unaware 
that Nipunika has already snatched it from the air, believes he has spotted it: 
Manavaka: Friend! What’s this I see tossing in the wind, near the hill by the 
pleasure-garden? … Ah, I was fooled. It’s just a peacock feather, and the sheen on 
its threads is fading. 
King: I am devastated!304 
 
The activity of searching has so conditioned the perception of the jester—has so predisposed his 
seeing with images from memory—that the feather flying in the wind first enters his ken as the 
missing letter. 
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 What distinguishes the poet, then, is not the mere possession of a passive memory, which 
is included in all perception, but the manner in which it releases its images into perception. As 
Aurobindo writes of Pururavas, 
Not only is his mind stored with pictures which break out in the most splendid 
tropes and similes, but he cannot see any natural object or feel any simplest emotion 
without bathing it in the brilliant tones of his imagination & expressing it in regal 
poetry.305 
 
The poet, here figured as Pururavas, does not speak poetically just for some special affinity he 
happens to have for rhetorical flourishes but because he sees the world with an eye more attentive 
to the particularity of each perception, feels with a heart more attuned to the particularity of each 
experience, and so is less susceptible to the generalized interpretation of the world that his 
immediate context dictates. Or to put it in the language of Aurobindo’s later text on memory, the 
poet is liberated from “the interference of previous associations formed or ingrained in 
the…passive memory” and can therefore “receive first impressions without an unconscious bias 
against the novelty of novel experience.”306 That is why the poet has the “inveterate…habit of 
seizing on every situation & emotion and turning it into a poem.”307 Whereas in our everyday 
experience the mind’s image-memory cuts out and measures objects of perception to the 
requirements of the familiar, the poetic image arises when an experience frustrates the memory’s 
search for precedents, calling for a distinctive kind of measuring that maintains the object in its 
unfamiliarity. This search for precedents is illustrated in the following passage of Aurobindo’s 
Urvasie, taken from Pururavus’ first speech on seeing his beloved: 
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Wast thou not a part 
Of soft auspicious evenings I have loved? 
Have I not seen thy beauty on the clouds? 
In moonlight and in starlight and in fire? 
Some flower whose brightness was a trouble? a face 
Whose memory like a picture lived with me? 
A thought I had, but lost?308  
  
These lines lay bare the structure of poetic perception the moment it is faced with something 
inassimilable to past experience: Pururavas’ mind reels for a precedent, but unable to rest satisfied 
at any one image, it searches for another as we witness his memory come unhinged. For 
Aurobindo, having a poetic temperament amounts to being endowed with such heightened powers 
of attention, which allow the poet to see the world anew and thus withdraw from common 
interpretations of it.  
 However, what Kalidasa gives us in Pururavas is not quite the portrait of a poet but that of 
a poet-king. Kingship changes things considerably, since while the mere poet can rest satisfied 
with reinterpreting the world, the poet who is also a king will wish to actualize his reinterpretations. 
Aurobindo usefully compares the poet-king’s situation to that of a playwright:  
[The poet-king’s] rage when a word of his life-drama is mispronounced or a part 
ill-studied or a conception not complied with is a magnified reflection of the 
vexation felt by a dramatist at a similar contretemps in the performance of his 
darling piece; and unfortunately unlike the playwright he has the power to vent his 
indignation on the luckless offenders in a fashion only too effective.309  
 
Whereas the mere poet creating a world on paper is free from all but mental constraints, the 
dramatist is tasked with creating a world on stage and therefore must work with other players—
actors, musicians, costume designers, set designers—who have their own competing visions for 
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the production. Here Aurobindo may well have in mind the opening of Act 3 of Vikramorvaśīya, 
where we learn that Bharata, “the mighty dramatist of heaven” (as Aurobindo calls him in his poem 
Urvasie), has exiled Urvashi to earth for mistaking her lines in his own “darling piece.” Like the 
dramatist, the poet-king cannot avoid contending with other interpretations of the world, which in 
a way constitute the basic material from which he must work, and when that material proves 
resistant he grows frustrated: “he [attempts] to weave his own imaginations into life; he will not 
see facts; he will not recognize the inexorable logic of events.”310 Thus predisposed to ineffectual 
rule, the poet-king is a potentially regrettable phenomenon. 
For Aurobindo, a number of examples from literature and history—including 
Shakespeare’s Richard II, Renan’s Nero, and Kalhana’s Sriharsha—seem to suggest precisely this, 
that “the meeting of poet & king in one man wears always the appearance of an anomaly, a 
misplacement,” and that “the very qualities which have fitted him to be a poet unfit him to rule.” 
It is thus noteworthy that Kalidasa’s depiction of Pururavas departs from this bleak conception: 
To our surprise we find that the Hindu poet does not associate incompetence, failure 
& tragedy with his image of the poet-king; on the contrary Pururavus is a Great 
Emperor, well-loved of his people, an unconquered hero, the valued ally of the 
gods, successful in empire, successful in war, successful in love.311 
 
If Kalidasa has chosen to depict a successful poet-king, it is not because he is “at fault in his 
knowledge of the world and of human nature”; rather, he “simply gives us the other side of the 
shield,” showing us another possible manifestation of the poet-king. Not only is it inaccurate to 
say that poet-kings are invariably “incompetents and weaklings”; they can even prove historically 
consequential: 
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There are times when Nature gifts the poetic temperament with a peculiar grasp of 
the conditions of action and an irresistible tendency to create their poems not in ink 
& on paper, but in living characters & on the great canvas of the world; such men 
become portents & wonders, whom posterity admires or hates but can only 
imperfectly understand. Like Joan of Arc or Mazzini & Garibaldi they save a dying 
nation, or like Napoleon & Alexander they dominate a world.312  
 
By including Joan of Arc, Mazzini, and Garibaldi in his list, Aurobindo shows us that he isn’t just 
interested in kings but more broadly in political leaders, so that his analysis of Pururavas is perhaps 
more aptly characterized as a study of the “poet-leader.” Moreover, if we recall that Aurobindo is 
writing his essay on Vikramorvaśīya on the eve of his own immersion in anticolonial politics, it 
will not seem so great a leap to read his character sketch of Pururavas as a meditation on the 
temperament of a political revolutionary. 
Does Kalidasa’s Pururavas provide a template for the successful revolutionary? It is true 
that Pururavas doesn’t succumb to the poet-leader’s predictable faults of being ineffectual or 
tyrannical. However, even superficial consideration of the Vikramorvaśīya’s plot shows that he is 
by no means successful. Pururavas may initially succeed in bringing Urvashi to earth (or to spell 
out the implied allegory, in manifesting ideal life among humans), but that first union is short-
lived. And while his heavenly reunion with Urvashi in the play’s final act is a triumph, it is also 
costly, requiring the abandonment of his earthly duties as king. Kalidasa himself doesn’t judge 
Pururavas one way or the other, or at least not explicitly, since his presentation of him is simply 
“a study of the poetic temperament in a heroic & royal figure for no issue beyond the study 
itself.”313 In distinction, Aurobindo expresses serious reservations about Pururavas’ conduct. In 
his analysis of Kalidasa’s play, for example, he seizes on a few barely perceptible moments when 
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Pururavas experiences a brief “paralysis of activity” of a kind which “often overtakes the poetic 
temperament in action even in its most capable possessors.”314 Yet Aurobindo’s criticisms of 
Pururavas are most clearly articulated in his original narrative poem Urvasie, composed around 
the same time as his critical writings on Vikramorvaśīya. 
Plotwise, Urvasie and Vikramorvaśīya share the same broad outline: (1) Pururavas falls in 
love with Urvashi at first sight; (2) Urvashi lives with him on earth for a brief period; (3) the pair 
is separated, leaving Pururavas dejected; (4) Pururavas eventually becomes an inhabitant of heaven 
to dwell forever with Urvashi. Among the many differences that Aurobindo introduces in his 
rendering of this bare-bones frame, two stand out to me as particularly significant. The first 
concerns how he imagines the unions of Pururavas and Urvashi. In Vikramorvaśīya, both of their 
unions come about through luck (the first when Urvashi herself comes to the king’s palace as he 
pines for her, the second when Pururavas chances upon the magic stone that will return Urvashi to 
her original form). By contrast, the unions staged in Urvasie result from Pururavus’ ascetic force. 
In giving Pururavus more responsibility in his dealings with Urvasie, Aurobindo foregrounds the 
potential ethical implications of the story, and makes ethics about the choice between assenting to 
the world and abandoning it. The second major difference concerns the emphasis Aurobindo puts 
on the story’s symbolic meanings. Such meanings are not entirely absent from Kalidasa’s play; 
earlier we saw, for instance, how Pururavus’ remark in VŪ 1.8 associates Urvashi with sensuous 
life. That association is also suggested by Kalidasa’s account of the separation of Urvashi from 
Pururavas. In the original version of the story recounted in the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, their 
separation is a consequence of heaven’s jealousy: Urvashi leaves Pururavas when two gandharvas 
intent on winning her back steal her cherished rams. By contrast, in Vikramorvaśīya the two are 
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separated when Urvashi accidentally trespasses on Kartikeya’s forbidden grove—or as Aurobindo 
calls it, “the fatal grove of the Virgin War-God where ethereal beauty & delight are not suffered 
to tread”—and turns into a vine.315 Here too Kalidasa implicitly associates Urvashi with 
sensuousness, since her separation from Pururavas is due to her incompatibility with a certain 
conception of asceticism. However, whereas such symbolism is only occasionally hinted at in 
Kalidasa’s text, Aurobindo repeatedly draws our attention to it, making Urvasie as much a 
commentary on Kalidasa’s work as it is a poem in its own right. In what follows, I will therefore 
read Aurobindo’s poem as continuous with his literary critical remarks, examining how Urvasie 
dramatizes the ethical problems and significances that Aurobindo sees implied in Kalidasa’s play. 
Above I noted that when Pururavas first beholds Urvashi in Vikramorvaśīya, he marvels at 
her beauty and at the fact that so sensuous a being could have emerged from the thigh of an ascetic 
(section 3). In Urvasie too Pururavus marvels at the goddess’ sensuous beauty; however, he is less 
astonished by this quality in itself than by the effect it has on him. Here is how Aurobindo imagines 
Pururavus’ first thoughts on seeing her from a distance:   
O thou strong god, 
Who art thou graspest me with hands of fire, 
Making my soul all colour? Surely I thought 
The hills would move and the eternal stars 
Deviate from their rounds immutable, 
Never Pururavus; yet lo! I fall. 
My soul whirls alien and I hear amazed 
The galloping of uncontrollable steeds. 
Men said of me: ‘The King Pururavus 
Grows more than man; he lifts to azure heaven 
In vast equality his spirit sublime’; 
Why sink I now towards attractive earth? 
…All beauty of earthliness is in thee, all 
Luxurious experience of the soul. 
O comest thou because I left thy charm 
Aiming at purity, oh comest thou, 
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Goddess, to avenge thyself with beauty? Come!316 
 
Before meeting Urvasie, Pururavus believed (along with those around him) that he was unerringly 
steadfast in his kingly duties, even more so than the hills and stars. While he acted within the 
world, he did so without letting it touch him, “aiming at purity” and possessing what Aurobindo 
elsewhere calls “ascetic self-denial & keen swordlike practical will.”317 He therefore resembled 
the partial ascetic described in section 3, whose withdrawal from sensuousness is motivated by an 
aversion to it. Meeting Urvasie completely upends this self-conception: Pururavus grows strange 
to himself—his “soul whirls alien”—as he “[hears] amazed/The galloping of uncontrollable 
steeds.” At one level, what Pururavus hears is bizarrely the imminent sound of his own chariot 
horses: resigned to the power of his attraction to Urvasie, he has a vivid presentiment of the 
galloping which will take him to her as soon as he completes his thought (as the narrator tells us 
soon after Pururavus finishes his speech, “joyous he cried aloud and lashed his steeds”).318 At 
another level, the galloping belongs to horses within him—to those horses which, in both Sanskrit 
and Greek traditions of philosophy, are figurative for certain components of the self. In the 
Kaṭhopaniṣad, Yama speaks of the five senses as horses that must be controlled by the charioteer 
of reason: 
Know the self as a rider in a chariot, 
and the body, as simply the chariot. 
Know the intellect as the charioteer, 
and the mind, as simply the reigns. 
 
The senses, they say, are the horses, 
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and sense objects are the paths around them; 
He who is linked to the body, senses, and mind, 
The wise proclaim as the one who enjoys.319 
 
In Plato’s Phaedrus, the dialogue in which love is characterized as a divine madness, the self is 
pictured in similar terms as a two-horsed chariot led by “intelligence, the soul’s steersman,” where 
one horse represents the appetitive part of the soul and the other represents the spiritual part.320 As 
Socrates explains in the following passage, which corresponds almost exactly to Pururavus’ 
situation, both horses are in one way or another driven wild in face of the beautiful: 
When the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his entire soul is suffused with a sense 
of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire. As for the horses, 
the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still controlled, then as always, by its 
sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping…. The other one, however, no 
longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it leaps violently forward 
and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer….321 
 
Whatever line we take—whether we follow Yama’s image or that of Socrates—Urvasie’s beauty 
has also unbridled steeds of the soul, which just a moment earlier were subdued, and Pururavus 
experiences this unbridling as the revelation of color. For if Urvasie has made Pururavus’ “soul all 
colour,” it is because previously it was either white (“O thou who wast so white,” Tilottama once 
calls out to Pururavus) or colorless (describing Urvasie to Pururavus, Menaca says she “is other 
than thy marble caryatids/And austere doors, purity colourless”).322 Once holding himself above 
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earthly experience, reducing its colorful variety to a monotone, Pururavus now finds himself 
sinking towards it and indeed welcoming the fall.  
When he goes on to perform austerities in the mountains in order to win Urvasie, then, 
Pururavus resembles the world-affirming ascetic Narayana, since he attempts through this second 
askesis to bring to the world a richer sensuousness. At first he succeeds, and for the brief period 
that Urvasie lives on earth her presence enriches it: 
The sacred city felt a finer life 
Within it; burning inspirations breathed 
From hallowed poets; and architects to grace 
And fancy their immense conceptions toned…. 
Seven years the earth rejoiced in Urvasie.323 
 
Aurobindo’s description of Urvasie’s transformative effect on earthly life echoes the account 
offered in his critical writings of the mythopoeic significance of the apsaras: “they are the ideal 
pursued by the poet through his lines, by the artist shaping his soul on his canvas, by the sculptor 
seeking a form in his marble.” Pururavus is like these artists in that he too has devoted his life to 
the pursuit of an apsara. But whereas poets, painters, and architects breathe out their “burning 
inspirations” in language, paint, and marble, Pururavus is inspired by Urvasie to transform the very 
life of his city. He thus appears, at least at this point in the poem, as the model of a successful poet-
king.  
Urvasie’s time on earth is brief, however, and when at the end of seven years the heavens 
reclaim her by a trick, Pururavus is left dejected and stunned, as much by Urvasie’s departure as 
by the fact that it should touch him: 
I was not wont so quickly to despair. 
O hast thou left me and art lost in light, 
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Cruel, between the shining hemispheres? 
Yet even there I will pursue my joy. 
Though all the great immortals jealously 
Encompass round with shields thy golden limbs, 
I may clash through them yet, or my strong patience 
Will pluck my love down from her distant stars. 
Still am I Ila’s son, Pururavus, 
That passionless pure strenth though lost, though fallen 
From the armed splendid soul which once I was.324 
 
Here again Pururavus registers how much his encounter with Urvasie has changed him. He used 
to be an “armed splendid soul,” free of passionate attachments to the world and therefore “not 
wont so quickly to despair”; now that Urvasie has infiltrated the armor which protected him from 
such attachments, Pururavus realizes he cannot live without her. Eventually he does win her back, 
but not in either of the ways he envisions—neither by taking up arms against the gods nor by 
“plucking” her “down from the distant stars.” Pururavus once again repairs to the mountains to 
perform austerities (for if despite all his changes he feels he is the same person—if he nonetheless 
remains “Ila’s son, Pururavus”—it is precisely because he still has the “strong patience” required 
for ascetic practice):  
Long he, in meditation deep immersed, 
Strove to dissolve his soul among the hills 
Into the thought of Urvasie. … 
The storm-blast…woke him not… 
For he lived only with his passionate heart.325 
 
This time, however, rather than bring Urvasie to earth, Pururavus’ askesis serves to make him 
worthy of the gods’ company (somewhat like Uma’s askesis in Kumārasaṃbhava), so that he may 
                                                
324 Ibid., 216. 
 
325 Ibid., 221. 
 
	 159 
dwell with her forever in heaven. He has thus succeeded in reuniting with his beloved, but the 
reunion has come at great cost: 
Then love in his sweet heavens was satisfied. 
But far below through silent mighty space 
The green and strenuous earth abandoned rolled.326 
 
That the poem ends on these foreboding lines suggests that Pururavus’ final victory is hollow, that 
it has been achieved by sacrificing something which should not have been sacrificed.  
What Aurobindo shows us in Urvasie is in fact a picture of three types of asceticism. The 
first is what Pururavus had been practicing before the start of the poem, a dispassionate askesis 
which aims at purity by holding the world at a distance. The second askesis is what he practices 
soon after falling in love with Urvasie in order to bring her to earth, an artistic askesis that succeeds 
for a brief time in transforming life. The third askesis, performed after Urvasie’s return to heaven, 
resembles the first two while being essentially different from them. Like the second, it is performed 
with a “passionate heart” and in pursuit of beauty; like the first, it ultimately amounts to a denial 
of life, since pursuing beauty to the heavens requires abandoning earth. However, the nihilism of 
the third askesis issues from the artist’s and not the philosopher’s recoil from life: Pururavus has 
grown disappointed by the earth’s inability to sustain the divine ideal he glimpsed (as Aurobindo 
will later put it in the poetic cosmology that opens Savitri, “The excess of beauty natural to god-
kind/Could not uphold its claim on time-born eyes”), and he settles for a compromised reunion 
with beauty in an unearthly cocoon.327 I take Aurobindo’s presentation of these three variants as 
exploring the relationship between askesis and life. Askesis is often regarded as a withdrawal from 
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life and thus as an indifference to the political. Aurobindo certainly recognizes the existence of 
such an apolitical askesis (as we saw in section 3); however, not all asceticism is thus grounded in 
a hostility to life. The figure of Narayana, the ascetic who paradoxically fathered Urvashi, is 
important to Aurobindo precisely for modeling an alternative ascetic disposition, one that urges 
the withdrawal not from life itself but from conventional life, in order to generate for it new 
possibilities. Not only is such a life-affirming askesis compatible with the political but, as 
Aurobindo suggests in his character sketch of Pururavas, it may even be necessary for any radical 
reinterpretation of the world, and so necessary for casting “life into solution towards the creation 
of fresh forms.” But the person who undertakes such an askesis walks on a razor’s edge, always in 
danger of withdrawing from earth to the point of disengagement. This to me seems the implied 
warning of Urvasie’s conclusion, that even a strong commitment to the transformation of life can 
mutate into disillusionment. 
 
5. Conclusion: Kalidasa and the Future Poetry 
 Aurobindo’s engagement with Kalidasa at the fin de siécle reflects a deepening investment 
in anticolonial politics as well as a desire to formulate a nationalist account of Indian history. Since 
Kalidasa was regarded as a major cultural figure and a quintessentially Indian poet by many of 
Aurobindo’s contemporaries (both Indians and European Indologists), he was an ideal candidate 
for being the subject of such a project. Several of Aurobindo’s essays on him are thus devoted to 
situating his poetry within the Sanskrit literary tradition and providing a revised account of that 
tradition, in order to formulate a defense of Indian art and culture. At the same time, reading 
Kalidasa led Aurobindo to formulate a rich set of reflections on the nature of the political 
revolutionary and on the relationship between askesis and politics. Aurobindo discontinued “A 
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Proposed Work on Kalidasa” soon after entering the fray of politics, and if we judge by the 
concerns of his later writing, it seems that Kalidasa’s poetry would never again fascinate him to 
the same degree. Nonetheless, brief references and allusions to Kalidasa turn up often enough 
throughout his oeuvre that we can at least guess what significance the poet continued to have for 
him. I will conclude by suggesting a connection among three such references, beginning with a 
passage that appears near the end of Urvasie. 
On his way to heaven—that is, after performing his third askesis but before regaining 
Urvasie—Pururavus meets the goddess Ila, who is his mother. Although Ila warns him about the 
consequences of abandoning earth, she is not at all surprised by Pururavus’ unrelenting pursuit of 
Urvasie, since in being attracted to sensuous beauty, he takes after her: 
From me, 
O son, thou hadst the impulse beautiful 
That made thy soul all colour. For I strive 
Towards the insufferable heights and flash 
With haloes of that sacred light intense. 
But lo! the spring and all its flowers, and lo! 
How bright the Soma juice. What golden joys, 
What living passions, what immortal tears! 
I lift the veil that hides the Immortal—Ah! 
My lids faint. Ah! the veil was lovelier. 
My flowers wither in that height, my swan 
Spreads not his wings felicitous so far. 
O one day I shall turn from the great verses 
And marble aspiration to sing sweetly 
Of lovers and the pomps of wealth and wine 
And warm delights and warm desires and earth.328 
 
Ila bears witness here to the challenge faced by the partial ascetic: she strives “toward the 
insufferable heights” but falls whenever she glimpses the earth, in a way suffering from the 
impossible desire voiced by the speaker of Keats’ “Bright Star.” She is thus caught in the crosshairs 
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of two experiences that generate two distinct kinds of poetry: on one hand, the “great verses/And 
marble aspiration” one finds, for instance, in those texts in “the Upanishads which declare the 
world to be unreal”;329 on the other, the sensuous poetry of “warm delights and warm desires and 
earth” written by a poet like Kalidasa. On Ila’s understanding of the aspiring ascetic’s situation, 
Narayana’s “highest conception of asceticism,” which honors the claims of both spirit and earth, 
is simply impossible.  
Years later, Aurobindo would come to be “disgusted” with his poem, once responding to a 
library’s request for it as follows: “I don’t think I have the Urvasie, neither am I very anxious to 
have this poem saved from oblivion.”330 One reason for Aurobindo’s dissatisfaction with it (apart 
from his vague sense that “as a whole it lacks in originality”) might have been its failure to envision 
the synthesis he desired.331 For in his book The Future Poetry, published serially between 1917 
and 1920, Aurobindo claimed that the unification of the spiritual with the sensuous that Ila had 
deemed impossible would in fact be the task of a future poet, a writer who hadn’t yet appeared 
(though anticipated by the likes of Whitman, Yeats, and Tagore) and whose work would somehow 
resolve precisely what Ila had left unresolved: “If it wings to the heights, it will not leave earth 
unseen below it.”332 What this poet sees, in other words, 
will not be as in the old times something hieratically remote, mystic, inward, 
shielded from the profane, but rather a sight which will endeavour to draw these 
godheads again to close and familiar intimacy with our earth and embody them not 
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only in the heart of religion and philosophy, nor only in the higher flights of thought 
and art, but also, as far as may be, in the common life and action of man.333 
 
Aurobindo’s prophetic announcement uncannily resembles the call for unifying philosophy and 
poetry “that Novalis and the Schlegel brothers had assigned to the poetry of the future as its 
task.”334 Moreover, while Aurobindo doesn’t explicitly name Kalidasa, his emphasis here on what 
is “close,” “familiar,” and “common” recalls his observation from nearly two decades earlier that 
Kalidasa’s poetry “insists on translating the ideal into the terms of the familiar, sensuous & 
earthy.”335 His own attempt at this “translation” or “unification” is documented in Savitri, a 
massive epic poem which, together with his life, was under constant revision until his death. Once 
in 1931 he described his poem as follows:  
Savitri…is blank verse without enjambment (except rarely)—each line a thing by 
itself and arranged in paragraphs of one, two, three, four, five lines (rarely a longer 
series), in an attempt to catch something of the Upanishadic and Kalidasian 
movement, so far as that is a possibility in English.336 
 
The remark pertains to matters of versification and seems to tell us nothing substantive about what 
Aurobindo was hoping to achieve with his poem. Nonetheless, the juxtaposition of texts as 
different as the Upanishads and Kalidasa’s poetry is striking—so striking that, in light of the 
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conclusions of this chapter, one wonders whether Kalidasa had become for Aurobindo a metonym 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Sanskrit Literature and the Present 
 
In the previous chapters, I have tried to describe closely how three different thinkers read Kalidasa. 
In chapter 2, I examined Kuntaka’s reading of Kalidasa as reflected in his book Vakroktijīvita. 
When Kuntaka writes that Kalidasa’s poetry is written in the “delicate style,” he means that it 
reveals the world to us in its most stunning aspects. Kuntaka attends to many of the ways that it 
does this, but he is especially interested in Kalidasa’s depictions of courtly situations, since they 
have the power to teach courtly audiences how best to conduct themselves. In chapter 3, I examined 
Vedantadesika’s reading of Kalidasa, reflected not in any explicit remarks but in his own poetic 
and philosophical writings. While Vedantadesika is also fascinated by Kalidasa’s manner of vivid 
description, he is interested in it because the reading and writing of such poetry activates the kind 
of imagination involved in devotional meditation. In chapter 4, I examined Sri Aurobindo’s 
reading of Kalidasa, which is reflected mostly in fragmentary critical essays and original poetry 
inspired by Kalidasa. Aurobindo’s reading is partly motivated by the need to revise the account of 
Indian literary history proposed by nineteenth-century European Indologists. But he also finds in 
the sensuousness of Kalidasa’s poetry an affirmation of the world which runs counter to world-
denying strains in Indian thought, and which comes to be central in his own conceptions of 
revolutionary and spiritual work. 
The readers examined in this dissertation have each somehow related Kalidasa’s poetry to 
his own context, whether this context is a royal court, a religious or spiritual practice, or 
anticolonial politics. They can thus be said to have engaged in presentist reading—an expression 
which throughout this chapter I will use to designate any reading premised on the idea that a text 
might have implications for one’s present circumstances. There are good reasons to avoid this 
term. For one thing, the very word “presentist” could misleadingly suggest an absolute 
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incompatibility with historically attuned approaches to reading, as though presentist reading 
invariably suppressed or overlooked historical considerations. The expression has also come to 
carry negative connotations, being associated with uncritical ahistoricism (i.e., the anachronistic 
imposition of present ideas onto the past) or even textual manipulation (i.e., the deliberate 
misappropriation of past texts to suit present agendas). Nonetheless, I find the term useful for 
distinguishing the approach I will advocate here from approaches whose ultimate goal is to 
understand another historical moment than our own, typically either a text’s orginal moment of 
production or a later moment in the history of its reception. In what follows, I will try to outline 
the possibility of a critical presentism, one that sees texts as potentially meaningful for the present 
precisely by affirming their historical difference. I will begin by comparing my dissertation to 
other studies that have similarly focused on the reception of Sanskrit literature (section 1). While 
in certain ways my dissertation follows the argumentative pattern of these studies, it also features 
significant differences, both in the kind of conclusions it makes about a text’s later readers and in 
the picture of reading that emerges from the particular cases examined. I will then try to show what 
implications these differences might have for a general account of reading, and ultimately for the 
practice of literary criticism (section 2). 
 
1.  The Trouble with Presentist Reading 
My dissertation is one among a number of studies in textual reception—that is, studies 
which examine how a particular text or body of writing has been received in history. These include 
Romila Thapar’s study of retellings of the Shakuntala narrative; Ajay Rao’s study of the 
Srivaishnava religious tradition’s reception of the Rāmāyaṇa; Deven Patel’s study of the reception 
of Sriharsha’s Naiṣadhīyacarita; and Richard Davis’ survey of readings of the Bhagavadgītā over 
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two millennia.337 The examples of reading which these scholars have chosen to study, and the way 
they have written about them, tend to highlight the reader’s role in the situation of encountering a 
text. Rao, for instance, shows how Srivaishnava readers of the Rāmāyaṇa used specific strategies 
to invest the text with theological meanings, just as Thapar shows how different tellings of the 
Shakuntala narrative reflect shifting attitudes towards women. In the preceding chapters, I too have 
been interested in the role that readers play in making meaning of texts: how Kuntaka’s interest in 
the didactic function of literature predisposes him to read scenes in Kalidasa’s poetry for their 
ethical content; how in his Haṃsasandeśa Vedantadesika uses the basic frame of Kalidasa’s poem 
to explore his own theological concerns; and how many of Aurobindo’s remarks on Kalidasa are 
motivated by his desire to revise the European account of Indian literary history.  
Yet I have been equally interested in taking the text itself as a focus of concern. That is, I 
have been attentive in each case to the following two possibilities: (1) that an instance of situated 
reading might tell us something about the text at least as much as about the reader (e.g., the way 
Vedantadesika’s poems draw our attention to Kalidasa’s obsession with daydreaming); and (2) 
that a text might have genuine effects on a reader’s thinking (e.g., the particular way Kalidasa’s 
poetry urges Aurobindo to reflect on the relationship between askesis and politics). In the course 
of this dissertation, then, a slightly different picture of the situation of reading has emerged, one 
that counterbalances the emphasis usually placed on readers by pointing up the role that texts 
themselves—not just their aura or social capital—can play in constituting the reading process. This 
picture of reading challenges the more or less implicit assumption that presentist readings are 
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generally naïve misreadings, strategic repurposings, or (less charitably) outright distortions. 
Furthermore, it raises questions which deserve more substantive answers than “the magic of the 
text”—not only “Why is it that we can feel solicited, buttonholed, stirred up, by words that were 
drafted eons ago?” but also “How can texts that are inert in one historical moment become newly 
revealing, eye-opening, even life-transforming in another?”338 In the next section, I will try to find 
some answers to these questions. Before that, however, I would like to examine more closely the 
current bias against presentist reading in Sanskrit literary studies, and more broadly in premodern 
South Asian literary studies. 
This bias shows itself first in the scarcity of projects of original interpretation, and in the 
relative abundance of the history-of-reading studies mentioned above. When we consider the thrust 
of these studies, such a state of affairs is unsurprising: who would wish to fall victim to 
anachronism, overinterpretation, and naïveté when they have been exposed as mistakes in the work 
of past presentists? The project of working out a text’s implications for the present instead falls to 
religious readers, artists, activists, and popular writers.339 When on occasion scholars do venture 
original readings, these are usually presented as brief or informal reflections, whether in the pages 
of translators’ introductions, magazine articles, blog posts, or even spontaneous remarks at a 
conference.  
The bias against presentist reading in scholarly practice assumes the status of a critique in 
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the work of some Sanskritists who have explicitly reflected on method. Yigal Bronner describes 
how, in negatively judging works of śleṣa poetry (i.e., the poetry of paranomasia), Indologists were 
in fact unconsciously adopting aesthetic criteria that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe and 
perpetuating orientalist narratives about Indian literature and culture. In order to redress this 
orientalist legacy, Bronner argues, the study of śleṣa must begin by suspending personal judgments 
and asking why it was cherished by the people who wrote and read it.340 Likewise, in his 
introduction to the massive edited volume Literary Cultures in History, Sheldon Pollock outlines 
a “historical-anthropological” approach that attends not to what texts mean and do for us but what 
they meant and did for past readers, since “we cannot orient ourselves to a text without first 
grasping how its readers oriented themselves—unless we want to read it in a way that no South 
Asian reader ever did and abandon the attempt to know what literary culture meant in history.”341 
Pollock distinguishes his historical-anthropological approach from two others; first, from  
standard literary historiography—the situating of literary discourse in relation to 
other kinds of discourse at given historical moments; the elucidation of stylistic 
change; the contextual interpretation of literary works in service of an “appreciation 
of literature.”342 
 
Pollock’s gloss of literary historiography offers one way of characterizing the approach to literary 
study exemplified throughout the recent edited volume Innovations and Turning Points: Towards 
a History of Kāvya Literature, where many of the essays “segregate literature from the rest of 
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culture, society, and polity” in precisely the way Pollock wishes to avoid.343 Second, and more 
relevant in the present context, Pollock distinguishes his approach from “literary criticism as 
normally practiced in South Asian scholarship, as well as the naive subjectivism to which it so 
often falls victim”—that is, the kind of criticism Edward Freeman would have called “mere chatter 
about Shelley.”344 The alternatives in literary scholarship thus appear to be either less urgent or 
less rigorous than the historical reconstruction of reading practices. 
Of late, the field seems to be showing some signs of openness to projects of original 
interpretation. For example, in his more recent work tracing the outlines of a new critical philology, 
Pollock proposes a “philological practice that orients itself simultaneously along the three planes 
of a text’s existence: its moment of genesis; its reception over time; and its presence to my own 
subjectivity,” arguing that a hard-line historicism cannot simply ignore presentist readings 
(whether of our own time or of the past) but must reckon with their very existence. More generally, 
scholars have increasingly felt compelled to denounce fantasies of pure objectivity, remark on their 
own investments and limitations, and acknowledge an elusive quality of all texts that renders their 
interpretation inexhaustible. To give one example, here is how Richard Davis concludes his book 
on the Bhagavadgīta’s reception: 
In reviewing some of the ways that the Gita has lived over the centuries, we have 
seen how the work has spoken in multiple new ways to new audiences. As Bakhtin 
writes, “There is neither a first word nor a last work. ... Even meanings born in 
dialogues of the remotest past will never be grasped once and for all, for they will 
always be renewed in later dialogue.” We may be certain that this text will continue 
to reincarnate itself in new ways. Or as Vishnu puts it in the Gita Mahatmya, these 
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will all be part of his “highest home” in great time.345 
 
Yet, while the openness to interpretation evidenced in such remarks is certainly promising, it is 
hard to see what difference it has made in scholarly practice. As Rita Felski notes, “context has 
often been queried in literary studies, whether we think of the Russian formalist case for the 
autonomy of literary form or Gadamer’s insistence that the work of art is never just a historical 
artifact.…And yet these arguments have had little success in halting the tsunami of context-based 
criticism.”346 This is certainly true of Sanskrit literary studies, where passing acknowledgments of 
the literary work’s tendency to transcend the moment, or of our inability to do so, haven’t had 
much of an impact on the actual shape of scholarship. I share David Shulman and V. Narayana 
Rao’s sense that “the very notion that one might be able to characterize a poet’s oeuvre stylistically 
and thematically…seems exotic to the field.”347 Rather than offer original readings of literary 
works, scholars report those of others, much as I have done in this dissertation. We study past 
readers’ presentist interpretations while maintaining for ourselves an ironic distance from the 
messy business of reading. Is there not a way of writing about literature that would depart from 
this model of academic irony, but that wouldn’t at the same time fall into the traps of text-twisting 
and anachronism, or of “naïve reading, sentimental effusion, impressionistic judgment, fuzzy-
headed amateurism, and mere ‘chatter about Shelley’”?348 
 
                                                
345  Richard H. Davis, The Bhagavad Gita: A Biography (Princeton University Press, 2014), 210. 
 
346 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (University of Chicago Press, 2015), 152.  
 
347  Velcheru Narayana Rao and David Shulman, Srinatha: The Poet Who Made Gods and Kings 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2012), ix. 
 
348  Felski, The Limits of Critique, 151. 
 
	 172 
2. Poetry’s Afterthought: A Practice of Literary Criticism 
Despite the various and complex arguments which have been made against presentist 
reading, many of them seem to be grounded in one or two of the following assumptions: 
1) Presentist reading serves agendas; that is, it generally takes the form of 
repurposing or “using” texts. 
2) Presentist reading is naïve; that is, its obliviousness to historical context results 
in anachronism or some regrettable form of miscontextualism.  
 
It is true that agenda-driven and anachronistic readings aren’t just possible but common, as many 
of the history-of-reading studies listed above have convincingly shown. What I am less certain 
about, however, is whether all instances of presentist reading are reducible to these scenarios. I am 
reminded here of the remarkable moment in Abhijñānaśākuntala which for Kuntaka “shines out 
as a cause of delight to sensitive readers” (as we saw earlier), and which Abhinavagupta also 
remembers when formulating his phenomenology of reading.349 Recall that Act 5 of Kalidasa’s 
play opens with Dushyanta encountering a poem sung by Hamsapadika, a woman of his palace 
with whom he has been amorously involved: 
Bee! After kissing the mango-blossom  
like that, panting for its fresh honey,  
how could you now have forgotten it,  
resting at ease inside a mere lotus?350 
 
Here is how Dushyanta experiences the song: 
Dushyanta: (To himself) Hearing a song with such a meaning, though not far from 
anyone I love, why am I suddenly filled with sorrow? 
 
                                                
349  See Sheldon Pollock, A Rasa Reader: Classical Indian Aesthetics (Columbia University 
Press, 2016), 195.  
 
350 ahiṇavamahuloluvo tumaṃ taha paricumbia cūamaṅjarīm | 
kamalavasaimettaṇivvudo mahuara vimhario si ṇaṃ kahaṃ || A 5.1 || 
(Skt. chāyā: abhinavamadhulolupas tvam tathā paricumbya cūtamañjarīm | 
kamalavasatimātranirvṛto madhukara vismṛto ‘sy enām katham ||) 
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When even a happy man is disturbed  
on seeing visions beautiful, and hearing sweet words, 
perhaps then he remembers with his soul,  
though not his wakeful mind, affections  
of another birth rooted in the heart.351 
 
What Kalidasa shows us here is a mind confronting its powerlessness to fully know itself. 
Hamsapadika’s song affects Dushyanta viscerally, as a disturbance that he must suffer without 
being able to know directly. To account for this disturbance, he therefore infers the presence of 
latent memories from a past life, of “affections” or attachments that have stuck to his soul like 
residues. It is possible to read Dushyanta’s line of thought here as an exercise in deductive 
reasoning: (1) in order to be moved by this poem about a bee, one needs to have had a relatable 
experience; (2) I can’t remember any such experience in my life; (3) therefore, I must have had 
one in a past life. However, if we consider the events leading up to this moment, it seems more 
likely that the urgency driving Dushyanta’s thoughts is greater than the mere perplexity of a logical 
problem. Dushyanta has abandoned Shakuntala, whom he married and impregnated on a recent 
hunting expedition, and while his conscious mind has forgotten her thanks to sage Durvasa’s curse, 
the sorrow he feels points to a kind of unconscious remembering—a purely affective remembering, 
perhaps, devoid of any notional content. However we wish to understand the complex workings 
of Dushyanta’s memory, it is at least clear that he feels that this song about flowers and a bee 
somehow pertains to him personally (“why am I suddenly filled with sorrow?”), that it somehow 
implicates him, and he is deeply unsettled by this feeling. I thus read Dushyanta’s theory of past 
                                                
351 Rājā (ātmagatam): kiṃ nu khalu gītam evaṃvidhārtham ākarṇyeṣtajanavirahād ṛte’pi 
balād utkaṇṭhito’smi | athavā | 
ramyāṇi vīkṣya madhurāṁśca niśamya śabdān 
paryutsuko bhavati yatsukhito’pi jantuḥ | 
taccetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvaṃ 
bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni || 5.2 || 
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lives as prompted not by the philosopher’s compulsion to explain but by an accused man’s instinct 
to clear his conscience: the poem seems to call him guilty—of what, he does not know—and he 
tries to soothe himself by explaining away the guilt with a wild speculation (which, whatever its 
general interest, will turn out to be false in Dushyanta’s case).  
Dushyanta’s example reveals that when we encounter a text, we bring to it not only our 
conscious mind—the part of us that wills, makes decisions, draws up plans for the future, etc.—
but also latent parts of ourselves, such as memories we haven’t thought about for years, or desires 
that are too embarrassing or inconvenient to face directly. Because a text has the potential to access 
these latent parts of me, I cannot assume that I will be able to use it in the same way I use a tool—
that is, as a temporary extension of myself that will leave me fundamentally unaltered. For just as 
readers are capable of using texts to suit their agendas, texts are capable of influencing readers 
(and indeed of changing their agendas, as we will find in a later example). Or to put it in Pollock’s 
language, any text that is present “to my own subjectivity” has the potential to alter that subjectivity 
in unforeseeable ways. Even so, while Dushyanta can’t be said to have used Hamsapadika’s poem 
in any way, it is possible that he hasn’t understood it properly. Dushyanta may feel addressed by 
the poem, but couldn’t that feeling be misguided? And more generally, while any text we encounter 
by chance—that we overhear in a palace, receive as a gift, find on a class syllabus—may have 
significant consequences for our thinking, might these consequences not be accidental?  
The concern here is that once a poem falls on unintended ears, or under unintended eyes, 
it no longer speaks the way it originally did, and to understand it how it seems to speak could lead 
to error. Concerning Hamsapadika’s song, Kalidasa tells us close to nothing about the 
circumstances of its composition. It is possible Hamsapadika didn’t compose the poem with 
Dushyanta in mind (if she composed it at all), even possible that she wasn’t aware Dushyanta was 
	 175 
listening in as she practiced her music. In that case, any effect that the poem has had on Dushyanta 
would be unintended. Let us suppose, then, that Hamsapadika very much intended for the poem to 
fall on Dushyanta’s ears and communicate a veiled reproach. Dushyanta would then be right in 
speculating as he does with Madhavya, right before his private experience of inexplicable sorrow: 
 Madhavya: You understood, then, the meaning of the song’s words? 
Dushyanta: (Putting on a smile) This is someone I once made love to, and so she is 
harshly reproaching me for what I did with Queen Vasumati. My friend, Madhavya, 
let Hamsapadika be answered with this word from me, that she has reproached me 
well.352 
 
However, even supposing that Dushyanta is right about Hamsapadika’s intention here, we are left 
wondering about the pang of sorrow that archives, in however garbled a manner, his abandonment 
of Shakuntala. Hamsapadika couldn’t possibly have meant for the song to provoke that response, 
since at this point in the play the only person in the palace who has even heard of Shakuntala is 
Madhavya. And Dushyanta lied to him earlier about how much he loves Shakuntala in order to 
ensure that he wouldn’t blab: “How could I be interested in someone who knows nothing about 
love, who grew up with deer! My friend, don’t take seriously the words I spoke in jest.”353 All this 
suggests that the effect of Hamsapadika’s song on Dushyanta is completely unintended. What are 
we to make of this kind of unintended effect? 
Let us consider a situation where the circumstances of composition are better known. 
Suppose you received a love letter addressed to someone else and, failing to read the envelope, 
                                                
352 vidūṣakaḥ—kiṃ dāva gīdāe avagao akkharattho | 
(Skt. chāyā: vidūṣakaḥ—kiṃ tāvad gītyā avagato’kṣarārthaḥ |) 
rājā—(smitaṃ kṛtvā |) sakṛtkṛtapraṇayo’yaṃ janaḥ | tad asyā devīṃ vasumatīm antareṇa 
mahadupālambhanaṃ gato’smi | sakhe mādhavya madvacanād ucyatāṃ haṃsapadikā | nipuṇam 
upālabdhāḥ sma iti | (Kālidāsa, Abhijñānaśākuntala (The Abhijñānaśākuntalam of Kālidāsa), 160.) 
 
353 kva vayaṃ kva parokṣamanmatho mṛgaśāvaiḥ samam edhito janaḥ | 
parihāsavijalpitaṃ sakhe paramārthena na gṛhyatāṃ vacaḥ || A 2.18 || 
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took it to pertain to yourself. While reading the letter this way would certainly have major 
consequences for your thinking, your failure to grasp its original context would involve a serious 
error that may well lead to embarrassment and even heartbreak. Kalidasa imagines a comparable 
scenario in Act 2 of Vikramorvaśīya, where Urvashi authors the following love poem intended 
solely for the eyes of Pururavas: 
Lord, you do not know my mind;  
but if I really felt about you who love me  
the way you think I feel, 
 
then why do even breezes from heaven’s grove 
scorch my body as it lies  
on a bed of crushed coral flowers?354 
 
Soon after Pururavas reads the poem, the wind blows it into the hands of his queen Aushinari and 
her servant Nipunika. But when Nipunika reads it, her first instinct is not to understand the poem 
as though it were addressed to her personally (it is particularly difficult to do that here, since the 
title “lord” doesn’t suit her in either gender or rank) but rather to return the letter to its original 
circuit of communication: “I suspect this is a poetic composition of Urvashi addressed to our lord, 
and that it fell into our hands through the carelessness of noble Manavaka.”355 Nipunika’s instinct 
                                                
354 sāmia saṃbhāviā jaha ahaṃ tue amuṇiā | 
taha aṇurattassa jai ṇāma tuha uvari || VŪ 12 || 
ṇaṃ me luliapārijāasaaṇijjayammi honti | 
ṇandaṇavaṇavādāi accuṇhaā sarīrae || VŪ 13 | 
(Skt. chāyā: svāmin saṃbhāvitā yathāhaṃ tvayā’jñātā | 
tathānuraktasya yadi nāma tavopari || 
nanu mama lulitapārijātaśayanīye bhavanti | 
nandanavanavātā apy atyuṣṇakāḥ śarīrake ||) 
 
355 bhaṭṭāraṃ uddisia uvvasīe kavvabandhotti takkemi | ajjamāṇavaappamādeṇa amhāṇaṃ hatthaṃ 
gadotti | 
(Skt. chāyā: bhartāram uddiśyorvaśyāḥ kāvyabandha iti tarkayāmi | 
āryamāṇavakapramādenāvayor hastaṃ gata iti |) Kālidāsa, Vikramorvaśīya (The Vikramorvaśīyam 
of Kālidāsa), 126.) 
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to contextualize the poem serves her well, yielding the upsetting but crucial knowledge that 
Pururavas has been unfaithful to Aushinari. But let us say that just now, as I read this particular 
poem of Urvashi, I do feel addressed by it. I obviously don’t mean that I believe I am on the 
receiving end of a speech act; I am aware that the author is Urvashi, who is professing her love to 
Pururavas and not to me. I nonetheless find that the poem pertains directly to my experience of the 
world, not only giving language to earlier thoughts in me that have gone unregistered but also 
urging me to ask unprecedented questions of myself. Now, for instance, it reminds me how difficult 
it is to know another’s mind, and how acutely this difficulty is felt when we most desire that 
knowledge; I also find myself asking “What is it to feel cool wind as fire?”, a question that may 
stay with me and thus alter my attunement to the world. How do such ways of feeling addressed 
by the poem relate to the original circumstances in which Urvashi composed it? 
 In considering these poems of Hamsapadika and Urvashi, two distinct ways of meaning 
have come into view: a poem might be read as a coded statement intended to convey a message, 
and whose codedness may be attributed to any number of causes (playfulness, bashfulness, 
propriety, irony, convention, discretion, protection…); alternatively, a poem might be read, quite 
apart from any message-like content, as a provocation, where what is provoked in us could be any 
number of things (an untouched memory, an untapped desire, a strange thought, an uneasy 
sensation, an unprecedented question, a new style of narrating one’s life, a new way of imagining 
another’s mind…). In distinguishing a poem’s coding capacity from its provocative power, I am 
riffing on a similar distinction that Abhinavagupta makes, following Anandavardhana, between 
content-suggestion and affect-suggestion, or laukikadhvani (lit. “ordinary suggestion”) and 
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rasadhvani, concepts for two different ways that words can indirectly yield meaning.356 The 
distinguishing feature of content-suggestion, and what urges me to translate laukikadhvani this 
way, is that “it always replaces the direct expression of a meaning; a meaning, moreover, which 
has the form of a command, a prohibition, or a number of other such forms, and so is called 
content.”357 In other words, content-suggestion points to that aspect of poems or utterances that 
may be decoded, paraphrased, or translated into plainer language (the way Dushyanta paraphrases 
the bee-poem simply as “Hamsapadika is reproaching me,” or how we may translate Urvashi’s 
poem as “I love you too”). In distinction, “an affect (rasa)…is something that even in one’s dreams 
couldn’t be expressed directly and doesn’t involve ordinary speech.”358 If an affect doesn’t lend 
itself to direct expression, it isn’t because it is an ineffable content, something for which one tries 
to find the right word-representations but somehow always comes up short. Rather, the very idea 
of expressing affects is misguided—inconceivable “even in one’s dreams”—because affects have 
little to do with content, representation, coding, or messaging. The temptation to speak of 
expressing affects, even to ask whether affects might be expressed, understandably comes from 
the fact that an affect is generated by words (and in this sense alone constitutes an artha or 
“meaning”). But only that which counts as content may be expressed. An affect cannot be 
expressed by words; it can only be provoked, or induced, or suggested by them, through “the 
                                                
356 Abhinavagupta’s category of “ordinary suggestion” subsumes the more familiar categories of 
“ornament suggestion” (alaṅkāradhvani) and “content-suggestion” (vastudhvani) (or more 
precisely “mere content-suggestion,” vastumātradhvani). 
 
357 laukiko yaḥ svaśabdavācyatām kadācid adhiśete | sa ca vidhiniṣedhādyanekaprakāro 
vastuśabdena ucyate | (Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, Dhvanyālokalocana: Kerala 
Commentaries, 1:200, commentary on 1.4.) 
 
358 yas tu svapne’pi na svaśabdavācyo na laukikavyavahārapatitaḥ … rasaḥ | (Ibid., 1:200–201.) 
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kindling of previously deposited memory-traces (latent desire, for instance) that correspond with 
the stimulant factors and indicators” gathered in a poem—stimulant factors such as the breeze and 
flowers, and indicators of mental states such as tossing and turning.359  
 Like affect-suggestion, provocative power also refers to a poem’s ability to provoke 
instinctive responses in the mind that receives it. What distinguishes the concept I am proposing 
is that it accommodates a broader range of experiences of being provoked, not just that specific 
variety of literary sympathy known as rasa. Thus, for instance, when Stanley Cavell witnesses 
Lear’s perplexing rage at his daughter’s refusal to profess her love for him publicly—perplexing 
because at first it strikes Cavell as disproportionate to its cause—he is prompted to consider the 
power of shame, which often lies at the root of apparently inexplicable behavior, kicking up 
distractions when what we are ashamed of is in danger of being exposed. What Lear is ashamed 
of, and what Cordelia’s silence threatens to expose, is his terror of genuine love—that is, the kind 
of love that needs no public protestations: “for some spirits, to be loved knowing you cannot return 
that love, is the most radical of psychic tortures.”360 King Lear shows Cavell how our 
understanding of love is shaped by the ways we’ve learned to accept it or hide from it, and how 
the tension between the acceptance and avoidance of love can grow to be intolerable:  
Our lives begin by having to accept under the name of love whatever closeness is 
offered, and by then having to forgo its object. And the avoidance of a particular 
love, or the acceptance of it, will spread to every other; every love, in acceptance 
or rejection, is mirrored in every other. It is part of the miracle of the vision in King 
Lear to bring this before us, so that we do not care whether the kind of love between 
[Lear and Cordelia] is forbidden according to man’s lights. We care whether love 
is or is not altogether forbidden to man, whether we may not altogether be incapable 
of it, of admitting it into our world. We wonder whether we may always go mad 
                                                
359 -vibhāvānubhāvasamucitaprāgviniviṣṭaratyādivāsanānurāga- | (Ibid., 1:200–201.) 
 
360  Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 266. 
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between the equal efforts and terrors at once of rejecting and of accepting love. The 
soul torn between them, the body feels torn…, and the solution to this insoluble 
condition is to wish for the tearing apart of the world.361 
  
In a very different approach to King Lear, James Shapiro situates the play in England of the early 
seventeenth century, when “no domestic or foreign issue would more deeply preoccupy James and 
his subjects…than the Union of Scotland and England.”362 Understood in this context, 
Shakespeare’s play, which begins with Lear’s division of the kingdom among his three daughters 
and ends disastrously, appears to convey a political message (however challenging this may be to 
work out clearly), since “for Jacobeans inundated by pageantry, polemic, and gossip about the 
proposed Union, any play that turned to Britain’s distant past to explore the consequences of a 
divided kingdom would have been seen as part of [the Union debate].”363 What Kalidasa so clearly 
shows us in Abhijñānaśākuntala is that the approaches adopted by Cavell and Shapiro do not 
exclude one another, even from the same mind. For when Dushyanta tries to return Hamsapadika’s 
poem to its original context in his comment to Madhavya, he does so in order to apprehend its 
message correctly; however, that contextualization doesn’t stop him from being confronted 
immediately afterwards by the poem’s provocative power, from being shocked into inexplicable 
sorrow. The crucial difference between these approaches lies in the kind of knowledge each one 
yields. I take it that the stakes of contextualist reading require little clarification, given its 
prevalence as an approach; in what follows, I will therefore try to specify, with the help of writers 
from a range of traditions, the kind of knowledge yielded by attending to a work’s provocative 
                                                
361 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 276. 
 
362 James Shapiro, 1606: Shakespeare and the Year of Lear (Faber & Faber, 2016), 41. 
 




Even to see that such attention yields knowledge, not just a sensation of delight or shock 
which we wouldn’t be wrong but vague to call aesthetic pleasure, demands that we take seriously 
the experience of being provoked by a text. It asks that we momentarily suspend the image of 
reading as clue-finding, the idea that a text is a code and the reader a detective; it asks, as Marielle 
Macé puts it, that we withdraw “from semiotic analyses (which arose following Umberto Eco’s 
Lector in fabula) and from the narratological vision of reading,” since “both of these describe the 
reader’s task as a deciphering process, …as a question of filling in blanks and omissions in the 
text, a performance staged inside a communication structure.”365 We should temporarily weaken 
this powerful image of reading not because it is objectionable in itself—indeed, we found 
admirable examples of it in parts of Aurobindo’s reading of Kalidasa—but lest, on account of it, 
we pass over (or at best acknowledge while failing to understand fully) the range of experiences 
of reading that don’t occur as the reflective act of decoding. In his improvised theory of aesthetic 
experience, Dushyanta offers one explanation for why such experiences are particularly difficult 
to grasp: “perhaps [the reader] remembers with his soul (cetas), though not his wakeful mind, 
affections of another birth rooted in the heart.” I wish to take this speculation as my starting-point 
for trying to understand what it is to encounter a work’s provocative power. 
                                                
364 The reason I feel justified in adopting Kalidasa as my theorist here is that Dushyanta, 
Nipunika, and Shapiro all share the instinct to contextualize. It is true that Shapiro does not boil 
King Lear down to an unambiguous message like the other two readers; if that difference appears 
significant, the scene I examine below from Bhavabhuti’s Uttararāmacarita may offer a more 
satisfying example to think with. 
 
365  Marielle Macé, “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being,” trans. Marlon Jones, New Literary 
History 44, no. 2 (August 8, 2013): 224. For an in-depth analysis of the gripping image of critic-
as-detective, see chapter 3, “An Inspector Calls,” in Felski, The Limits of Critique. 
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On Dushyanta’s account, aesthetic experience is inherently stubborn to analysis because it 
involves an unconscious domain of thinking called cetas (very loosely translated above as “soul”), 
whose workings are by definition opaque to reflection and which for Abhinavagupta is populated 
by memory-traces (vāsanās). As we saw in the previous chapter, Aurobindo is also interested in 
this unconscious region of the mind, calling it by the cognate word citta: 
The reservoir of past mental impressions, the citta or storehouse of memory, which 
must be distinguished from the specific act of memory, is the foundation on which 
all the other layers stand. All experience lies within us as passive or potential 
memory; active memory selects and takes what it requires from that storehouse. 
But the active memory is like a man searching among a great mass of locked-up 
material: sometimes he cannot find what he wants; often in his rapid search he 
stumbles across many things for which he has no immediate need; often too he 
blunders and thinks he has found the real thing when it is something else, irrelevant 
if not valueless, on which he has laid his hand.366 
 
I am inclined to read this passage as a kind of unintended gloss on Dushyanta’s words, and to 
identify Dushyanta—or more precisely his conscious or “wakeful” self—with the man who 
searches in vain. We could then redescribe his situation in terms of the passage as follows: 
Dushyanta has been alerted by the poem to an unfamiliar presence in his passive memory, but 
when he searches for it (perhaps asking himself, did I ever abandon someone I loved?), he ends 
up fumbling around in a storehouse of memories, most of which are locked away. This disorienting 
experience leads him to surmise (at this point going beyond Aurobindo’s text) that these locked-
away memories must have gotten there in a past life, and that while he cannot fully know them, he 
can sometimes feel their presence when they vibrate at the prompting of artworks like 
Hamsapadika’s poem.  
I find that the link which Dushyanta draws between literature and the unconscious is 
                                                
366 Sri Aurobindo, Early Cultural Writings, 386. 
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usefully developed in Macé’s essay “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being.” While Macé doesn’t 
write of past lives, she does share Dushyanta’s general presumption of a complex unconscious, 
conceiving of it broadly as an assemblage of latent elements that silently structure daily life: 
Our mental and social life is indeed made up of the “traces” and “intentions” of 
form, of effective memories and desires, which exert their plastic force (modifying 
its object without breaking it) on the situations and apparatuses of daily life, 
modulating our living configurations, our forms of perception and attention, or our 
entire vision of the world.367 
 
Each person’s unique style of entering everyday situations—the way one’s mind immediately 
picks out certain elements in a perceptual field while allowing others to fall away, responds well 
or poorly to a particular kind of humor, determines its threshold of fear for striking up conversation 
with a stranger, and so on—is conditioned prior to any willful decision-making by an underlying 
field of memories and desires, which are “effective” because, once activated, they have the 
potential to alter that style (imagine, for instance, how being reminded for the first time of a 
pleasant encounter that took place several years ago might suddenly boost one’s courage in a social 
situation today). All this rich subterranean life may come alive as we encounter various styles of 
perceiving, feeling, and acting recorded in a literary work. For Macé, “reading thus represents an 
opportunity to test out ways of being, attitudes, rhythms through which books affect, affirm, or 
disorient readers along with their gestures and tendencies, their ways of perceiving and paying 
attention.”368 It may comfort or upset me to identify with a speaker who feels the sadness I 
remember feeling last year, or a sadness I don’t remember feeling but somehow find myself taking 
on; a narrator’s mode of perception in describing a mountain may stun me as it makes available a 
                                                
367 Macé, “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being,” 217.  
 
368 Ibid., 224.  
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new style of noticing the world; faced with a character’s cruelty I may feel disturbed, struggling 
to distinguish myself from what I see. These are among the many possible ways of being provoked 
by a work; “the crucial point to understand is the way that readers from different points of origin 
come to take texts as samples of existence, using them as real lines of movement in life.”369 We 
see here how Macé shares Dushyanta’s intuition about a special rapport that literature has with the 
unconscious; however, whereas Dushyanta merely stumbles upon this intuition in a chance 
encounter, Macé is interested in how readers use it to their advantage, reading texts in order to 
access parts of themselves that are not directly available.  
It is precisely this capacity of texts to serve as “real lines of movement” that Ralph Waldo 
Emerson seizes on for its radical disruptive potential, valuing literature for the resources it offers 
for recomposing the present: “The use of literature is to afford us a platform whence we may 
command a view of our present life, a purchase by which we may move it.” For Emerson, moving 
life is an immensely difficult task because our everyday existence is trapped in a prison of habits, 
whose grip on us is strongest when we most think we are free. Even when we consciously try, we 
feel powerless to bring about any real transformation of life from within it: 
In my daily work I incline to repeat my old steps, and do not believe in remedial 
force, in the power of change and reform. But some Petrarch or Ariosto, filled with 
the new wine of his imagination, writes me an ode or a brisk romance, full of daring 
thought and action. He smites and arouses me with his shrill tones, breaks up my 
whole chain of habits, and I open my eye on my own possibilities.370 
 
In this passage, poems are characterized neither as vessels containing universal truths that must be 
experienced to be fully understood nor as aesthetic pieces to be consumed for restful pleasure. 
                                                
369 Ibid., 217. 
 
370  Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” in Essays and Lectures (Library of America, 1983), 409. 
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Rather, they present series of “arousing” provocations which can destroy the reader’s current 
habits of mind at the same time as they create a new sense of what is possible. In Bhavabhuti’s 
Mālatīmādhava (“Malati and Madhava”), the Buddhist nun Kamandaki (who is perhaps another 
reader of Kalidasa) seems to share this view of literature as she works behind the scenes to alter 
the lives of her dear ones. When Lavangika asks for help on behalf of her friend Malati, who has 
been betrothed by her father to the king’s minister instead of the man she loves, here is how 
Kamandaki responds: 
Simple girl, what do you suppose I can do about it? Fathers and fate are all-powerful 
in the lives of young women. And what the storytellers say, that Vishvamitra’s 
daughter Shakuntala loved Dushyanta, just as the nymph Urvashi loved Pururavas, 
and that Vasavadatta, who had been betrothed by her father to King Sanjaya, gave 
herself to Udayana—I could go on—all that seems terribly rash, and I certainly 
don’t endorse doing what they did.371   
 
In the soliloquy that concludes Act 2, Kamandaki reveals her intention behind listing these famous 
stories of rebellious love: “by spewing out those tales of old, I have indicated the path she must 
take.”372 Kamandaki shows here an intuitive grasp of the provocative potential of stories, even 
believing it will remain unblunted by her feigned disapproval of the ones she mentions. I 
nonetheless imagine Kamandaki to wait a few seconds before saying “all that seems terribly rash,” 
allowing a pause for Malati’s contemplation of the “daring thought and action” of Vasavadatta to 
start taking effect and transforming her sense of the possible. 
This idea of literature’s provocative power, which I have so far been trying to develop 
                                                
371 ayi sarale kim atra mayā bhagavatyā śakyam | prabhavati prāyaḥ kumārīṇāṃ janayitā daivaṃ 
ca | yac ca kila kauśikī śakuntalā duṣyantam apsarā urvaśī purūravasam cakama ityākhyānavida 
ācakṣate vāsavadattā ca saṃjayāya rājñe pitrā dattam ātmānam udayanāya prāyacchad ityādi tad 
api sāhasābhāsam ity anupadeṣṭavya evāyam arthaḥ | (Bhavabhūti, Mālatīmādhava 
(Bhavabhūti’s Mālatīmādhava with the Commentary of Jagaddhara), ed. M. R. Kale (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), 56–57.) 
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along different lines through the writings of Kalidasa, Abhinavagupta, Macé, Emerson, and 
Bhavabhuti, has in fact already turned up in the experiences of reading examined in this 
dissertation. I have at no point wanted to suggest that Kalidasa was the greatest influence in the 
thinking of Kuntaka, Vedantadesika, or Aurobindo, nor that these readers were free of any 
agendas; indeed, in each reader’s time, the very name of Kalidasa had a cultural prominence that 
could have made using his works somehow advantageous, whether for establishing a theory of 
poetry, popularizing a religious view, or consolidating a national identity. What I have rather been 
arguing is that the more common arguments encountered in reception studies—that later readers 
of texts read meanings into them, or strategically used their charisma in the service of some 
cause—have only a limited explanatory power in the cases of reading I have examined. This 
limitation is particularly evident when we consider how each reader responds to Kalidasa’s 
descriptive style, encountering it as a provocation that opens up a new way of perceiving. Kuntaka 
remarks on it directly, comparing Kalidasa’s fine-grained and delighted attention to things to that 
of honey-crazed bees hovering close to flowers; we gather its influence on Vedantadesika from 
the Kalidasan images and expressions scattered throughout his poetry, which I argued should be 
understood as part of Vedantadesika’s cultivation of a practice of intense visualization; and 
Aurobindo is explicit about its effect on readers: “[Kalidasa’s] creations in fact live in a peculiar 
light…. Our vision is affected by the recognition of something concealed by the sunbeams & yet 
the cause of the sunbeams; but it is plain human sunlight we see always.”373 (The mode of 
perception that generates Kalidasa’s style also strikes Thoreau, whose recollection of pollen 
dropping from the pitch-pines on Walden Pond in early May mingles in the passive memory with 
                                                
373 Sri Aurobindo, Kalidasa: Essays and Translations, 66. 
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a Kalidasan image: “Even in Calidas’ drama of Sacontala, we read of ‘rills dyed yellow with the 
golden dust of the lotus.’”374) 
How each reader encounters Kalidasa’s characters is slightly more challenging to 
understand, but also more illuminating on the difference that a concept like provocative power 
could make in our understanding of a text’s reception. When Kuntaka reads of a king who gives 
more of his wealth than was requested, he finds a model for ideal conduct; when Vedantadesika 
reads of a man imagining his distant beloved in vivid detail, he sees an exercise of the imagination 
which closely resembles what is involved in devotional meditation; when Aurobindo reads of a 
mortal trying to bring to earth the goddess with whom he has fallen in love, he finds a figure for 
the political revolutionary. There is a temptation to regard such instances of reading (especially 
the last two) with skepticism, as examples of readers finding in texts the meanings they want to 
see, even meanings which aren’t already there. For if Kalidasa showed little interest in devotional 
meditation, and couldn’t possibly have known about revolutionary politics, how could his poetry 
have anything to say on those topics? Such a line of thinking seems to presume that meaning 
inheres in a text like content in a container, or like treasure in a locked-up chest. On this 
understanding, a multiplicity of meanings will always be met somewhat uneasily, at worst 
considered an outcome to be avoided, at best a result to be tolerated if only for its empirical 
inevitability. However, if we understand the phenomenon of meaning in view of a work’s 
provocative power—that is, if we attend to the meaning which isn’t located in a text but born of a 
text’s encounter with the mind—unintended and multiple meanings would no longer signal a lack 
of rigor or interpretive foul play. As Martin Heidegger usefully puts it in a different context, 
                                                




A dialogue of Plato…can be interpreted in totally different spheres and respects, 
according to totally different implications and problematics. This multiplicity of 
possible interpretations does not discredit the strictness of the thought content. …A 
dialogue of Plato is inexhaustible—not only for posterity and the changing forms 
of comprehension to which posterity gives rise; it is inexhaustible of itself, by its 
nature.375 
 
A local question or set of questions (e.g., “How should one act?” “How shall I meditate on god?” 
“What is it to be a revolutionary?” or “Why can words written centuries ago still be meaningful 
today?”) may hollow out the specific receptivity of a reader’s mind, the narrow groove along which 
any work will be constrained to enter it; but a poem by Kalidasa will fill that groove in its own 
surprising way, yielding an answering thought that it alone could have provoked. The potential of 
a text to generate multiple meanings should thus be attributed not only to the shifting empirical 
circumstances in which it is read but also to its very nature. 
Even when a work of literature is understood this way—as a provocation rather than as a 
univocal bearer of content—it is still possible to speak of intended meanings, which would no 
longer refer to messages restored to their original circuits of communication but to intended effects. 
We saw how Kamandaki intends for the stories of Shakuntala, Urvashi, and Vasavadatta to have 
a specific influence on Malati’s sense of the possible, just as Kuntaka wishes that Kalidasa’s 
depictions of ideal conduct will help shape the moral impulses of princes and courtiers. Bhavabhuti 
imagines a more elaborate instance of this kind of intention in Act 7 of Uttararāmacarita (“Rama’s 
Last Act”), where he shows us a play by Valmiki being performed for Rama. When Rama learns 
from it what has happened to Sita after he banished her, he is so overwhelmed by guilt and grief 
that he faints, prompting Lakshmana to call out, “Lord Valmiki, help! Help! Is this the meaning 
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(artha) of your poem?”376 It is possible to read this line as though it were spoken by Bhavabhuti 
through the mouth of Lakshmana. Reading it this way, Pollock sees it as one of several instances 
in the play where Bhavabhuti interrupts the audience’s suspension of disbelief, directing their 
attention away from the lives of characters and towards his own activity as a poet (which in this 
case consists in rewriting the ending of the real Valmiki’s Rāmāyaṇa).377 While I acknowledge the 
level of meaning to which such a reading is attuned, for now I would like simply to read the line 
in its immediate fictional context, taking it as the genuine expression of Lakshmana’s mind. The 
question “Is this the meaning of your poem?” would then be addressed to Valmiki in panic over 
Rama’s fainting, and would mean as much as “Is this the intention (artha) of your poem?” or more 
explicitly “Is fainting the effect you intended your poem to have on Rama?” In place of an answer, 
Valmiki initiates a sequence of events culminating in the revival of Rama by Sita’s touch, which I 
read as his implicit response to Lakshmana: No; what I ultimately intended to bring about with my 
poem was their reunion. Here Bhavabhuti would seem to suggest that Valmiki’s play does have a 
specific intended meaning, which could be recovered by interviewing the author or paying close 
attention to the original performance context. 
But since, as we learn from Lakshmana, Valmiki has invited all beings in the universe to 
the event, it is possible to imagine another member in the audience, perhaps one of the citizens of 
                                                
376 bhagavan vālmīke, paritrāyasva, paritrāyasva | eṣa kiṃ te kāvyārthaḥ | (Bhavabhūti, 
Uttararāmacarita (The Uttararāmacarita of Bhavabhūti), ed. M. R. Kale (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1934), 173.) 
 
377 Bhavabhūti, Uttararāmacarita (Rama’s Last Act), trans. Sheldon Pollock (NYU Press and the 
JCC Foundation, 2007), 41.  
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Ayodhya who was involved in spreading rumors about Sita’s unfaithfulness.378 Let us say that on 
seeing depicted the consequences of Rama’s cruelty, this citizen doesn’t just feel compunction for 
his own role in her banishment but starts seeing Rama, once spotless in his eyes, as a coward. What 
could we conclude about his experience of the play? Most likely Valmiki didn’t intend this effect, 
at least not in the way he intended for the play to incline Rama to take Sita back. At the same time, 
supposing that this citizen of Ayodhya has heard the same words of the play that Rama has heard, 
and seen the same gestures and expressions, we couldn’t quite say that his response is grounded in 
error. For what Valmiki’s play has imparted more than true or false information is a sense of life; 
or more accurately, it has provoked in the unintended viewer an altered sense of life. It is always 
a potential of a literary work to provoke the mind that receives it; even for the same reader, how a 
work does this will vary depending on when it is taken up. That is one reason why the meaning of 
a literary work is inexhaustible: it makes at least as many provocations as the number of times it 
is read. (As an instance of aesthetic experience, Rama’s witnessing the dramatization of his own 
story may seem more exceptional than exemplary, since identifying with oneself isn’t as drastic a 
movement of the imagination as identifying with a genuinely fictional character. However, I take 
Bhavabhuti to be showing us an extreme version of the experience of identification. For when 
Dushyanta hears of the treacherous bee, as perhaps when Claudius sees Lucianus in The Murder 
of Gonzago, he is overwhelmed by the same suspicion that occurs to Rama: Is that really how I 
behaved?) 
Poets themselves often anticipate, or in any case desire, that unintended readers will 
encounter their works. This seems true of Bhavabhuti, whom the director in Mālatīmādhava 
                                                
378 Opening of Act 7: “By his power, Valmiki has assembled the whole group of beings.” 
<vālmikinā…bhūtagrāmaḥ svaprabhāveṇa sannidhāpitaḥ |> Bhavabhūti, Uttararāmacarita (The 
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famously quotes as saying the following: 
Those who give my work a bad reputation 
know something, I am sure. This labor is not for them.  
There will be born, or already exists, one who shares my nature; 
for time is endless and the earth is wide.379 
 
In such statements, of which one could find numerous examples, writers show an awareness that 
their words may provoke minds they couldn’t possibly have known or even imagined. The 
experience of feeling addressed by the words of an earlier poet would be one way to arrive at this 
intuition. Emerson goes so far as to suggest that the farther a work travels from its context, the 
greater its power to denaturalize the present: 
Literature is a point outside of our hodiernal circle through which a new one may 
be described.…We fill ourselves with ancient learning, install ourselves the best 
we can in Greek, in Punic, in Roman houses, only that we may wiselier see French, 
English and American houses and modes of living.380 
 
Here again Emerson characterizes literature not as a theorist or critic but from the perspective of 
someone trying to think differently. The point of reading is not to produce more writing about 
literature—not to theorize the system of literature, write instructions for appreciating famous 
works, or get involved in debates on how best to understand this or that poem—but to be shocked 
into a different way of living. For Emerson, in other words, the prime result of reading will have 
been, not a new interpretation of a work, but a new interpretation of life. 
And yet, perhaps counterintuitively, Emerson’s remark suggests one idea of what a 
contemporary practice of literary criticism could be; namely, the articulation of how it is one has 
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utpatsyate’sti mama kopi samānadharmā 
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380 Emerson, “Circles,” in Essays and Lectures, 408–9. 
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been shocked—or to put it in Emerson’s language, a transcription of the “view of our present life” 
from the platform afforded by literature—in the hope that this articulation releases new 
possibilities into thinking and thus new ways of composing the present. Such a criticism would 
not take the form of judgment on a work; that is, it wouldn’t primarily be interested in determining 
by whatever standard how well a work has been constructed, whether it succeeds in delivering 
aesthetic pleasure, or whether it once succeeded in delivering such pleasure to an original audience. 
Nor would it see literature as merely providing vivid illustrations of philosophical ideas, though it 
might put literary writers in conversation with philosophers (Cavell, for instance, wishes to deny 
the idea that the two essays on literature in his book Must We Mean What We Say?, those on King 
Lear and Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, are “at best applications of philosophy, while the remainder 
are [at least closer to being] straight philosophy”).381 What this kind of criticism would instead 
seek to do is highlight the aspects of literary works which today are most thought-provoking, and 
elaborate the specific ways that these aspects call our attention to life and challenge habitual 
patterns of thinking.382 
In describing the theoretical basis and practice of an alternative model for writing about 
Sanskrit literature, what I have in effect tried to do is outline an approach to criticism that would 
regard Sanskrit literary texts not just as aesthetic objects or cultural artifacts but as forms of 
thinking. I am not arguing, however, that formal and historical considerations have no place in 
                                                
381 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, xxx.  
 
382 This in fact seems to be an idea which more or less explicitly guides the work of many 
modern practitioners of literary criticism, including Walter Benjamin, Stanley Cavell, and 
Barbara Cassin, to name just three. However different these readers of literature are from each 
other (different in style, in the traditions and periods of writing they work on, in the questions 
that generate their philosophies), their approaches to criticism all take literary works primarily as 
provocations to thought. See Benjamin, Walter Benjamin; Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?; 
Barbara Cassin, Nostalgia: When Are We Ever at Home? (Fordham University Press, 2016). 
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such an approach, since often it is with the help of such considerations that the provocative power 
of a work can be fully grasped. For example, the severity of Durvasa’s rage in Abhijñānaśākuntala 
can be gauged only by understanding the codes of hospitality in the world of the poem, just as it 
is only through understanding the genre conventions and history of messenger-poetry that we can 
take in the full measure of Vedantadesika’s thinking in Haṃsasandeśa. Nor do I wish to argue that 
attending to a work’s provocative power is more important than understanding how a work 
operates at a formal level, or reconstructing how it once was read; indeed, the chapters of this 
dissertation were attempts at reconstructing how Kalidasa was read at different moments in history. 
A work of literature can tell us many things, and I have tried to bring one of these to light. My 
sense is that if we try reading Kalidasa a little differently than we are accustomed, we may find 
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